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The political contention that considers forests to be mere economic assets to achieve state welfare has 
slowly changed into a more conservative view since the Ninth World Forestry Congress in Mexico in 
1985 rightly acknowledged that there has been severe tropical forest destruction and environmental 
deterioration around the globe. Several international agreements to address specific forestry issues 
have been established and new forms of forest governance have been formed, and an alliance of 
domestic and international actors have to implement these, mostly in forest-rich countries.. These 
attempts have sometimes met with difficulty, due to the domestic forest-related bureaucracies’ own 
programmes and goals. Here, various interests in domestic politics compete for international support, 
resulting in the acceptance, rejection of, or changes to, those forest governances. Consequently, 
international forest governance may be adopted in a country in a form that is different from its original 
concept. To gain more insight into forest politics as carried out by bureaucracies, and its consequences 
for forest policy processes and forest resources, this dissertation examines the question of how forest-
relevant bureaucracies respond to new international forest governance. 
This framework contributes to a description of the bureaucratic processes involved in the 
implementation of selected international forest governances. For this purpose this framework will be 
structured as follows: 
1. Theoretical framework on bureaucratic politics, domestic politics in response to international 
forest regimes, theory of power, and the concept of absolute and relative power gains; 
2. Methodological framework for data collection and analysis of international forest issues relevant 
in Indonesia, the role of influential actors in specific cases, bureaucracies respond to forest policy 
introduced by other actors, and power dynamics of actors involved; and 
3. Results, highlighting the selection of international forest governance forms by domestic 
bureaucracies, the effort bureaucracies make to restore their authority over forests, the 
international influence on forest politics, the forming of super bureaucracy and its suspension, and 
symbolic forest policy. 
The origin of this framework consists of five articles, each of which addresses specific questions in 
selected study cases. The publications are listed below, together with a brief description. 
Article 1: Wibowo, A., & Giessen, L. (2015). Actor positions on primary and secondary international 
forest-related issues relevant in Indonesia. Journal of Sustainable Development, 8(3):10-27. This 
article identifies timber legality, climate change (including the REDD initiative) oil palm plantation 
and its environmental aspects, harmonisation of wood and forest certification schemes, land use 
change, forest and species conservation, and deforestation and decentralized forest governance as the 
seven most relevant forest issues in Indonesia. 
Article 2: Wibowo, A., & Giessen, L. (2015). Absolute and relative power gains among state agencies 
in forest-related land use politics: The Ministry of Forestry and its competitors in the REDD+ 
Programme and the One Map Policy in Indonesia. Land Use Policy, 49, 131-141. It describes how the 
two forest-related policies involving many state agencies do not work well since there is no strong 
leading agency responsible for them. 
Article 3: Wibowo, A., Sahide, M.A.K, & Giessen, L. (2015). From voluntary private to mandatory 
state governance in Indonesian forest certification: Reclaiming authority and legitimacy by 
bureaucracies. Article submitted to Global Environmental Change. This describes the strategy of the 
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Ministry of Forestry of increasing its influence over stakeholders along the value chain of domestic 
timber business, by utilising its authority in Indonesia-EU FLEGT-VPA negotiation. 
Article 4: Pratiwi, S., Wibowo, A., & Giessen, L. (2015). Third-party certification of forest 
management in Indonesia: Analysing stakeholders’ recognition and preferences. Journal Manajemen 
Hutan Tropika [Journal of Tropical Forest Management], 21(2), 65–75. This unveils certification 
schemes preferred by industries and the criteria they use in selecting such schemes. 
Article 5: Wibowo, A., Pratiwi, S., & Giessen, L. (2015). Comparing forest certification and timber 
legality systems in Indonesia: Complementary or competitive? Environmental, Development and 
Sustainability, under revision. This compares two international and one national forest certification 
scheme with the timber legality verification system in Indonesia that uses the Forest Certification 
Assessment Guide (FCAG), and concludes that those schemes are in competition and that each of 
them tries to delegitimise the others.  
These five publications answer the central question of how forest-relevant bureaucracies respond to 
new international forest governance. To address this central question, four questions that are more 
specific are formulated, namely:  
(i) What policy instruments are international forest governances trying to apply to domestic forest 
policy?;  
(ii) Who are the important domestic and non-domestic actors involved in the policy processes 
concerning specific forest issues?;  
(iii) How do the main forest-related bureaucracies respond to forest policy introduced by other 
bureaucracies?; and  
(iv) What are political factors influence the acceptance of new forest-related policies?. 
We used non-participant observations, expert interviews, and content analyses of policy documents in 
most of our works. Specifically, online survey was used to identify stakeholders’ perception on forest 
certification schemes working in Indonesia and Forest Certification Assessment Guide (FCAG) to 
compare the standard of forest sustainability certification and timber legality verification. We applied 
theory of actor-centred power, theory of power, concept of absolute and relative power gains, and 
domestic response to foreign agenda in all publications. 
The results show that, first, forest-related bureaucracies are more responsive to issues with high 
economic benefit, and pay less attention to those with low economic benefit. They are also more 
involved with topics that become issues of international concern, such as timber legality, climate 
change and REDD+, and oil palm plantation and its environmental aspects. Second, domestic 
bureaucracies in charge of economic tasks are more involved in the forestry business than those in 
charge of environmental tasks. In addition to the Ministry of Forestry, the Ministry of Trade and the 
Ministry of Industry are the two ministries most involved in domestic forest governance. Other state 
agencies that influence domestic forest policy are UKP4 (Presidential Delivery Unit for Development 
Monitoring and Oversight, Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian 
Pembangunan), REDD+ Agency, BAPPENAS (National Development Planning Agency, Badan 
Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional), DNPI (National Council on Climate Change, Dewan Nasional 
Perubahan Iklim). Third, domestic bureaucracies form alliances with central power in the states (the 
president) to be involved in or/and to shape domestic forest policies, and to cooperate with 
international actors to gain public legitimacy for the way in which they run their programmes. Fourth, 
the three main cases examined in this dissertation, namely REDD+, one map policy and forest 
certification, are likely to be symbolic only. Symbolic policy is defined as sense of a non-policy, 
which formulates goals and instruments but is not assigned with clear responsibilities in terms of 
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implementing agencies, sufficient staff, budget resources and necessary information. This conclusion 
is based on the fact that REDD+ policy, as well as timber legality verification, are based on weak legal 
constructions, have no single and strong leading agency responsible for ensuring continuity, and have 
only weak long-term agendas with no stand-alone budgets or discrete staff. Weak legal construction 
means that the policy can be changed, postponed or discontinued by other powerful actors, and having 
no leading agency means that there is an absence of an actor with the power to direct and implement 
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1. Introduction: Research Background and Guiding Questions 
 
 
The political contention that considers forests to be mere economic assets to achieve state welfare has 
slowly changed into a more conservative view since the Ninth World Forestry Congress in Mexico in 
1985 rightly acknowledged that there has been severe tropical forest destruction and environmental 
deterioration around the globe. Since then, several international agreements to address specific forestry 
issues have been drafted and established as solid forms of forest governance (Humphreys, 2006). 
According to the Global Forest Expert Panel/GFEP (Glück et al., 2010), the core component of the 
international forest governance arrangements is “international multilateral intergovernmental treaties 
and agreements which directly address forests, either focusing on sustainable forest management or 
more specific goals, such as biodiversity conservation or climate change mitigation; and have 
achieved, or have the potential to achieve, significant effects on forests.” The GFEP further identified 
eight policy instruments as core components of the international forest regime complex, namely (i) 
Non-legally binding instruments on all types of forests (NLBI), (ii) the International Tropical Timber 
Agreement (ITTA), (iii) forest certification schemes, (iv) world trade agreements (WTAs), (v) forest 
law enforcement, governance and trade (FLEGT), (vi) the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 
(vii) the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 
and (viii) the climate change regime (Glück et al., 2010). 
International actors implemented those forms of international forest governance and their policy 
instruments in certain states. These included nation-state actors, intergovernmental organisations, 
treaty secretariats, multilateral financial institutions, regional and other multilateral organisations, 
nongovernmental organisations, and business and industry (Chasek et al., 2013), with the later 
addition of international bureaucracies and science networks (Biermann and Pattberg, 2012). 
However, the efforts of those actors to influence domestic forest policy faced many challenges. 
Lindstad and Solberg (2010) studied these challenges by determining the effect of international policy 
processes on forest protection in Norway using Underdal’s approach (2002). This approach requires 
three points of reference as a basis from which to measure influence, namely, the initial situation, a 
condition without a regime; the actual situation, an endpoint at which a regime performs within a 
certain time; and the agreement’s objective, the point where a regime’s performance is intended to be. 
They then calculated an effectiveness index using a formula proposed by the Oslo-Potsdam Solution 
(Helm and Sprinz, 2000), and found that a numerical value such as the effectiveness index increased 
confusion instead of providing enlightenment. In addition, this index could not separate the many 
influences resulting from national and international factors and, in addition, it could not provide clear 
figures for the cause-effect relationship and was only able to reflect a limited number of regimes in a 
regime complex. 
Bernstein and Cashore (2012) argue that forest regime effectiveness is too complicated to measure, 
since regimes have multiple channels of influence and represent a complex (not a one-way) interaction 
between global and domestic politics. They then propose a shift in focus of study, from effectiveness to 
influence, and they develop four pathways of influence, specifically: international rules; international 
norms and discourse; markets; and direct access to domestic policy-making processes (Bernstein and 
Cashore, 2000, 2012). Wilson (2003) used the framework of four pathways later on to track 
transnational influence on the conservation of boreal ecosystems in Canada, and he found that each of 
them “works” in various degrees and reckoned that it seems to be used continuously. Since then there 






countries, for example: the influence of international actors in changing Brazil’s position on climate 
change (Kasa, 2013), how the business sector led to the institutionalisation of unsustainable timber 
practices in Russia (Ulybina and Fennell, 2013), how multilevel governance motivated and facilitated 
knowledge transfer and learning in climate change negotiations (Rietig, 2014), how third-party 
organisations influence timber regulation in Sweden (Johansson and Keskitalo, 2014), the relevance of 
global and regional land use regimes in Indonesia (Sahide et al., 2015a), and the mapping of 
international actors’ positions in domestic forest-related issues in Bangladesh (Rahman and Giessen, 
2014), Argentina (Burns and Giessen, 2014) and Indonesia (Wibowo and Giessen, 2015a).  
Although one may know a specific path has been used in influencing domestic forest policy, the ways 
in which international forest actors and governance work at a domestic level are unclear, as are the 
ways in which local bureaucracies respond to ideas until they are finally implemented, rejected or 
changed. In addition, an international forest policy instrument may be in intense competition with 
others. At this point, it is important to study in depth how local bureaucracies interact and form 
coalitions in response to international forest governance and its policy instruments, and what the 
results of this response are.  
This dissertation seeks to explain this by using the example of Indonesia. Indonesia was selected as a 
country for study for three reasons. First, as a developing country, it is very influenced by 
international actors in terms of gaining financial support from foreign countries and international 
funding resources. Second, deforestation resulting from the development of forest plantations for pulp, 
paper and palm oil generates market resistance to those products, which influences the government’s 
other decisions pertaining to forests. Third, the forestry sector is facing heavy pressure from 
agricultural, mining and plantation sectors, as local governments seek sources of income to fund their 
local development by converting forests to other more marketable sectors, resulting in intense 
competition among new and old state agencies. The REED+, One Map, and forest certification politics 
are selected as case studies for further analysis since the three cases have been identified as the most 
relevant forest issues in Indonesia (Wibowo and Giessen, 2015a). For this examination, this 
dissertation proposes its guiding question to be:    
How do forest-relevant bureaucracies respond to new international forest governance? 
In order to answer this main question, we suggest four other specific questions, namely: 
 What policy instruments of international forest governance are trying to influence forest domestic 
policy? 
 Who are the important domestic, non-domestic, and international actors involved in the policy 
process that pertain to specific forest issues?  
 How do the main forest-related bureaucracies respond to forest policy introduced by other actors?  
 What are political factors that influence the success of new forest-related policy? 
 
These specific questions will be answered in a cumulative PhD dissertation consisting of 10 peer-
reviewed publications. The brief descriptions of each work and contributions of the author of this 
dissertation (indicated in bold here and in the other articles in the list) and other individual authors to 
the constitutive publications (Article 1-5) are detailed below. 
Article 1: Wibowo, A., & Giessen, L. (2015). Actor positions on primary and secondary international 
forest-related issues relevant in Indonesia. Journal of Sustainable Development, 8(3):10-27. This 
article identifies timber legality, climate change (including the REDD initiative) oil palm plantation 
and its environmental aspects, harmonisation of wood and forest certification schemes, land use 






seven most relevant forest issues in Indonesia. Giessen developed theory and hypotheses of the study, 
and developed the methodology and methods. Wibowo adapted and applied the theory and hypotheses 
to the case, adapted and applied the methodology to the case, and produced case findings regarding 
international forest policies in Indonesia. 
Article 2: Wibowo, A., & Giessen, L. (2015). Absolute and relative power gains among state agencies 
in forest-related land use politics: The Ministry of Forestry and its competitors in the REDD+ 
Programme and the One Map Policy in Indonesia. Land Use Policy, 49, 131-141. This article shows 
that the two forest-related policies involving many state agencies do not work well because there is no 
strong leading agency responsible for them. Giessen developed theory and hypotheses of the study, 
and developed the methodology and methods. Wibowo adapted and applied the theory and hypotheses 
to the case, adapted and applied the methodology to the case, and produced case findings regarding 
international forest policies in Indonesia. 
Article 3: Wibowo, A., Sahide, M.AK, & Giessen, L. (2015). From voluntary private to mandatory 
state governance in Indonesian forest certification: Reclaiming authority and legitimacy by 
bureaucracies. Article submitted to Global Environmental Change. This explains the strategy of the 
Ministry of Forestry in increasing its influence over stakeholders along the value chain of domestic 
timber business by utilising its authority in the Indonesia-EU FLEGT-VPA negotiation. Giessen 
developed theory and hypotheses of the study, and developed the methodology and methods. Wibowo 
adapted and applied the theory and hypotheses to the case, adapted and applied the methodology to the 
case, and produced case findings regarding international forest policies in Indonesia. Sahide applied 
methodology to the case and produced case findings on Indonesian bureaucracies using international 
regimes. 
Article 4: Pratiwi, S., Wibowo, A., & Giessen, L. (2015). Third-party certification of forest 
management in Indonesia: Analysing stakeholders’ recognition and preferences. Jurnal Manajemen 
Hutan Tropika [Journal of Tropical Forest Management], 21(2), 65–75. This describes the 
certification schemes preferred by industries and the criteria they use in selecting such schemes. The 
author contributed in the formulation of research questions, organising the research method, and 
discussing the results. Giessen developed theory and hypotheses of the study. Giessen and Wibowo 
developed the methodology and methods. Wibowo and Pratiwi adapted and applied the theory and 
hypotheses to the case, adapted and applied the methodology to the case, and produced case findings 
regarding international forest policies in Indonesia. 
Article 5: Wibowo, A., Pratiwi, S., & Giessen, L. (2015). Comparing forest certification and timber 
legality systems in Indonesia: Complementary or competitive? Environmental, Development and 
Sustainability, under revision. This compares two international and one national forest certification 
scheme with the timber legality verification systems in Indonesia, using the Forest Certification 
Assessment Guide (FCAG), and concludes that each of those schemes are in competition and tries to 
delegitimise the others.  The author contributed data analysis and the formulation of the conclusion. 
Giessen developed theory and hypotheses of the study. Giessen and Wibowo developed the 
methodology and methods. Wibowo and Pratiwi adapted and applied the theory and hypotheses to the 
case, adapted and applied the methodology to the case, and produced case findings regarding 
international forest policies in Indonesia. 
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We selected findings from the works listed above to answer the specific research questions posed in 
advance, and structured them according to following sections: 
 Theoretical framework on bureaucratic politics, domestic politics in response to international forest 
regimes, theory of power, and the concept of absolute and relative power gain; 
 Methodological framework for data collection and analysis of international forest issues relevant in 
Indonesia, the role of influential actors in specific cases, bureaucracies respond to forest policy 
introduced by other actors, and power dynamics of actors involved; 
 Results, highlighting the selection of international forest governance forms by domestic 
bureaucracies, the effort bureaucracies make to restore their authority over forests, the international 
influence on forest politics, the forming of super bureaucracy and its suspension, and symbolic 
forest policy; and 
 Strategic options for selected actors. Based on scientific findings, this last chapter offers strategic 
policy suggestions for selected policy actors. Two major national agencies affected by international 
forest regimes, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry and Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia, serve 
as examples for the transfer of findings to political practice. 
A detailed picture of these forest politics assignments could be used to explain the cause of forest 
policy failures in the past or estimate the degree of success of future forest policy processes and/or 
implementation from the perspective of bureaucratic politics. Therefore it could be useful information 
for other countries. The studies in this dissertation contribute an explanation of how international 






2. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
This study drew on the theory of international influences and bureaucratic politics. It analysed 
domestic consequences at national level, focusing on the power structures among the main actors, and 
not on policy content as such. Below is a brief description for each of the concepts and theories used in 
this dissertation, and a summary of their uses in publications, presented in Table 3. 
2.1. Bureaucratic politics  
Bureaucratic politics theory is used to accommodate a broader palette of actors that may be 
influencing forest policies at national level. According to Bauer et al. (2012: 28), bureaucracies are 
“agencies that have been created by governments or other public actors with some degree or 
permanence and coherence and beyond formal direct control of single nation governments and that act 
in the international arena to pursue a policy.” Bureaucracies are different from organisations, which 
are institutional arrangements built upon normative frameworks, members, and bureaucracies as 
administrative core institutions; and institutions, which are merely sets of principles and norms (Bauer 
et al., 2012: 28-29).  
Bureaucracies have a formal goal in serving the public interest and an informal goal in surviving and 
in expanding organisational interests, like maximising power, budget and staff; where organisational 
interests are prioritised if formal and informal goals cannot be achieved simultaneously (Niskanen, 
1974; Krott et al., 1990; Peters, 2002; Allison and Zelikow, 1999). Although this seems to be logical, 
the behaviour of a bureaucracy as noted above is not homogenous, since it depends on the capability 
of each bureaucrat to gain personal benefit (Blais and Dion, 1990). As an initial assumption, this study 
accepts that Niskanen’s view is widely applicable. To pursue those dual goals, bureaucrats could act as 
political institutions and administrative bodies (Krott, 2005). As political institutions they are equipped 
with legitimacy, public mandate, financial resources and competent staffs; and as administrative 
bodies, bureaucracies have expertise and information, administrative ideology, decision-making 
power, alliances, permanent positions, and a disregard for politics. 
Giessen et al. (2014) show that utilitarian (economic) bureaucracies compete with specialised 
bureaucracies in international forest and forest–environmental policy negotiations, which suggests that 
the economic interests of the state figure strongly in forest-environmental negotiations. Based on this 
propensity, one can argue that competition for budget allows ministries in charge of economic tasks 
(e.g., ministry of economics) to have more power in deciding which foreign ideas should be adopted. 
In contrast, as environmental issues are discussed with increasing intensity in the arena of international 
negotiations, bureaucracies with environmental duties (e.g., ministry of the environment and ministry 
of economy) also have more power to justify their programmes in order to succeed within “the global 
agenda”. Based on this thought, this dissertation theorises that bureaucracies compete to secure 
external support due to internationalisation of forest issues, which can also be used to increase 
legitimacy, power source, and bargaining positions for strategic tasks at a domestic level. 
 
2.2. Domestic politics' response to international forest regimes and 
influential local actors 
In response to a policy agenda introduced by foreign actors, domestic bureaucracies have the options 






degree to which they receive benefits like increased staff, working plans, and formal tasks (Peters, 
2002). In general, policy process carried out by bureaucracies in response to new policy agendas will 
go through five stages of a policy cycle (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995:13), namely, agenda-setting, 
policy formulation, decision-making, policy implementation and policy evaluation. Prior to reaching 
the decision-making stage, any idea could be changed if it does not match the interests of the 
bureaucracies.  
Major policy changes in a country may occur if external political, economic and social conditions 
change significantly (Giessen, 2011), through processes involving, among others, policy learning; 
ideas and discourses; policy entrepreneurs and experts; policy networks, subsystems and their 
bureaucracies; external shocks and crises; internationalisation trends; veto players; ruling political 
parties; and institutional change (Giessen et al., 2014). These are the starting points for changes that 
allow bureaucracies to contact international actors, negotiate their interests, set up coalitions, arrange 
mutual agendas, and finally, gain power. Power and information become important factors used by 
bureaucracies to achieve conflict resolution between actors in forest utilisation conflicts (Krott, 2005). 
International forest policies intended for implementation on the ground should involve provincial and 
district governments, non-governmental organisations, local people, and forest-related associations in 
the policy-making process, as these are influential stakeholders in forest affairs (Nurrochmat et al., 
2015a). In addition, the success of recent forest policy developments demands the participation of 
local people, respect for indigenous people rights, and openness toward public input (Bernstein and 
Cashore, 2012), which are closely linked with those non-state actors. That is why, despite the fact that 
this dissertation focusses on the bureaucratic politics surrounding forest resources, the above actors are 
always taken into account in the analyses to some extent. 
 
2.3. Theory of power 
As mentioned earlier, bureaucracies can only run any policy if they are equipped with the "fuel" which 
political literature calls power. After analysing various power theories by Weber (1972), Giddens 
(1984), Arts and van Tatenhove (2004), Lukes (1974), Dahl (1957) and Simon (1981); Krott et al. 
(2014) presented the actor-centred power (ACP) approach as a new analytical framework for assessing 
bureaucratic obstacles faced by forestry programmes. Krott et al. (2014) define power as a social 
relationship in which actor A has the ability to alter the behaviour of actor B without recognising B’s 
will. In other words, power could be the ability to shape a programme according to one’s owns 
interests, even against resistance from other actors. According to Krott et al. (2014), power consists of 
three elements, and it can be ascribed to one actor or it can be distributed among several, equal actors. 
The first element of power, coercion, is defined as altering the behaviour of the subordinate by force. 
In a social relationship, coercive power is associated mainly with bureaucracy, where the people 
provide the bureaucracy with a mandate through law for it to implement any agreed rules and to 
reinforce such rules by applying sanctions to those who disobey them. The second element is 
(dis)incentives, which is defined as advantages or disadvantages introduced to alter the behaviour of 
the subordinate. Authorities could direct others’ behaviour by introducing a disadvantage, e.g., the 
revocation of permits for forest concessionaires, for those who fail to perform harvesting operations in 
an ecologically sound manner. Advantages could also change subordinates’ behaviour because all 
actors naturally desire to maximize their benefits. The last element of power is dominant information, 
which means unverifiable information. Information can be classified as pure information, which can 
be easily verified by recipients, and selected information, which recipients can verify only with 






Dominant information becomes an element of power because actors without valid information cannot 
easily make appropriate decisions. In this context, dominant information includes any information that 
can be provided only by a state agency and that is needed by other stakeholders. In some cases, the 
absence of such information for the public due to ‘unwillingness to share’ or ‘unavailability to share’ 
could be used to increase the bargaining position of the agency responsible for it. Table 2 gives an 
overview of these three power elements. 
Table 2: Elements of power and their definitions, facts and examples 
Element Definition Observable facts Example  
Coercion Altering behaviour 
by force 
Revocation of rights or physical 
action, threat of either 





Providing of, or threatening with 
the removal of sources of 





by means of 
unverified 
information 
Providing of, or threatening with 
removal of, source of unverified 
information 
Exclusive data from the 
Ministry 
Source: Krott et al. (2014)  
 
This study uses the ACP approach rather than the three dimensions of power by Lukes (2005), which 
is widely acknowledged as the main literature on the power concept (McCabe, 2013), because the 
ACP approach focusses on power as property, namely, the power to do something, regardless of 
whether this power is used (see Wibowo and Giessen, 2015b) for substantive discussion on both 
approaches). On the other hand, Lukes’ three dimensions of power and previous works in which he 
criticized, e.g., Dahl (1957) and Bachrach and Baratz (1962), are focused on power as domination, 
widely known as power over (Haugaard, 2012), which may be identified from observable (overt and 
covert) and latent conflicts (Lukes, 2005: 29). In brief, Krott et al. (2014) assess “in terms of what” an 
actor has power, while Lukes (2005) assesses “over whom” an actor has power.  
 
2.4. Absolute and relative power gains 
The concept of absolute and relative power gains is used specifically in Article 2 (Wibowo and 
Giessen, 2015b), when the author analyses the power dynamics of the Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry and other bureaucracies in Indonesian REDD+ and One Map politics. This concept allows the 
author to quantify the power gained by each bureaucracy within a period of time and helps to decide 
who the real winner is in either forest policy process. Prabowo et al. (2015) acknowledge that 
simultaneous use of absolute and relative power gains concept and ACP approach by Wibowo and 
Giessen (2015b) has been enhancing the application of ACP approach. 
In short, this concept enables the user to decide the real winner among two or more actors by 
comparing the amount of absolute/ultimate gain it obtains from its initial capability. The ratio of both 
figures is called relative gain (Halas, 2008). The actor with the higher percentage of relative gain is 
seen as the winner, compared to other actors with lower percentages of relative gain. There are three 
conditions under which a player can be considered the winner. First, when it has lower capabilities but 
obtains the same amount of absolute gain as that obtained by others. Second, when it has capabilities 
similar to those of to others but obtains more absolute gain. Lastly, when it has a higher capabilities 






much money as his older brother from their parents, though he requires less to cover his needs than his 
older brother does. In the study, initial capability is a power source held by any actor, such as budget 
allocation, number of staff, strategic tasks, and exclusive information, whereas absolute gain refers to 
strategic tasks. The selection of strategic tasks as single indicator of absolute gain is based on the fact 
that every task should be equipped with sufficient power elements.  





Local actors’  
response 
Theory of power 
Absolute and  
relative power gains 
Article 1 X X   
Article 2 X X X X 
Article 3 X X X  
Article 4 X X X  














All ten articles in this dissertation utilise well-established methods in data collection, namely 
observation, interviews, and document analyses. Specifically, those methods were used together with 
online survey to identify stakeholders’ perception on forest certification schemes working in Indonesia 
(Article 4) and Forest Certification Assessment Guide (FCAG) to compare the standard of forest 
sustainability certification and timber legality verification (Article 5). Below are brief descriptions of 
the methods used in this dissertation. 
 
3.1. Non-participant observations 
According to Fenno (1986), observation is at the heart of political analysis since it shows the real 
behaviour of observed object in a certain period of time; hence what it demonstrates can be seen as the 
truth. Patton (2005) points out that observation, together with interview and content analysis, are 
useful and credible methods in qualitative research.  
The author acted as a non-participant observer to record opinions, interests, and alliances made by the 
actors in several national and international forestry meetings between June and September 2013 in 
Bogor and Jakarta. The meetings included the National Conference on the Future of Production Forest 
Management (4 September 2013), the National Seminar on Indonesian Palm Oil (2 July 2013), the 
National Workshop on the Strategic Steps Post-Constitutional Court Ruling No.35/PUU-X/2012 (22 
August 2013), the Indonesian Roundtable on Greening the National Development Plan (21 June 
2013), National Workshop on the Forestry Law: Constitutional Court Ruling No.35/PUU-X/2012 (29-
30 August 2013), Workshop on Community-Based Forest Management (25 July 2013), and several 
meetings of NGOs concerning forest resource governance. 
In each occasion the author noted the main messages delivered by the governments, international 
organisations, academics, NGOs, indigenous people, the business sector and other participants, and 
considered them to be the official position of the speaker on a particular issue. During coffee break, 
the author interacted with the participants, gathered their “less official statements” and handled them 
as primary data. 
The challenge in collecting data through observation was that the actors involved in many meetings 
were more less the same, and therefore they slowly became aware of the presence of an outsider in 
their circle and became more distant in their conversations with the author. On the other hand, the 
author was aware that “the speakers” in Indonesia’s forest governance are limited to persons in the 
capital, with very narrow involvement of the stakeholders from the provincial and district levels. The 
decision-making processes on regulations or recommendations generated from the meetings produced 
even by fewer people.  
 
3.2. Expert interviews 
Expert interviews are the second method used to gather data from the interviewees who had already 
been contacted before. The author classified as "experts" those who had at least five years of 
experience or held a PhD degree in a specific area of Indonesian forest governance. Harrison (2013) 






should be checked against other sources. In this research, the author conducted semi-structured 
interviews, i.e., a conversation between interviewer and interviewee on specific predetermined topics, 
but one where participants are free to change the issues if they feel this is important (Longhurst, 2003).  
The author uses interviews to identify the main actors and their positions on specific forest issues.  
Actors’ positions and their prospective coalitions were gleaned from Faggi et al. (2014), Lozano 
(2013) and Tuppura et al. (2015). In analysing actors’ positions we assumed that every actor behaved 
rationally, meaning that actors tried to maximize their own benefit rather than to promote a general 
goal, like maintaining environmental sustainability and equality. To contest norm- and interest-driven 
is acceptable (see: Van Schaik and Schunz, 2012; Gulbrandsen, 2003), since each actor (which can be 
an individual, organisation or state) has its own interests, adding to their effort to find common 
aspirations. 
The main challenge in identifying the positions of actors (individuals who represent organisations or 
entities) is that they are present in many field of discussion about forestry, such as the preservation of 
local rights, timber legality, the REDD+ Programme, and palm oil plantation.  One person could be a 
member of more than one organisation; hence the information about new forest policy circulates only 
within a limited number of people. Furthermore, the author found it difficult to separate between 
personal and organisational views within the interviewees' statements, therefore the author explicitly 
avoided the inclusion of these statements in the text. 
 
3.3. Content analysis 
Content analysis is a widely used qualitative research technique to interpret meaning from the content 
of text data (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). In this book content analysis was used to analyze policy 
documents issued by the governments, stakeholders’ opinion related to international forest issues in 
public media, stakeholders’ position papers, and standards and systems established by relevant 
sources. We scrutinized total of 17 official documents issued by President and Government of 
Indonesia, 2 ministries and three other national bureaucracies in order to identify the power dynamics 
of bureaucracies in REDD+ and one map policies (Wibowo and Giessen, 2015b). As many as 19, 14, 
24, and 3 standard, procedure and regulation of certification developed by FSC, PEFC, LEI and the 
Ministry of Environment and Forestry, respectively, were compared and assessed against FCAG 
framework (Wibowo et al., 2015b). In Nurrochmat et al. (2015b) we analyzed legal and sustainable 
timber regulations from ten ASEAN member states and seek options for beneficial timber trading 
inside ASEAN. Those documents were categorized and framed under corresponding theories in each 
article. 
Specifically we used content analysis with some extend over public and professional media to identify 
international forest issues in Indonesia (Wibowo and Giessen, 2015a). For this we undertook two 
steps. First, we chose two national newspapers in the Indonesian language, the Media Indonesia and 
Kompas, and a national newspaper in English, namely The Jakarta Post. The combination of 
keywords hutan (“forest”), kayu (“wood”), internasional (“international”) and global were inserted in 
each newspaper’s search engine to elicit a first set of 200 relevant articles in order to identify relevant 
international issues within Indonesian public deliberation. Whether an article was considered to be 
relevant depended on the connection of its content with international forest-related issues in Indonesia. 
Second, based on identified keywords in the first step, the Google search engine was employed to find 
more relevant and concrete articles and comments. Only articles from public mass media were 
considered in order to map the public deliberation on a given issue. To explore deeper deliberations 






forestry, agriculture and conservation (i.e. Majalah Kehutanan Indonesia, Tabloid Agro Indonesia and 
Mongabai), and any publications from international organisations related to the Indonesian forest 
sector. Selected issues may overlap in part in their categorisation due to differences in context or focus 
of deliberation. From the public and expert data sources, the authors elicited and interpreted the main 
actors’ positions on the issues if applicable. The absence of any relevant news in the public media was 
taken as an indication that the issue was not important for the public or that it had not become a public 
concern. These steps were fully Internet-based, which has numerous limitations, such as lack of a 
central index, lack of quality control, the fact that not all information is complete, or that not all 
information is covered by the media (Dawson, 2003). However, the author did interview experts to get 
a balance of information on the issues. 
 
3.4. Online survey 
Online survey was used to identify stakeholders’ perception on forest certification schemes and timber 
legality verification in Indonesia and their contribution to enhance forest and timber governance 
(Article 4/Pratiwi et al., 2015). The respondents were categorised into main respondents, which 
consisted of those from logging companies (LC), from the wood processing industry (WPI) and from 
the wood processing association (WPA), and supporting respondents, which consisted of auditors, 
environmental organisation representatives, academics, and government officials. These respondent 
groups were chosen due to their strong interests (Krott, 2005) and influences (Steffek, 2009) in forest 
governance. The questionnaires were divided into 3 types, one each for (i) LC and WPI, (ii) WPA, and 
(iii) supporting respondents. The questionnaires consisted of two sections. The first, General 
Information, included the name of the respondent, the type of respondent (type of stakeholder), 
workplace, and contact information. The second, Stakeholder Preferences, consisted of the 
respondents' experiences and perceptions of each of the four schemes' characteristics, e.g., their market 
acceptance, the complexity of their requirements, and the ease with which certificates from each could 
be obtained. The online questionnaires were distributed in January and February 2015 through 
personal email, mailing lists, association channels, and social media. Out of 508 personal emails sent 
108 replies (21%), comprising stakeholders from logging companies (23 persons), from the wood 
processing industry (23 persons), from the wood processing association (7 persons), auditors (22 
persons), environmental organisation representatives (18 persons), academics (11), and government 
officials/Ministry of Environment and Forestry employees (4 persons). Eight respondents replied and 
did not fill the questionnaires due to lack of updated knowledge and company privacy. 
 
3.5. The Forest Certification Assessment Guide (FCAG) 
The Forest Certification Assessment Guide (FCAG), developed by the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF) in collaboration with the World Bank (WWF and WB, 2006) was used as a framework in 
comparing the strength of forest sustainability certification and timber-legality verification schemes 
currently in use in Indonesia. The FCAG consists of three parts, namely, (1) compliance with 
international norms and standards, (2) standards and the standard-setting process, and (3) conformity 
assessment, certification, and accreditation. Within these parts there are 11 criteria and 55 
requirements based on the Global Forest Alliance requirements and criteria. The FCAG, which tends 
to financial institutions’ views, also acknowledges other existing standards for conformity assessment, 
such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the International Social and 






by the WWF, a proponent of FSC, one of the certification schemes assessed in this study, the FCAG 
framework is internationally accepted and used by analysts (for example, Hinrichs and Prasetyo, 2007; 
Maryudi, 2009; Walter, 2006, 2011) in comparing contested schemes. In this study, each scheme 
(FSC, IFCC, LEI and SVLK) was analysed against the requirements of the FCAG framework. 
Evaluation focussed on forest management standards and systems established by these schemes in the 
Indonesian context. The analysis was carried out as a desk study, based on the publicly available 
documentation of the schemes as well as key literature (see: Empirical materials). Furthermore, it 
assessed the schemes' ability to satisfy the FCAG framework scored as: fulfilled (1 point), partly 
fulfilled (0.5 point), not fulfilled (0 point), and not applicable (-). The schemes were graded according 
to their scores to determine which best conformed to the FCAG criteria, even though better schemes 







4. Research Results 
 
 
4.1. Economically viable and international forest issues are a greater 
concern for state bureaucracies  
Three new bureaucracies, namely the National Council on Climate Change (Dewan Nasional 
Perubahan Iklim or DNPI), the Presidential Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight 
(Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan or UKP4), and the 
REDD+ Agency were established by President of Indonesia to assist the Ministry of Forestry in 
tackling prolonged forest problems. However, based on deliberation in public and expert spheres, 
Wibowo and Giessen (2015a) found that those bureaucracies paid the most attention to economically 
viable and international forest issues, and paid less attention to issues of environmental value. 
Surprisingly, the Ministry of Trade was involved in three out of seven issues identified (Table 4), 
signalling that forest resources are still influential in economic development and in Indonesia’s foreign 
trade.   
 
Table 4: Main forest related issues and major state agencies involved 
No. Forest related issues State agencies involved  
1 Timber legality  Ministry of Forestry 
 Ministry of Trade 
2 Climate change, including REDD initiative  Ministry of Forestry 
 UKP4 
3 Oil palm plantation and its environmental aspects  Ministry of Forestry 
 Ministry of Trade 
4 Harmonisation of wood and forest certification schemes  Ministry of Forestry 
 Ministry of Trade 
5 Land use change  UKP4 and REDD Agency 
 Ministry of Forestry 
6 Forest and species conservation  Ministry of Forestry 
7 Deforestation and decentralized forest governance  Ministry of Forestry 
 Local governments 
Note: Issues 1-3 are identified as primary issues, whereas issues 4-7 are secondary. 
Source: Wibowo and Giessen (2015a, 2015b). 
 
Wibowo et al. (2015c) offer three reasons to support this conclusion. First, Indonesia received 
international grants of 178.5 million USD
1
 for 36 projects in 2013, equivalent to 28% of the Ministry 
of Forestry’s budget in the same year (Ministry of Forestry, 2014). Hence, international donors play a 
significant role in directing national forest agendas by state agencies. Second, the Ministry of Forestry 
has an organisational interest, which is to try to restore its existence in domestic politics by influencing 
people along the timber value chain and to show that SVLK is able to increase Indonesia’s timber 
export value (Wibowo et al., 2015a; Wibowo et al., 2015b). It also tries to gain the acknowledgement 
of global forest stakeholders by being the agency in charge of the EU-Indonesia FLEGT-VPA process. 
Participation of the Ministry of Forestry in the international forest agenda will help to define its 
existence as the agency which is responsible for over two third of the state’s land, something which 
                                                          
1






has been threatened lately by other state agencies through pro-environmental development agendas 
such as climate change and green development streams.  
These findings agree with Resosudarmo et al. (2013) and Edwards et al. (2014), who stated that it was 
the intention of the President of Indonesia to show the world that Indonesia had been making many 
efforts to tackle forest problems that are frequently highlighted by environmentalists as well as to deny 
accusations, by the NGOs, of it being a forest destroyer. The signing of the EU-Indonesia FLEGT-
VPA by the Ministry of Forestry could also be seen as an attempt to boost the country’s new image as 
a legal timber producer, although in fact there is a not significant change in domestic timber 
regulation. Wiersum and Elands (2013) state: “the FLEGT-VPA process mainly concerned a further 
adaptation of the already existing Indonesian timber legality policy which has a traditional timber 
sector orientation.”  
In fact, McDermott (2014) noted that international forest governance in the last decade has evolved 
through three phases (Figure 1), namely, from certification of sustainable forest management, to the 
regional timber legality initiative, and then to the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation and forest enhancement (REDD+). The change in each phase is a result of its evaluation 
and improvement. To date there is little evidence to show that REDD+, as the latest global forest 
regime wave, has allowed actors to reach their initial goals successfully (McDermott, 2014; Harada et 
al., 2015; Luttrell et al., 2014). In this regard, it has been argued that the Ministry of Forestry and other 
agencies in charge of forests followed international trends in handling the forest-related agenda 
(Sahide et al., 2015b, under review; Giessen et al., 2015, under revision). 
 
Figure 1: Phases in international forest governance and corresponding issues adopted by the Ministry 
of (Environment) and Forestry 
Source : McDermott (2014), Wibowo and Giessen (2015a) 
 
4.2. State actors reclaiming timber trade governance  
Our results show that currently there are three forest sustainability certification schemes (FSC, LEI, 
and PEFC) and one timber legality verification (SVLK) in use in Indonesia, where each represents one 
type of forest governance (Table 5). Wibowo et al. (2015a) point out that “Due to the lack of capital, 
human resources and interest affinity, the hybrid private-public government will disappear, and the 
FMUs and wood industries will make alliances with the government to support traditional forest 
Phase of forest sustainability 
- Oil palm plantation and its 
environmental aspects 
- Land use change 
- Forest and species 
conservation 
- Deforestation and 
decentralised forest 
governance 
Phase of timber legality 
- Timber legality 
- Harmonisation of wood and 
forest certification schemes 
Phase of REDD+ initiative 







governance. Consequently, there will be only two certification schemes competing for the market in 
the future, namely, the pro-environment and pro-business schemes. The first scheme is represented by 
FSC and LEI, and the pro-business scheme consists of SVLK and PEFC.” 













Rule makers Environmentalists  Academics Land owners Government  
State involvement No Partially Limited  Full 
Supporting actor ENGOs No Industry Government 
Territorial focus International  National International  National 
Auditor Third party Third party Third party Third party 
Public examination Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Certificate 
acceptability 
International National  International EU and national 
Brand image Strong Weak Quite strong Weak  
Industry 
participation 
Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Mandatory  
Actor involved B to B B to B B to B G to G and B to 
G 
Law enforcement No No No Yes  
Source: Wibowo et al. (2015a). 
Competition among the four schemes has become intense since the Ministry of Forestry made SVLK 
mandatory for all FMUs and timber manufacturers, and asked the Ministry of Trade to impose legality 
certification as one requirement for timber export. Through both regulations, the Ministry of Forestry 
makes itself the main timber regulator and expands its authority to all timber stakeholders. Wibowo et 
al. (2015a) analyse this and conclude that the Ministry of Forestry strives for three benefits, namely: 
(i) increasing its presence in downstream industry circles by financing the first SVLK-certification 
process for small enterprises, (ii) compelling the enterprises to choose SVLK only or either SVLK and 
private schemes for cost efficiency reasons, and (iii) making SVLK better known and legitimate in 
domestic and overseas markets.  
Competition among forest certification schemes is normal and widely observed in Sweden 
(Gulbrandsen, 2005), Canada, the United States, Germany (Cashore et al., 2005b), and Russia (Malets, 
2015). However, the trend of reclaiming authority over private governance only happens in tropical 
countries such as Ghana, Republic of Congo, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Liberia, and 
Indonesia (Overdevest and Zeitlin, 2014). Nurrochmat et al. (2015b) report that ASEAN countries are 
now trying to establish a set of regional principles for timber trading inside the region and use 
FLEGT-VPA of each country as a basis for these principles. The states, apparently, try to deceive 
market that already aware with environmentally friendly products created by private schemes, but do 
not care whether the products’ labelling indicates that they are associated with a pro-environmental or 
a pro-business scheme. The states benefit from the financial inability of timber producers and 







4.3. International influences changing domestic power structures and 
interactions 
The establishment of DNPI and the REDD+ agency, which took power from the Ministry of Forestry, 
cannot be separated from the international influences (Wibowo and Giessen, 2015b). DNPI was 
introduced in 2008 after Indonesia hosted the 13
th
 Conference of the Party of UNFCCC in 2007 as an 
answer to the need for an agency that would report Indonesia’s National Communications to the 
UNFCCC and would be responsible for monitoring the country’s emission reduction, while the 
REDD+ Agency was introduced to fulfil the requirements included in the letter of intent between 
Indonesia and Norway (see: The Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia, (2010). Wibowo and Giessen (2015b) show that the DNPI and the REDD+ 
Agency together took 54% of strategic tasks on REDD+ Programme, compared to the Ministry who 
get only 9% of strategic tasks. The new agencies also increased competition for international political 
support and neither provides its competitor with assistance in the programme for which it is not 
responsible. An example of this can be observed in that the Ministry of Forestry has kept exclusive 
access to its dominant information –it only shares 17 of 29 thematic maps it produces– and in that it 
has used the dominant information it has as a source of power when there have been systematic 
attempts to reduce its power.  
Moeliono et al. (2014) have also observed similar behaviour, which revealed that the most influential 
actors in the REDD+ Programme in Indonesia tended not to seek or obtain information from other 
actors, and that the information exchange between them was weak. Wibowo and Giessen (2015b) add, 
“This dearth of information exchange indicates that each bureaucracy does not want to open its agenda 
regarding policy formulation and will expose it to the public only when it is complete.”  According to 
Krott et al. (2014), giving dominant information to the opponent may increase their power and harm 
one's own agenda.  
 
4.4. Bureaucracies and super-bureaucracies  
Our study on international forest politics in Indonesia distinguishes between bureaucracies and super-
bureaucracies in forest resource management, as ilustrated in Figure 2. Initially, one may earn one's 
livelihood by oneself. Simple delegation from authorised person to  subordinate then needs to manage 
the distribution of wealth. Increasingly, the subordinate becomes more independent in the management 
of resources under his authority and a supra-bureaucracy is created by authorised person of highest 
rank in order to control and supervise the use of resources.  
The creation of UKP4 by the President of Indonesia is the means he used to control the balance of 
power of bureaucracies –including the Ministry of Forestry, which became more independent over 
time. Complaints by researchers, bureaucrecies, local people, ENGOs, and international actors 
concerning the poor forest governance practiced by the Ministry of Forestry led the president to give 
UKP4 more authority to supervise and lead forest governance reformation (Wibowo and Giessen, 
2015b). Under the coordination of UKP4, the government postponed the issuance of new business 
permits in production forests, assigned to the Ministry of Environment responsibility for primary 
forest and peatland areas, designated BIG as the coordinator for technical aspects in the One Map 
initiative, and appointed itself as the leading agency for the One Map initiative. However, the power of 
UKP ended when the new President dissolved UKP4, DNPI and the REDD+ Agency, and empowered 






(and disbanding) a new and super-bureaucracy with limited staff, dominant information, and a budget 
is easy (Helperin and Clapp, 2006) and that it is not an effective way to manage millions of hectares of 
state forests. On the contrary, the problems in immense forest governance will exist whenever all 
bureaucracies wield the the same level of power, and there is no powerful and single leading agency in 
charge (Sulistiawati, 2013).  
 
Figure 2: The forming of supra-bureaucracy 
 
4.5. SVLK, REDD+ and One Map Policy as symbolic policies? 
Wibowo and Giessen (2015a) point out that the timber legality verification system (SVLK) is one of 
the most discussed policies by the Ministry of Forestry, since it guarantees that timber products which 
have already passed SVLK verification and have obtained the V-Legal/FLEGT license are then 
automatically legal, making it easier for them to enter the EU market. Indonesia’s REDD+ 
programme, on the other hand, is known as an ambitious policy since President Yudhoyono 
announced, in 2009, that the country intended to reduce its carbon emissions by 26% and that, with 
international contributions, it may increase its rate reduction by up to 41% by 2020. Similar, with only 
16.6% of forest mapped area had been gazette by the Ministry of Forestry in 2012; it is difficult to 
whole stakeholders to agree One Map for all development agenda. The three policies quickly drew the 
attention of forest stakeholders who pointed out their pros and cons. Business groups, 
environmentalists, academics, and the EU actually fully supported SVLK before the Ministry of 
Forestry made it obligatory for all timber producers and processing industries (Wibowo and Giessen, 
2015a). Uncertainty regarding SVLK implementation reached its peak when business group lobbyists 
successfully forced the Ministry of Trade to loosen timber export provisions by allowing furniture 
producers to use self-declaration on timber legality to replace the V-Legal document just three days 
before the SVLK implementation planned by the Ministry of Forestry, on 1 January 2015 (Ministry of 
Industry, 2014). Similarly, environmental NGOs and researchers questioned how Indonesia could 
reach its target in the midst of the complexity of forest governance at the national level and of 






Given the presentation of many refutations from business groups and other ministries regarding the 
adequacy of SVLK, and limited progress on the REDD+ programme, Wibowo and Giessen (2015b) 
consider both to be examples of symbolic policy, or non-policy in a sense, one which, beyond 
formulating goals and creating instruments, is not endowed with clear responsibilities to implement 
agencies, hire sufficient staff, budget resources and manage all necessary information. Other authors 
have written on similar ideas (Krott et al., 1990; Krause, 2011; Edelman, 1977). This conclusion is 
based on the fact that REDD+ policy, and also SVLK, are based on weak legal constructions, have no 
single strong leading agency responsible for ensuring continuity and have only weak long-term 
agendas with no stand-alone budgets or discrete staff (Wibowo and Giessen, 2015b). A weak legal 
construction means that the policy could be changed, postponed or discontinued by other powerful 
actors, while the lack of a leading agency means that there is no actor with enough power to direct and 
implement the policy or with the authority to penalize whoever is against it.   
Hesitation regarding SVLK was also found among scientists although some (e.g. Dharmawan et al., 
2012) try to ensure that SVLK can bring the country towards better forest governance. Nurrochmat et 
al. (2014) conclude that “implementing SVLK standards amid multiple forest regimes causes 
redundancy of administrative procedures in forest management and timber trade in Indonesia” and 
“leads to decrease in cost efficiency, weak legitimation, and low effectiveness of the system, 
especially in community forests”. In response to these obstacles, Maryudi et al. (2015) call for SVLK 
deregulation for smallholder forests. In contrast, Wijaya et al. (2012) pushed the Ministry of Forestry 
to strengthen the ecological and social aspects of the SVLK standard in order to reach sustainable 
forest management. Mulyaningrum et al. (2013) allege that there are difficulties in implementing 
SVLK, since the Ministry of Forestry is too dominant in its formulation of SVLK and uses its coercive 
power as a state agency. 
Reports on REDD+ practices on the ground come to identical conclusions. For example, Purnomo et 
al. (2012) observe that “REDD+ policy in Jambi needs to be simplified by, among other things, 
providing better quality of space for local initiatives, showing real benefits to actors, and reducing 
complexity by developing a super body.” Similarly, Rochmayanto (2013) argues that REDD+ 
implementation in Riau faces a high risk of failure due to the potential for social conflict and 
corruption, uncertainty in land use rights, and administrative constraints.  
 
4.6. Contrasting forest certification with legality verification 
Competition between forest certification schemes and legality verification affect stakeholders’ 
perceptions and the industries that use the schemes in timber trading. Our three studies reveal that (i) 
state-driven certification scheme is likely to take the lead over the private ones (Wibowo et al, 2015a); 
(ii) a better certification scheme is not always preferred by the timber industry (Wibowo et al., 2015b, 
2015d), and that (iii) industry prefers to use SVLK as it is mandatory, and using it can avoid double 
charges in the certification process (Pratiwi et al., 2015). A brief explanation of these findings follows. 
As mentioned in section 4.2, each certification scheme that currently exists in Indonesia is at one type 
of forest governance, namely environmental-private governance (FSC), hybrid private-public 
governance (LEI), producer-private governance (PEFC), and state governance (SVLK). Based on the 
nature of the various proponents and their interests we argue that in the future those schemes will 
simply gravitate towards two types: pro-environment schemes (FSC and LEI) and pro-business 
schemes (PEFC and SVLK). This claim is based on the fact that FSC and LEI were established and 






organisation. In contrast, PEFC and SVLK were established by the business sector that was supported 
by the governments and intended to secure their domestic and foreign market from “well certified 
timber.” Law enforcement mechanisms proposed by the pro-business scheme will force all industry 
figures to engage with them, eroding all opponents. 
The evaluation of the four schemes shows that FSC fulfils almost 100% of FCAG requirements and is 
identified as the best scheme, followed by PEFC, LEI and SVLK. Our study (Wibowo et al., 2015b) 
shows that firms do no automatically choose the ideal scheme for improving forest governance and 
enhancing business. Pratiwi et al. (2015) finds that about 60% of respondents from the processing 
industry acknowledge that the FSC is a necessary scheme for Indonesia, followed by SVLK (13%), 
LEI (12%), and PEFC (9%). However, respondents from logging companies and the wood-processing 
industry prefer to be certified under the SVLK (48-57%), followed by the FSC (43-48%), the PEFC 
(13-43%), and the LEI (9-29%). This preference is strongly influenced by the mandatory nature of the 
SVLK, government subsidies, and market acceptance. 
Furthermore, statements by each scheme’s proponents in the mass media show that all schemes are in 
competition rather than being complementary. However, it should be noted that the aim of competition 
is not merely to gain legitimacy and trust in the marketplace (Cashore et al., 2004; McDermott, 2012), 
and it exists because of different sustainable forest management concepts and norms in each scheme 






5. Strategic Options for Selected Actors 
 
 
This dissertation is relevant for the improvement of the performance of two policy actors, namely the 
Ministry of Forestry and Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia. Based on the results of the study and recent 
forest politics trends, this dissertation offers suggestions for them. 
5.1. Strategic options for the Ministry of Environment and Forestry 
The problem facing by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry is that it lost the trust of domestic 
and foreign stakeholders. Wibowo and Giessen (2015b) write, “… The Ministry of Forestry has been 
blamed for these forest problems because its policies have frequently been deemed inconsistent, 
inaccurate, inadequate and unfair. Other negative attributes attributed to the Ministry of Forestry, such 
as corruption (Nellemann and Interpol Environmental Crime Programme, 2012), a lack of 
transparency and data openness (Simangunsong, 2004; Brown, 2002) and limited public participation 
in decision-making processes (Santosa et al., 2013), have caused the public to lose trust in the 
Ministry.” Hence, further policies should respect other actors and interests. The following are some 
strategic options for future forest development. 
First, future programmes should be designed with a long term and permanent agenda in mind. Since 
the new president, or Minister of Environment and Forestry or other bureaucracies can change or 
discontinue programs created by previous forest officials, this study suggests that the major policies, 
where the Ministry of Environment and Forestry acts as the leading sector, should be established based 
on a specific law that can only be changed with the consent of the House of Representatives 
(parliament). The creation of a statute may require a long time and split task of the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry, but it gives credence to the planned program. 
Second, public trust should be improved by providing transparency and data openness. The 2008 
Information Law actually asks all Ministries to produce accurate, complete, and updated information, 
and forces them to disclose it to the public.  However, what kind of data should be produced and what 
should be shared are up to the Ministry. Opening data to the public can increase the Ministry’s 
legitimacy, but it has a cost in terms of a reduction of the informational power element. 
Third, degraded and deforested areas should be converted to other development uses and there should 
be a focus on the development of conservation and protection forests, through programmes such as 
ecotourism and environmental services. The Decree of Constitutional Court No. 35/PUU-X/2012, 
which excludes customary forests from state forests and returns their management to indigenous 
people, and the One Map Initiative, could be a way to reduce significantly the size of the forest area to 
be managed by the Ministry. Although the conversion cannot automatically solve forest problems, at 
least it gives people access to the land in order to make it more productive, increasing their prosperity, 
and it provides more options for other development programmes. It also prevents the Ministry from 
becoming a scapegoat when forests are damaged.  
 
5.2. Strategic Options for Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia (LEI) 
Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia (LEI) is a non-profit and constituent-based organisation the mission of 
which is to develop a credible forest and biodiversity certification scheme, to support sustainable and 






management for its constituents and customary people (LEI, 2014). To implement this mission, LEI 
developed a certification scheme for forests, non-timber forest products, a timber chain of custody, and 
it established social and environmental standards for REDD+ implementation, and for the accrediting 
certification bodies (LEI, 2014). Although it has a wide range of certification schemes, the total forest 
area and companies it has certified since 2009 has tended to stagnate. This has been attributed to a 
close competition against other forces. Below are short explanations and map (Figure 3) describing 
competing forces. 
(1) Existing schemes 
- FSC. Some independent researchers (e.g., Gulbrandsen, 2004; Wibowo et al., 2015b, 2015d) 
point out that the FSC has better standards for achieving sustainable forest management. The 
FSC scheme is preferred by timber processing industries, as indicated by the number of its CoC 
certificates, which is almost three times higher than those of PEFC (UNECE and FAO, 2013, 
p.20). This figure supports the idea that the motive industrial groups have for becoming certified 
is to satisfy their business partners and the market. 
- PEFC. PEFC certificates are preferred by logging industries and forest owners, as shown by its 
market share in 2014, which was about 255 million hectares (PEFC, 2014) as compared to the 
FSC-certificate forest area, which was about 182 million hectares for the same year (FSC, 
2014). This supports the notion that PEFC was dedicated for forest owners. 
- SVLK. The compulsory nature of SVLK makes for securing the market, namely upstream and 
downstream timber industries (Wibowo et al., 2015a). The benefit of SVLK-certified timber 
products was confirmed by the yearly increase of timber export value to Europe, from 5.4 
million dollars in the middle of 2013 to 11 million dollars by the middle of 2014 (ITTO, 2014). 
- LEI. The progress of LEI certified-forest areas has been stagnant since its appearance in 1998. 
LEI seems to be complementary to other schemes and forest and timber companies only use it to 
enhance their business performance, before adopting other certification schemes. LEI, however, 
has extensive experience in the formulation of certification standards for forest management.   
(2) ISO-CoC scheme. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) plans to establish 
CoC standards for wood and other lignin material (e.g., timber, bamboo) to reduce the cost of 
multi-certification schemes (IHB, 2013), though this plan has been rejected by FSC and PEFC 
(FSC and PEFC, 2013). In 2014, 17 countries participated in the formulation of an ISO-CoC 
standard, and 18 other countries were observers (ISO, 2014). 
(3) Substitutive service. Refusal of non-certified tropical timber is often seen as a technical trade 
barrier and protectionism benefitting non-tropical timber. However, the business continues to run 
due to the absence of complaints submitted to the WTO. Tallontire and Blowfield (2000) reveal 
that FLEGT-VPA has the potential to violate trade agreements under the WTO, and could 
possibly be cancelled if it is found to be a cause of unfair trade against some parties.  
(4) Forest and timber industries. The companies consider for adoption only those schemes with wider 
acceptance in their next value chain, and avoid those that cannot improve their images 
(Nurrochmat and Yulianti, 2013). Rejection of SVLK-certified pulp by paper companies (The 
Jakarta Post, 2014) shows that the market is rational and cannot be driven by the law. This also 
happened in the US and Europe, and eliminated local schemes. 
(5) Buyers. Normally, buyers choose quality and lower price products. However, about 73% of them 
are willing to pay a 12% higher price for certified products (Elliott, 2014). Thus, the popularity of 











Figure 3: Competing forces in the forest certification business in Indonesia (adapted from Porter, 
2008) 
 
In fact, the existing conditions of the LEI are as follows:   
1. The members consist of four chambers (eminent persons, indigenous people, business, and NGOs) 
with different backgrounds and various interests;  
2. LEI has no power to force the market to engage with it (as SVLK has); 
3. LEI is an organisation at the national level which competes for a market share against international 
organisations and a state-supported mechanism; 
4. LEI is experienced in establishing certification schemes for timber and forest. 
 
Based on the notions above, the following are strategic options that LEI may choose in order to 
continue working in the certification field. 
(1) Cooperating with FSC. LEI cooperated with FSC when they agreed to a joint certification 
protocol in 1999. Nowadays LEI can be the FSC-standard development group and provided 
recommendations for the revision of the FSC-International Generic Indicator. This is possible 
since LEI already has standards for forest management and timber CoC that are compatible with 
the Indonesian context.  
(2) Becoming a standard development group (SDG) for non-timber/forest or other biological 
commodities (e.g., rubber, cacao, and rattan). Until now, on-farm management standards for those 
commodities are still unavailable, although they have long been cultivated in the country. 
(3) Becoming a partner of the National Standard Agency (BSN) to discuss ISO Standards. In this 
case, LEI may provide input to the Agency so that the standards introduced by the ISO do not 
disserve national interests. 
 
The three options above require LEI to cooperate closely and form an alliance with one competing 
force, which is likely to benefit one of its member groups and be a disadvantage for other members. 
Global tendencies in the forest certification business reveal that local schemes can only exist in this 






This dissertation, on the other hand, hypothesizes that state-supported schemes will surpass the private 
ones in importance. Any option taken by LEI to stay in the forest certification business seems to affect 
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Abstract 
Over the last 20 years a considerable number of international forest-related policies has evolved, collectively 
referred to as the international forest regime complex. The objectives of this study are to identify the most 
relevant international forest-related issues discussed in Indonesia as well as the most active actors and their 
positions on these issues. The empirical methods used include content analysis of Indonesian newspapers, 
national expert journals, expert mailing lists, and international organizations’ position papers. In addition, experts 
were interviewed to verify and complement the data. As a result, three primary forest-related international issues 
in Indonesia are identified, namely: timber legality; climate change including REDD initiative; and oil palm 
plantation and its environmental aspects; and the other four considered as secondary issues, namely: 
harmonization of wood and forest certification schemes; land use change; forest and species conservation; and 
deforestation and decentralized forest governance. Public and expert deliberations are found to differ regarding 
the depth of information as well as their immediate importance for the people and their long-term objectives. The 
Ministry of Forestry and, surprisingly, the Ministry of Trade are the most active actors in these issues. The main 
lines of conflict lie between forest utilization interests which are supported by the Ministry of Forestry, Ministry 
of Trade, oil palm and wood industry associations face-to-face with forest conservation interests powered by 
WWF and Greenpeace. 
Keywords: international issues, forest policy, international forest regime complex, Indonesia 
1. Introduction 
Recent forest governance presents in many arena has involved more actors spreading from state representatives, 
intergovernmental organizations, treaty secretariats, multilateral financial institutions, nongovernmental 
organizations, as well as business and industry groups (Chasek et al., 2014) and assembling transnational 
interests into a unique forest regime (Overdevest & Zeitlin, 2014a; 2014b). Krasner (1982) defines international 
regimes as “a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Simply put and applied to the field of 
forest policy, this theory describes and analyses international cooperation, primarily among states, and how 
internationally agreed principles, norms and rules become relevant in national contexts (Smouts, 2008). 
International regimes are designed in order to influence state behavior including their implementation through 
national action and policies (Bernstein & Cashore, 2012; Giessen, 2012; Giessen et al., 2014). However, every 
country does not necessarily have equal influence in the arena of international diplomacy when advancing its 
interest, and eventually politically weak countries have to accept unsatisfactory international agreements 
(Lindstad & Solberg, 2010). A basic question, however, remains: are international commitments made relevant, 
implemented and enforced in individual countries? And how are specific issues of the international forest 
regimes complex (IFRC) put on the political agenda in public and expert networks and their deliberations. 
Humphreys (2006) identifies an international forest regime complex (IFRC) which consists of the following 
elements: forests as a carbon sink under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) regime; protection of endangered species under the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) regime; concerning indigenous and tribal people under 
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the regime of ILO Convention No. 169; sustainable forest management issues under the United Nations Forum 
on Forest (UNFF) regime; trade liberalization of forest products under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regime; land management issue under the Convention to 
Combat Desertification (CCD) regime; conservation of forest biodiversity as an issue under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) regime and the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) regime; and 
chain of custody rules under the private Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) regime.  
Each of these forest-related regimes has not necessarily been established simultaneously in all countries 
signatory to the respective agreements. The Global Forest Expert Panel on the International Forest Regime 
mentions a number of regimes influencing forest-related policy in several countries (Rayner et al., 2010; similar 
McDermott et al., 2010a; 2010b). Indonesia, the third-largest tropical rainforest country and the largest tropical 
lumber producer (UN-REDD, 2012; ITTO, 2011) is also influenced by diverse interests in its forests 
(Nurrochmat, 2005; Maryudi et al., 2012; Brockhaus et al., 2012). Identification of the major domestic political 
issues related to international forest policies, the actors involved and their positions are then crucial to 
understand the actual implementation of the IFRC and its specific components in Indonesia (Note 1).   
Based on circumstance, the objectives of this article are to identify the most relevant international forest-related 
issues discussed in Indonesian public and expert deliberations, and to identify the most active actors in these 
deliberations and their positions on the issues noted. In doing so, the authors are able to identify which parts of 
the international forest regime complex (IFRC) are currently the most relevant in Indonesia and which actors 
might have an interest in creating the ways in which the IFRC is implemented in Indonesia.  
2. Theoretical Approach 
“Actor” in this study refers to an individual person, governmental or non-governmental organization with a stake 
in any forest-related policy. Actors have their own interests which are not always precisely displayed in public 
arena (Krott, 2005). Public bureaucracies (e.g. a ministry) have dual goals: they strive for public service 
according to their mandates and are pursuing informal organizational goals. Due to these goals, public 
bureaucracies compete for resources, political domains and influence (Peters, 2010). To reach their goals 
successfully, actors seek other actors with (rather) similar interest, set up coalitions, raise bargaining positions 
and gain power. In this context, mass media could be used as a channel to send signals of preference and 
positions to other actors. 
Issue is a specific problem and could be a starting point of a forest policy process (Sadath & Krott, 2012). Issue 
arises because actors succeed in getting their goals onto the political agenda. They are rooted in conflictual 
underlying interests of the actors and manifest in public or semipublic deliberations of actors. An issue may 
come from within or beyond the country, depending on its scope and urgency. In this study, an international issue 
relevant in Indonesia means a specific issue comes from both national and international levels, and it has goals, 
measures, assumed effect, implementing actors and related to the global agenda on forest in Indonesia. An issue 
brought by powerful actor has a big opportunity to go into agenda setting, policy formulation then convert into 
government policy (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995). Accordingly, issue and actor cannot be separated. Ojha et al. 
(2009) suggest redistributing cultural/ideological power to actors with less power in order to raise the quality of 
deliberations. 
Steffek (2009) identifies five groups involved in influencing policy making, viz.: representatives of the state, 
independent experts, activists and lobbyists, journalists and citizens. Each has diverse power in policy making 
process. Yet, their voices could be even louder if sounding through mass media. Contrarily, the goals which are 
only delivered in actors’ private spheres will fail in showing real political orientation, especially to the public 
(Krott, 2005). According to this, any statement from actors through mass media can be seen as their initial 
positions in a specific issue recorded by public. An actor’s statement in expert deliberations draws more concrete 
position of the actor and less bias although, due to their hidden agenda, it may differ from which was published 
in public mass media. 
The Method section describes in detail how the study was conducted, including conceptual and operational 
definitions of the variables used in the study, Different types of studies will rely on different methodologies; 
however, a complete description of the methods used enables the reader to evaluate the appropriateness of your 
methods and the reliability and the validity of your results, It also permits experienced investigators to replicate 
the study, If your manuscript is an update of an ongoing or earlier study and the method has been published in 
detail elsewhere, you may refer the reader to that source and simply give a brief synopsis of the method in this 
section. 
 




In order to map the international forest related issues in Indonesia, this research distinguishes between 
deliberations of actors made either in public, such as newspapers, or in a more limited quasi-public arena, such 
as in expert media. Both differ regarding their degree of publicity and hence can be used differently by actors, 
e.g. by mobilizing the general public or by discussing detailed issues in expert circles as a selected audience. The 
authors consider articles/information published by these sources of data within publication period of 2008 and 
2012. The public deliberation is derived from magazines and newspapers easily accessible to a wide public 
audience. For analyzing public deliberations, the authors take two steps. First, choose two national newspapers in 
the Indonesian language, viz. Media Indonesia and Kompas, and a national newspaper in English, namely The 
Jakarta Post (Note 2). The combination of keywords hutan (“forest”), kayu (“wood”), internasional 
(“international”) and global were inserted on each newspaper’s search engine to elicit 200 first set of relevant 
articles in order to identify relevant international issues within Indonesian public deliberation. The determination 
of relevance of an article depended upon the connection of its content with international forest-related issues in 
Indonesia.  
Second, based on identified keywords in the first step, the Google search engine was employed to find more 
relevant and concrete articles and comments. As an example, when an article in the selected newspapers talks 
about timber legality, it actually discusses SVLK (Sistem Verifikasi Legalitas Kayu), FLEGT (Forest Law 
Enforcement, Governance and Trade) and VPAs (Voluntary Partnership Agreements) implementation and the 
debates around it. The authors then put SVLK, FLEGT and VPA into Google to collect a wider discussion. Only 
articles from public mass media were considered in order to map the public deliberation on a given issue.  
To explore the expert deliberations on international forest-related issues in Indonesia the authors collected data 
from four sources. 
First, interviewed experts whose deeper knowledge on forestry-related issues and international policy influences 
on Indonesian forestry policies respondents included senior lecturers from Bogor Agricultural University (IPB) 
and Gadjah Mada University (UGM) (each one person); senior advisor of the World Bank in Jakarta; senior 
advisor of the Ministry of Forestry; high official at the Ministry of Forestry; administrator Indonesian forester 
mailing list; editor at Indonesian forestry journal, and Minister of Forestry. Interview is required as 
supplementary method to verify specific data from other sources and was used to distinguish between primary 
issues of political relevance and the secondary ones. Interviewees were selected based on quick and ease of field 
access. To each of them, the authors posed two questions: (1) what are the rules/agreements/policies/issues at the 
international level that are currently relevant for forest, forestry or forest-related policy making in Indonesia? (2) 
How are these issues relevant in Indonesia? 
Second, data from professional journals in the fields of forestry, agriculture and conservation were collected to 
catch the discussion circulating among these experts’ networks. These journals are Majalah Kehutanan 
Indonesia, Tabloid Agro Indonesia and Mongabai (Note 3). Majalah Kehutanan Indonesia (Indonesian Forestry 
Magazine) is a monthly magazine published by the Ministry of Forestry. All articles it contained from 2008 to 
2011 were examined and only those with international pertinence to be considered. Agro Indonesia is a weekly 
tabloid, published since June 2004 and widely read by practitioners and policy analysts in the fields of forestry, 
agriculture, fishery, plantations and husbandry. All relevant topics from February 2009 (the first online edition) 
to October 2012 were screened. 
Third, the discussions among academics, observers and practitioners on the Indonesian forester interactive 
mailing list (rimbawan-interaktif@yahoogroups.com) were also taken into account. This mailing list was 
founded in 2000 and had 1406 members as of September 2014. The authors only considered entries within years 
2010 until 2014.  
Fourth, any publications from international organizations related to the Indonesian forest sector such as Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) files were also studied.  
Based on the data from all sources (interviews, professional journals, environmental and conservation news sites, 
mailing list archives and international publications), the specific issues were identified. Selected issues may 
partly overlap in categorization due to difference context or focus of deliberations. From the public and expert 
data sources, the authors elicited and interpreted the main actors’ positions on the issue if applicable. The 
absence of any relevant news in public media indicating the issue was not important for public or had not 
become a public concern. 
 




By scrutinizing source of data above, the authors identify seven primary and secondary issues on international 
policies relevant to forests in Indonesia. The primary issues are: timber legality, oil palm plantation and its 
environmental aspects, and climate change including REDD initiative; while the secondary issues consist of 
harmonization of wood and forest certification schemes, land use change, forest and species conservation, and 
deforestation and decentralized forest governance (Appendix A). Detailed descriptions for each issue follow 
below, distinguishing between public and expert deliberations and summarizing the positions taken by the main 
actors in each issue. 
4.1 Primary International Forest-related Issues 
4.1.1 Timber Legality 
Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) is the European Union (EU) policy to combat illegal 
logging and illegal trade in forest products. This includes the adoption of the FLEGT Action Plan (2003) which 
contains EU's commitment to develop a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) with timber producing 
countries to prevent illegal timber products from entering the European market. On 4 May 2011, the Indonesian 
Minister of Forestry and the EU Trade Commissioner signed the FLEGT document. Through this agreement, the 
EU will ensure free and unrestricted access to all FLEGT-licensed timber products from Indonesia. In order to 
implement the agreement, the Indonesian government developed the Timber Legality Verification System 
(Sistem Verifikasi Legalitas Kayu or SVLK). It is up to the EU now to recognize SVLK as a tool to determine 
the legality of Indonesian timber products exported to the EU.  
Public deliberation 
The agreement lists 48 kinds of certified wood products under that SVLK scheme that may be imported without 
restriction into EU countries (Media Indonesia, 2011a; Harian Terbit, 2012a). The government stated that this 
policy was fully supported by the industry. According to the Director of Processing and Marketing of Forest 
Products of the MoF, by the end of 2011 there were about 125 timber companies implementing SVLK along with 
30 forest concessionaires and timber estates. An industrial group represented by Director of Riau Andalan Pulp 
and Paper said they supported the government's efforts to encourage timber legality verification standards to be 
recognized internationally (Media Indonesia, 2011a; 2011b). At the SVLK launching event, the Minister of 
Forestry also claimed SVLK would prevent timber laundering in other countries (Kompas, 2012a). Hence, the 
government expects the program would be supported by small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs). For that 
purpose government allocated IDR 3 billion in financial assistance for handicraft producers in Bali and furniture 
makers in Jepara (The Jakarta Post, 2012a). The government committed to implementing SVLK for forest unit 
management and processing industries in December 2012 and 2013 respectively, and rejected a proposal from 
the APHI (Asosiasi Pengusaha Hutan Indonesia or Association of Indonesian Forest Concessionaires) and 
Asmindo (Asosiasi Industri Permebelan dan Kerajinan Indonesia or Indonesian Furniture Industry and 
Handicraft Association) to delay (Harian Terbit, 2012b; Suara Merdeka, 2012). However, later on, the EU was 
still reviewing SVLK rules and not yet ready to sign the agreement as of November 2012 (The Jakarta Post, 
2012b). Regarding this point, Deputy Minister of Trade said he questioned the readiness of the EU to implement 
wood export rules, and even bring this case to WTO if they found evidence of unfair trade (Antara, 2012a).  
Expert deliberation 
Using SVLK as the sole governmental tool for determining timber legality and applied to all kinds of 
wood-based products is actually not fully supported by industry groups. The chairman of Asmindo refused 
enactment of SVLK for furniture products since their raw materials are derived from primary industries that hold 
legality certificates (Agro Indonesia, 2012a). By contrast, Minister of Forestry felt confident that SVLK was the 
answer to the Indonesian timber trade’s problems and he asked all wood industries to meet it (Majalah 
Kehutanan Indonesia, 2011a; 2011b). On the other hand, the Conservation Director at WWF Indonesia said that 
50% of consumers in the country ask about wood products legality when they buy it (Agro Indonesia, 2012b). 
The third suspension of VPA signing by the EU raised questions. The Chair of the Indonesian Delegation for 
VPA Negotiation argues that VPA looks like a non-tariff barrier to trade (Agro Indonesia, 2012c). The Director 
of Forest Production Development and Forest Products Marketing of the MoF also doubted the EU’s 
commitment to reducing illegal logging since the reason for postponement was an administrative matter, namely 
translating the documents into the 27 languages of EU member countries (Agro Indonesia, 2012d). Furthermore, 
analysts blamed the severe economic crisis in some EU countries and industry protectionism as the real reasons 
for SVLK delay (Rimbawan Interaktif, 2012a). Researchers criticised the VPA as disguised trade barriers to 
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obstruct Indonesian wood products, especially for pulp and paper. Similarly, the Director of the Forestry 
Multistakeholder Programme also condemned the EU’s postponement of VPA endorsement (Agro Indonesia, 
2012c). 
In response to the VPA and SVLK controversies, a lecturer at IPB said that the issue was not about legality but 
legitimacy (Agro Indonesia, 2012e). Other experts and practitioners were still debating whether SVLK had to be 
implemented, since approximately 40% of sawmills are illegal and this would affect the legality of wood 
products (Rimbawan Interaktif, 2012b). They then asked the government to place more emphasis on bilateral 
agreements rather than waiting for EU agreement on SVLK, since they said EU regulation is not legally binding 
for its members (Rimbawan Interaktif, 2012c). 
There are six groups involved in the timber legality issue, namely the Ministries of Forestry and the Ministry of 
Trade; primary and large-scale forest industries; Asmindo, APHI and the downstream industries; the European 
Union (EU); the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF); and researchers and academics. The government, 
large-scale companies, environmental groups and the EU support a wood certification programme in order to 
achieve sustainable forest management. Meanwhile, Asmindo and APHI consider certification for furniture and 
handicrafts unnecessary because the raw materials they use are legal, and certification would increase production 
cost and lead to a decline in competitiveness. On the other hand, academics suggested all parties seek the 
legitimacy of Indonesian timber products with the assurance of forest sustainability. 
4.1.2 Climate Change Including REDD Initiative 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) was an approach proposed at Climate 
Change Conference 13 in Bali in 2007 and amended in 2009 at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit. It 
contains mechanisms for REDD and forest-rich countries to earn compensation for preserving their forests. 
President Yudhoyono, at the G20 Summit in Pittsburgh, filed a voluntary commitment to reduce Indonesia's 
carbon emissions by 26% by 2020, up to 41% with international assistance. Following the commitment, the 
government set up 70 programs funded by the state budget to reduce emissions as promised. 
Public deliberation 
Climate change has attracted people’s attention successfully. The emergence of the REDD initiative, however, 
raises a lot of pros and cons. Indigenous environmental groups reject REDD and call it “colonialism of forests”. 
They argue that REDD scheme will only seize control of indigenous forest people’s land and allow capital 
owners to occupy it (Kompas, 2009). At provincial level, some governors felt their provinces were appropriate 
for REDD implementation. Nevertheless, at that time the central government designated only eight provinces for 
the REDD trial (Kompas, 2011a). In the practice, each stage of REDD implementation program involved many 
parties and this led to slow progress. Many are worried, since the program was launched and approved 
internationally (Kompas, 2011b) 
Expert deliberation 
The Indonesian commitment to reduce carbon emissions concerned the involvement of the Norwegian 
government. In May 2010, Indonesia and Norway signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) with USD 1 billion of REDD+ 
funding for emission reduction activities (Majalah Kehutanan Indonesia, 2010). In 2011 the Ministry of Forestry 
also received a grant of USD 3.6 million from the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility to support Indonesia in 
reducing greenhouse gas emission by 26% by 2020 (Majalah Kehutanan Indonesia, 2011c). To meet its 
commitment the Indonesian government’s REDD+ Task Force has done many things, including a logging 
moratorium on 64 million hectares of primary forests and peatlands and limiting plantation size area (Agro 
Indonesia, 2011c; 2012i). However, Norway said the effort was not enough and Indonesia must do more (Agro 
Indonesia, 2012j). Lately, Norway would like to resign from the LoI (Rimbawan Interaktif, 2012e).  
Regarding this issue the authors consider there are three most active actors who affecting Indonesia policies, 
namely the Presidential Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight (UKP4) which also leads 
REDD+ Task Force, the Ministry of Forestry, and scientists. UKP4 has set many policies related to forest 
utilization and national strategic for REDD implementation. Those policies have wide implications for all REDD 
activities throughout Indonesia. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Forestry as a technical actor has an important role 
since forest sector is expected to reduce emission by 14% of the total national target. Their performance would 
be significant contribution to the success of REDD implementation. Scientists have much influence through 
academic discussion and policy formulation. 
4.1.3 Oil Palm Plantation and Its Environmental Aspects 
Indonesia had the biggest area of oil palm plantation with 48% of world palm oil production in 2012 (Note 4) 
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(Majalah Swa, 2012). This status was achieved in 2007 after Indonesian palm oil production exceeded that of 
Malaysia. At 34%, palm oil has the largest market share compared to other vegetable oils. Palm oil gradually 
shifted the market share of soybean oil produced by subtropical countries, which only reaches 30.1% (Media 
Indonesia, 2010a).  
Public deliberation 
The high productivity of oil palm plantation which takes around six to ten times compared to other vegetable oils’ 
grown in Europe and the US has been triggering unfair competition among its competitors. The Secretary 
General of Indonesian Palm Oil Association (Gabungan Pengusaha Kelapa Sawit Indonesia or GAPKI) said that 
the pressure on the oil has been going on since early 1980s. He detailed that NGOs’ allegations ranging from 
claim that palm oil having high cholesterol, inducing heart disease, causing pollution and destroying orangutan 
habitats (Media Indonesia, 2010b). The Indonesian government considered that claims of environmental 
destruction against the Indonesian oil palm plantation as a part of a trade war, which was to be countered by 
providing more accurate information. The Coordinator Minister for Economic Affairs said the government and 
industry had to fight against a smear campaign related to palm oil, even bringing unfair trade practices 
allegations to the World Trade Organization or to bilateral meetings (The Jakarta Post, 2012c). Previously, in 
2011, GAPKI resigned from the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) and supported Indonesian 
Sustainable Palm Oil (ISPO) as an alternative framework standard for palm oil certification, though still 
allowing their members to stay in RSPO (Bisnis Indonesia, 2011; Republika Online, 2011a). At the APEC CEO 
Summit 2012 in Vladivostok, a number of developed countries, led by the US, did not approve palm oil as 
environmental goods. At the time, President Yudhoyono said that palm oil was an environmentally friendly 
product, but it was blocked by unfair competition (Suara Pembaruan, 2012). In November 2012, Greenpeace 
indicated Indonesian oil palm companies did not protect the environment, since they did not hold RSPO 
certificates and were planting in shallow peat land, which however is legal in Indonesia (Antara, 2012b). 
Expert deliberation 
Oil Palm plantation issue in the Ministry of Forestry focused more on licensing forestland for plantation and 
mining. Hence, MoF did not pay much attention to this issue. Conflicts between Indonesian palm oil producers 
and other vegetable oil producers from Europe and the US have been going more intense and are recognized by 
Indonesian government as well as GAPKI. The Indonesian Deputy Minister of Trade challenged the EU to 
conduct research and prove their claim that oil palm destroys the environment and is harmful to health. He even 
presented scientific data to refute all such claims (Agro Indonesia, 2011a). In addition, the Indonesian 
government is also awaiting the US response on charges that palm oil did not meet the minimum standard of 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction (Agro Indonesia, 2012h). This unpleasant business attitude convinced 
GAPKI to resign from RSPO, since RSPO tends to support consumers’ interests. RSPO membership consists 30% 
of growers and 70% of non-growers, while RSPO decisions are based on a majority voice. GAPKI considered 
RSPO rules as only complicating matters for producers, and consumers did not buy palm oil with RSPO 
certificates at premium prices (Agro Indonesia, 2011b). GAPKI also suspects RSPO directed non-governmental 
organizations to protect western countries’ interests since they bluntly call for open war against palm oil. 
Apparently, this conflict would take a long time since President Yudhoyono fully supports expanding oil palm 
plantations (Investor Daily Indonesia, 2012). 
In general, groups involved in palm oil issue polarized into producer and non-producer. Group of producer 
consists of the Ministries of Forestry, Ministry of Trade, large-scale oil palm companies and their association 
(GAPKI); while the non-producer group comprises the EU, the USA, and environmental NGOs, to wit WWF 
and Greenpeace. Surprisingly, buyers’ alignment was determined by the groups’ campaign through mass media. 
Although buyers, being rational, like qualitied products at low prices, they do not want to be accused as a group 
who degrades the environment. 
4.2 Secondary International Forest-related Issues 
4.2.1 Harmonization of Wood and Forest Certification Schemes 
Issue on timber and forest certification emerged from the need for an information system to assess whether a 
timber product has been processed through environmentally friendly ways. For this purpose, environmental 
activists and other groups set up the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification scheme in 1993. By this 
time, there also emerged other certification schemes such as the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest 
Certification (PEFC) in Europe, Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) in North America and Lembaga Ekolabel 
Indonesia (LEI) in Indonesia. All of them are voluntary, which means participants could adopt the standards if 
they are willing and fulfill the requirements. In 2009, the Indonesian government developed SVLK as a timber 
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legality assurance and applied it in 2013 to all wood-based industries. Each certification scheme has specific 
attributes, such as market acceptance, cost, length of certification process, emphasized aspects, as well as 
standards flexibility. Business units, however, constantly use economic considerations in choosing affordable 
schemes in line with profit maximization. For this reason, some of them took more than one certification scheme 
at once (Bisnis Indonesia, 2012). This leads to a double charge, whereas buyers do not require a specific 
certification model. There was no any valuable public deliberation to this issue. Conversely, five of seven experts 
interviewed unequivocally stated that forest and timber certification was an international issue that strongly 
influenced Indonesian forest policy and practices. 
Expert deliberation 
As a matter of fact, the FSC scheme is voluntary and has been adopted by industries that primarily export 
wood-based products to Europe. Regarding this point, the Deputy Minister of Trade stated that there should be a 
bridge between mandatory and voluntary schemes so that those who receive SVLK automatically become FSC 
certified (Agro Indonesia, 2012f). A similar idea was also conveyed by the Executive Director of APHI, since the 
government was to do so on a voluntary basis (Agro Indonesia, 2012g). Along with the talks, on 6 March 2012, 
the Indonesia Forestry Certification Coordination (IFFC) introduced the PEFC certification scheme, which is 
known to have weak environmental criteria compared to the FSC, but was received well in Europe and the US. 
At present, the issue on harmonization of certification schemes is still on going.  
Based on previous information, there are four groups with strong interest in this issue, namely the Ministries of 
Forestry and Trade; the Indonesian timber industry; the WWF; and certification scheme owners. The Indonesian 
government must fight for wood products to be accepted in overseas markets. Therefore, trade barriers must be 
removed, and agreement with buyer countries have to be signed as soon as possible. Meantime, logging 
companies and other large-scale wood-based industries want their products accepted by the market with or 
without certification. Nevertheless, the furniture and handicraft industries reject double certification because 
their raw materials have already been certified, so they expect their products to be certified automatically. And 
last, certification scheme owners also want to preserve their certification schemes.  
4.2.2 Land Use Change 
Land use change in Indonesia is a warm issue among industrial groups and environmental activists. This comes 
from the USD 1 billion Letter of Intent (LoI) between Indonesia and Norway that includes moratorium of new 
forest utilization permits as Indonesian commitment to reduce carbon emissions. As known, the Oslo Agreement 
on forest moratorium actually applies only to primary forests and peat lands, and effectively began in early 2011. 
However, foreign NGOs tried to pressure the government to implement the moratorium on all types of forest, 
including secondary forests, which then were opposed by palm producers. In this issue, there is no any 
meaningful debate arising in public media. 
Expert deliberation 
The Chairperson of Indonesian Enterprises Association (Apindo) said that the President had to prioritize national 
interests rather than satisfy foreign insistence to implement the moratorium on all type of forests. The 
Association of Indonesian Palm Oil (GAPKI) stated that the moratorium on oil palm development and expansion 
was not possible since this commodity delivered considerable economic and social benefits (Agro Indonesia, 
2010). In May 2011, President Yudhoyono issued Presidential Decree No. 10, delaying all new utilization 
permits within primary forest and peat lands for two years, and instructed the Minister of Forestry to improve 
forest management policies (Majalah Kehutanan Indonesia, 2011d). However, the Secretary-General of the 
Ministry of Forestry and Greenpeace both said that the moratorium had to expand beyond two years (Mongabai 
Indonesia, 2012b). On the other hand, the Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN) took this 
opportunity to have included 6 million hectares of customary land into the New Integrated National Map 
(Mongabai Indonesia, 2012c). Some experts argue that the government should commit to a moratorium in all of 
primary forest and peat land area in order to meet the presidential pledge to reduce carbon emission by 26% in 
2020. They also ask the government to increase palm oil production through intensification rather than 
extensification (Rimbawan Interaktif, 2012d).  
Based on these findings, there are five groups strongly involved in this issue. First, the Ministry of Forestry as 
the authority in control of forestland use; second, plantation companies and other business groups who need vast 
land resources to running their business; third, indigenous people’s groups  concerned with keeping their land 
from encroachment by industry. Environmental organizations such as Greenpeace also pay attention to the 
land-use change issue to make sure the forest moratorium is implemented properly. Lastly, scientists raise the 
government’s awareness of how to balance both economic growth and forest and environmental sustainability. 
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4.2.3 Forest and Species Conservation 
Forest degradation and deforestation caused by fires, improper land use and logging activities have deflated 
biodiversity in Indonesia and lead to some species being endangered or extinct. The Indonesian government, 
people and communities in and around forests, business groups and conservation organizations then put much 
effort to prevent its deterioration.  
Public deliberation 
There were not so many articles on forest, land and species conservation in public mass media. If any, they put 
more emphasis on conflicts of interest in the conservation field, not conservation activities themselves. 
Conservation activities were undertaken to protect nature and build livelihood. For example, a breeding center 
for the endangered Bali starling was launched by Begawan Foundation in Bali (The Jakarta Post, 2011). They 
bred local birds with others to enhance genetic diversity. In Lampung, the Artha Graha Network in cooperation 
with the Ministry of Forestry conserve forest for tigers, elephants, gibbons and other wildlife (Media Indonesia, 
2011c). Other groups take indirect activities to conserve nature, such as the Indonesian Wild Birds Reservation, 
which launched a postage stamp series featuring endangered Indonesian birds (The Jakarta Post, 2012d). At the 
international level, the United States erased USD 28.5 million of Indonesian debt in a debt-for-nature swap 
agreement, namely the transfer of debt used for forest conservation. Previously, the US government wrote off 
USD 19.6 million of Indonesian debt for forest conservation focusing on the 13 national parks on Sumatra 
(Republika Online, 2011b). 
Expert deliberation 
The Ministry of Forestry has agencies for conserving nature under the supervision of the Directorate General of 
Forest Preservation and Natural Conservation. They are very concerned about endangered species such as Sunda 
pangolin (Manis javanica), Badak Jawa (Rhinoceros sondaicus), and Elang Jawa (Spizaetus bartelsi) in Java; 
Badak Sumatra (Dicerorhinus sumatrensis) in Sumatra; Cendana (Santalum album) in East Nusa Tenggara; 
snake-necked turtle (Chelodina mccordi) in Rote Island and tiger and orchid species (Majalah Kehutanan 
Indonesia, 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; also Mongabai Indonesia, 2012a). Most articles about species 
conservation were linked to the species status according to the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
(IUCN) or CITES (the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora). On 
the Indonesian forester mailing list, the discussions about conservation circulate around the forest as the habitat 
of animals and plants and the function of forests in mitigating natural disaster. Discussion also arose when mass 
media revealed violations committed by companies, such as the poaching of orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) when 
opening oil palm plantations (Rimbawan Interaktif, 2012f; 2012g).  
Only three actors with two meaningful roles were present in this issue, namely the Ministry of Forestry versus 
forest companies and conservation organizations. Mass media consider their activities important for arousing 
public awareness in environmental protection. Although environmental organizations and scientists talk about 
this issue, their roles were not very noticeable. In fact, the latter actors did not have a lot of influence on the issue, 
since mass media only reported the actors who took real action as preserving environment. 
4.2.4 Deforestation and Decentralized Forest Governance 
The high rate of deforestation in Indonesia and its impact has become a concern of the world. Sunderlin and 
Resosudarmo (1996) mentioned meaningful publications stated that deforestation in the 1990s was caused 
mainly by shifting cultivation, transmigration growth of population. Similar conclusion derived by data from the 
Ministry of Forestry indicated that 66% of deforestation was caused by commercial, local and subsistence 
agriculture (Kissinger et al., 2012). However, issues related to deforestation are often associated with corruption, 
weak law enforcement, inappropriate policy and the inability of central government to manage the forest 
(Suparna, 2001; FWI & GFW, 2002). These arguments then led to a rethink of authority sharing between central 
and local governments in forest management. In CGI meeting in 2001, forestry decentralization was agreed as a 
condition of loan debt. The central government then issued a series of regulations called forest policy reform. 
However, the deforestation rate has even peaked in the decentralization era (Nurrochmat, 2005).  
Public deliberation  
The Secretary General of APHI recognized local autonomy as the driving factor of deforestation. He said 
regional autonomy provides the opportunity for regents to issue concessions of less than 30 thousand hectares 
according to Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government. Unfortunately, these licenses did not meet with 
sustainable forest management practices, and massive deforestation occurred in most of the forest-rich districts 
(Media Indonesia, 2012). Supporting this claim, some of former heads of districts have been tried in court for 
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forestry-related crimes (Kompas, 2012b). Environmental organizations such as WWF, Indonesia Working Group 
on Forest Finance (IWGFF) and Transparency International Indonesia (TII) stated that decentralization opened 
space for corruption and collusion in natural resource utilizations (Gatra, 2012). The Director General of Forest 
Protection and Nature Conservation of the MoF reported that potential losses due to inappropriate permits during 
the era of decentralization reached IDR 276.4 trillion, including 770 illegal logging cases and 1724 for mining 
from 2004 until 2012 in eight provinces (Kompas, 2012c).  
Expert deliberation 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)’s report entitled Green Carbon, Black Trade mentioned 
rampant deforestation and illegal timber trade in various parts of the world caused by organized crime. In 
Indonesia, it was caused mainly by corruption at upper and lower state levels and system failure (Nellemann & 
INTERPOL Environmental Crime Programme, 2012). The MoF realized the decentralization process has not 
shown meaningful progress yet. Conflicts and disharmonized power sharing between central and local 
governments have enlarged opportunities in unsustainable forest utilizations and led to new pressure on forests 
(Kementerian Kehutanan, 2010). On the other hand, the central government seems to be very careful in setting 
new policies to avoid accusations of recentralization. Apparently, decentralization brought trouble and confusion 
for Indonesia in the middle of a desire to create greater regional autonomy (Kadjatmiko, 2008). Many 
researchers emphasized formulating suitable policy regarding forest decentralization. For instance, CIFOR has 
conducted 14 studies on decentralization and forest throughout Indonesia during period 2001-2005. 
The central and local governments and environmental organizations are the main actors playing important roles 
in this issue. The central government has to share its power with local governments for decentralization to work. 
In the meantime, it also faces heavy international pressure to manage the environment well. Local governments 
for their part harness unstable decentralization to profit from forest utilizations. On this point, environmental 
organizations come and use national and international publications to warn about long-term environmental 
damage. 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Public versus Expert Deliberations  
There are three differences in how the issues were presented in public and expert discourse deliberation. First, 
public mass media did not pay much attention to issues that did not have direct and immediate importance for the 
citizen, i.e.: harmonization of wood and forest certification schemes and land use change. This means that public 
mass media consider public preferences for their articles and ignore irrelevant topics for short-term interests of 
society. Second, public deliberations also differ from expert deliberations in terms of the depth of information. 
Third, public deliberations only touch debates on policymaking process and its implementation, while the 
expert’s give long-term strategic discussions, policy options, studies on policy impacts and dialogue space 
among interested groups. This deliberative behavior is quite similar to what happened in Bangladesh, Brazil, 
Bolivia, Peru, and other countries (see: Kleinschmit, 2012; Leipold, 2014; Medina et al., 2009; Sadath, 2012; 
Sadath et al., 2013; Sadath & Krott, 2012). 
5.2 The Most Active Actors 
The Ministry of Forestry is the most active actor in all issues. Another active actor is the Ministry of Trade, 
which actively involved in three issues, namely timber legality, harmonization of wood and forest certification 
scheme, as well as oil palm plantation and its environmental aspects. It indicates that forest-related issues at an 
international level are closely related to international trade and business (Humphreys, 2009). In these cases, the 
Ministries of Forestry as well as the Ministry of Trade work in similar directions, primarily in order to get 
Indonesian natural products into EU and the US markets (Kementerian Kehutanan, 2012a; 2012b; Nurrochmat et 
al., 2014; Cashore & Stone, 2012; Iben et al., 2014). This is surprising as the theory of bureaucratic politics 
suggest only a single actor has dominant role in a particular sector (Peters, 2010) and intersection of 
responsibilities among state bureaucracies will create conflict of interests and unproductive contestation (Sahide 
& Giessen, 2015; similar Ongolo, 2015; Hogl et al., 2009). Future studies must scrutinize this relationship not 
based on discursive contributions, but on on-going politics. 
This study also finds industrial groups, namely wood-based industry and oil palm plantation groups, involved in 
five of the seven issues. Most industries support foreign trade policies issued by the Ministry of Forestry and the 
Ministry of Trade even though some of them disagree on the certification policy for downstream industries 
(similar Obidzinski et al., 2014). However, they are in conflict with WWF and Greenpeace, who oppose these 
industries as destructive to the forest and environment. Industrial groups still demand proof of these allegations. 
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Environmental groups were another active actor that was present in almost issues. In the case of timber legality 
and harmonization of wood and forest certification schemes, both industry and WWF tend to a similar direction 
although each group has its own interests.  
5.3 The “Missing” Actors 
The roles of scientists and indigenous people were not apparently clear on these issues. Scientists’ role in 
analyzing issues is limited to scientific and policy discussions among themselves, not in the public media. This 
finding is in line with prior findings on the limited impact of scientific experts on public deliberation (e.g. Sadath, 
2012; Grundmann, 2009; Giessen et al., 2009; Hasanagas, 2014; Ekayani et al., 2015). Meanwhile, Aliansi 
Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN), as a representative of indigenous people, tries to circulate information 
regarding their predicament through several channels of group and social media. However, the complexity of the 
social order and conflicting interests among indigenous people makes this problem quite difficult to rise in 
public mass media, let alone at an international level. 
5.4 Issues in International Forest Regime Complex versus Domestic Issues 
The results suggest that the issues of timber legality, forest conversions, and climate change are now become the 
major topics discussed by the MoF. These issues demonstrate that the MoF puts more concern on production 
function of forest rather than to its non-economic functions. Pressures by environmental NGOs through their 
international networks still unable to bring more conservational and social issues –as elements of sustainable 
forest management- like endangered species protection, poverty alleviation of forest-dependent people, and local 
people rights’ recognition into the MoF’s priority programs. This fact strengthens claim mentioning although 
many issues available in international negotiations on and related to forest resource (Humphreys, 2006), 
bureaucracies always choose the most appropriate ones, according to their interests. It also clarifies that some 
issues may be applicable for certain country within specific period, while some others are not (Giessen et al., 
2014).  
6. Conclusion 
This paper has identified seven current international forest-related issues in Indonesia: timber legality; 
harmonization of wood and forest certification schemes; oil palm plantation and its environmental aspects; land 
use change; climate change including REDD initiative; forest and species conservation; and deforestation and 
decentralized forest governance. These issues are also observed work in Bangladesh (Rahman & Giessen, 2014) 
and Argentina (Burns & Giessen, 2014), and strengthen a notion mentioning recent global initiatives on forest 
spin around issue of forest sustainability, legal timber and REDD+ (McDermott, 2012). Two issues that are more 
technical as well as potentially contentious, specifically harmonization of wood and forest certification schemes 
and land use change were not present in public deliberations, but rather remained limited to expert circles. Hence 
the IFRC seems to be relevant in many ways in Indonesia. The issues identified do cover a wide range of policy 
domains described by Humphreys (2006) and Giessen (2012). In Indonesia, global climate agreements are made 
relevant through REDD, endangered species conservation is discussed and free trade issues are touched upon by 
timber legality and certification issue. However, elements of indigenous people, desertification, CBD and SFM 
are not discussed in Indonesian public and expert deliberations.  
Altogether the issues show that the most active actors in public and expert deliberations are the Ministry of 
Forestry and the Ministry of Trade, environmental NGOs like WWF and Greenpeace as well as wood and palm 
oil industry groups. This suggests that the competition of public bureaucracies and their societal clientele (i.e. 
ministries, see Peters, 2010; Rayner et al., 2001; Hogl et al., 2009; Giessen 2010a; 2010b; and Giessen & Krott, 
2009; Krott & Hasanagas, 2006) is an important driver of forest-related issues and politics in Indonesia. Their 
contribution to the issues indicates a relatively weak coalition on forest protection, whereas forest utilizations 
and trade interests seem to be rather strong. Moreover, the main lines of conflict as represented in the issues lie 
between forest utilizations (e.g. for profitable timber or other land use) and forest conservation, which is in line 
with research by Winkel (2007). This study only analyses the issues measured by more or less public statements 
in newspapers, expert journals and so forth. These only indicate the formal claims and positions of the actors 
which they are willing to display in more or less public deliberations in public and expert arena (Krott, 1990; 
Kleinschmit, 2012). Based only on this data on formal statements, the authors draw conclusions on which issues 
from the IFR are made relevant in Indonesia. Other issues which may become relevant based on informal goals 
of specific actors cannot be revealed by this study. 
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Notes 
Note 1. This exploratory study is part and basis of a broader research project, which will subsequently analyse 
the implementation of the IFRC in Indonesia in more detail.  
Note 2. These sources are available in the Internet at http://www. mediaindonesia.com/, http://kompas.com/, and 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/ respectively.  
Note 3. These are available in the Internet at http://www.dephut.go.id/index.php?q=id/node/5070, 
http://agroindonesia.co.id/ and http://indonesia.mongabay.com/ respectively. 
Note 4. Oil palm is the general name term of Elaeis guineensis crop while palm oil is the product that produces 
from oil palm fruit. 
 
Appendix A  
Main Actors and Their Positions on Each Issue 
Issue  Main actors Actors’ main positions 
Primary international forest-related issues 
1. Timber legality  
 
Ministry of Forestry and  
Ministry of Trade 
 Support FLEGT and VPA  
 Produce legal instruments and force industries to 
obey it 
 Promote global recognition of SVLK  
Primary and large scale forest 
industries 
 Support FLEGT and VPA  
 Willing to be certified 
Asmindo, APHI and downstream 
industries  
 
 Support FLEGT and VPA  
 Not willing to be certified 
 Downstream industries’ products automatically 
legal since their raw are certified  
EU countries (Indonesian wood  Postponed signing FLEGT and VPA three times  
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products destination)  Unclear position 
WWF  Support FLEGT, VPA and SVLK 
Researchers and academics  Distrust EU commitment 
 Bilateral agreements more important than VPA 
since the EU agreement is not legally binding 
 Push sustainable forest management practice to 
build Indonesian wood products’ legitimacy 
 Warn about SVLK as new gateway for corruption
2. Climate change 
including REDD 
initiative 
UKP4 and REDD+ Task Force  Indonesian representation in international forums
 Much interaction with international actor and less 
power  
Ministry of Forestry  Technical actor  
Scientists  Providing studies and conceptual frameworks for 
government 
3. Oil palm 
plantation and its 
environmental 
aspects 
Ministry of Forestry  Permits for plantation 
Ministry of Trade  Fight for acceptance of palm oil products without 
any restriction and as a source of national income
Indonesian Palm Oil Association 
(GAPKI) 
 Need to expand oil palm production 
Greenpeace and WWF  Promote sustainable environment irrespective of 
national policy 
EU and US industries  Protect domestic vegetable oil production by 
blocking palm oil imports 
Secondary international forest-related issues 
1. Harmonization of 




Ministry of Forestry 
and Ministry of Trade 
 Fight for SVLK in buyer countries 
 Recognize voluntary scheme and expect the 
opposite for SVLK 
Indonesian timber industry  Want mutual recognition between two kinds of 
certification so that they could get both at once 
WWF and other environmental 
organizations 
 Support FSC becoming the powerful and 
well-accepted wood and forest certification 
scheme 
FSC, LEI, PEFC and SVLK 
scheme owners 
 Fight for their scheme to be recognized by buyers 
and accepted by industry 
2. Land use change  UKP4 and REDD Task Force  Makes policies related to national strategy for 
land utilization 
Ministry of Forestry  Maintain control over forest land use 
 Keep land use change as their concern 
Plantation companies (GAPKI)  Need to expand oil palm plantation 
 Consider restrictions a business obstacle 
 Worry about influence of foreign lobby on 
Indonesian policy making 
Indigenous peoples  Secure their land from occupation by companies 
Greenpeace  Prohibit Indonesia from utilizing primary and 
secondary forests and peat lands 
Scientists   Counsel government to balance economic 
development and environmental protection 
3. Forest and species 
conservation 
Ministry of Forestry  Protect genetic resources and consider it a 
precious heritage the future 
Forest companies and 
conservation organizations 
 Participate in environmental preservation and 
species conservation 
4. Deforestation and 
decentralized 
Central government (Ministry of 
Forestry) 
 Secure forest for diplomatic purposes 
Local government  Utilize forest and other idle natural resources as 
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forest governance  source of income 
WWF, IWGFF, TII  Produce and utilize reports of poor forest 
management in Indonesia in widespread forums 
 
Appendix B 
Acronyms and Abbreviations  
AMAN Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (Indigenous Peoples’ Alliance of the Archipelago)  
APHI  Asosiasi Pengusaha Hutan Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Forest Concessionaires) 
Apindo Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia (Indonesian Enterprises Association)  
Asmindo  Asosiasi Industri Permebelan dan Kerajinan Indonesia (Indonesian Furniture Industry and 
Handicraft Association) 
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity 
CGI Consultative Group on Indonesia 
CIFOR Center for International Forestry Research 
EU European Union 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization  
FLEGT  Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade 
FSC Forest Stewardship Council  
GAPKI Gabungan Pengusaha Kelapa Sawit Indonesia (Indonesian Palm Oil Association) 
IFR International Forest Regime 
IFRC International Forest Regime Complex 
ISPO Indonesian Sustainable Palm Oil  
ITTO International Tropical Timber Organization 
MoF Ministry of Forestry 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
PEFC Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification 
REDD Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation  
RSPO Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
SFM Sustainable Forest Management 
SMEs Small and Medium Scale Enterprises 
SVLK  Sistem Verifikasi Legalitas Kayu (Timber Legality Verification System) 
UKP4 Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan (Presidential Delivery 
Unit for Development Monitoring and Oversight)  
VPA  Voluntary Partnership Agreements 
WTO  World Trade Organization 
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature  
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The Ministry of Forestry
International influences
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
More  than  ever,  state  agencies  responsible  for forest  issues  are  required  to balance  the  social,  economic
and  environmental  demands  on forests  in domestic  and  international  spheres.  New and  often  cross-
cutting  issues  may  threaten  the  position  and  power  of traditional  forest  bureaucracies  through,  e.g.,  a
redistribution  of  power  among  a number  of  other  land-use-related  state  agencies.  This  paper  analyzes  the
absolute  and  relative  power  of the Ministry  of  Forestry  (MoF)  in  two  selected  policy  processes  originating
on  the  international  and  domestic  levels,  namely  the REDD+  Programme  and  the  One  Map  Policy.  Building
on a behavioralist  conception  of  power  and  bureaucratic  politics  theories,  we  study  these  processes  to
reveal  the  power  dynamics  between  the MoF  and  other  state  bureaucracies,  based  mainly  on  documents
on  tasks  assigned  to these  bureaucracies.  Our  results  show  a clear  decline  in  the relative  power  of the
MoF,  most  notably  in the  case  of  incentive  and  coercive  power,  though  we  also  show  a  continuation
of power  resulting  from  dominant  information.  However,  due  to  political  intervention  from  the new
president,  traditional  forest  bureaucracy  is  now  reclaiming  most  of  relative  power  elements  in  these
cases. We  discuss  the core findings  and  conclude  that  both  REDD+  and  the  One Map  Policy  are  likely
to  become  effective  policies  only  if the  bureaucratic,  sectoral  and  multi-level  conflicts  of  interest  we
examine  are  addressed  and  fewer  leading  agencies  (or  one)  assume  responsibility  for  policy  formulation
and implementation.
© 2015  Elsevier  Ltd. All  rights  reserved.
Abbreviations: BAPPENAS, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National
Development Planning Agency); BIG, Badan Informasi Geospasial (Geospatial Infor-
mation Agency); BPN, Badan Pertanahan Nasional (National Land Agency); DNPI,
Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim (National Council on Climate Change); GtCO2e,
Giga metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent; Inpres, Instruksi Presiden (Presiden-
tial  Instruction); Kepres, Keputusan Presiden (Presidential Decree); MoA, Ministry
of  Agriculture; MoDA, Ministry of Domestic Affairs; MoE, Ministry of Environment;
MoEF, Ministry of Environment and Forestry; MoEMR, Ministry of Energy and Min-
eral Resource; MoF, Ministry of Forestry; MoFi, Ministry of Finance; MoLHR, Ministry
of  Law and Human Rights; MoPW,  Ministry of Public Works; MoSE, Ministry of State
Enterprises; MoT, Ministry of Trade; Perpres, Peraturan Presiden (Presidential Reg-
ulation); RAN-GRK, Rencana Aksi Nasional-Penurunan Gas Rumah Kaca (National
Action Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction); RAD-GRK, Rencana Aksi
Daerah-Penurunan Gas Rumah Kaca (Regional Action Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions Reduction); UKP4, Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang Pengawasan dan Pengendalian
Pembangunan (Presidential Delivery Unit for Development Monitoring and Over-
sight); UNFCCC, United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change.
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1. Introduction
More than ever, state agencies responsible for forest issues
are required to balance the social, economic and environmental
demands on forests in domestic and international spheres (Sayer
and Collins, 2012; Mwangi and Wardell, 2012; Maryudi, 2012;
Giessen, 2012; Giessen and Krott, 2009). These new and often
cross-cutting issues may  threaten traditional forest bureaucra-
cies through, e.g., a redistribution of power among a number of
land-use-related state agencies. Fundamentally, state agencies, as
bureaucratic politics and related literature reveal (e.g., Krott, 2005;
Olsen, 2006; Peters, 2001; Giessen et al., 2014; Buijs et al., 2014;
Kumar and Kant, 2005; Bennett et al., 2012, 2013), compete for
power in the form of formal mandates to pursue policies in these
emerging issue areas and to acquire staff and budgets. This com-
petition for power has been identified as an important factor in
land use and forest politics (Pedersen, 2010; Krott et al., 2014;
Aurenhammer, 2011, 2012; Ojha et al., 2014; Ongolo, 2015). In
this competition, the agencies use both domestic and international
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.07.018
0264-8377/© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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issues to strengthen their negotiation positions vis-à-vis com-
peting agencies. They do this by framing and taking up issues,
discourses and rules to legitimize their roles and by finding domes-
tic and/or international coalition partners (Bernstein and Cashore,
2012; Giessen, 2011, 2013).
Indonesia is affected by multiple claims from various national
and international groups regarding the utilization and conser-
vation of forests (Brockhaus et al., 2012). These claims include
forest certification, land tenure, forest biodiversity, forest carbon
sequestration and REDD+, as well as the One Map Policy on com-
peting land uses (see Wicke et al., 2011; Wibowo and Giessen,
2015; McDermott, 2014; Sahide and Giessen, 2015). These cross-
cutting and forest-related claims have the potential to challenge
and change the power of the Ministry of Forestry (hereafter MoF),
the traditional bureaucracy in charge of forest issues (similar Burns
and Giessen, 2015). Additionally, stakeholders have long been dis-
appointed with the MoF, which is often associated with corruption,
a lack of openness of data and information, and a disregard for
crimes taking place in forests. These concerns have led to vast
domestic and international criticism and an effort to reduce the
MoF’s power over forest governance, in favor of competing state
agencies (Brown, 1999; Palmer, 2001; Barr, 2006; Singer, 2008).
This paper analyzes the power dynamics of the Ministry
of Forestry (MoF) vis-à-vis its competitor bureaucracies in two
selected policy processes originating from international and
domestic levels, namely the REDD+ Programme and the One Map
Policy. In particular, we analyze the means of power these bureau-
cracies have at hand and changes in the equipment of these power
resources. We  argue that individual policy processes can increase
or decrease the MoF’s equipment of these power resources, mainly
due to policy tasks being assigned to an agency. It is possible that
in one case, the MoF  may  both lose and gain power resources such
as dominant information, (dis-)incentives and coercive power. We
hypothesize that the cases in which the observed specific power
resources of the MoF  are eroded are mainly due to it now sharing
responsibilities with other agencies, which often are new to the
field of forest policy.
In the following sections, we introduce bureaucratic politics and
power theory as our main analytical tools and describe some of our
major methodological choices in detail. Section 3 then explores the
power dynamics between the bureaucracies involved in the two
policy processes mentioned above, with special attention given to
the particular power elements bureaucracies may  lose or gain and
to the bureaucracies that gain at the expense of others. We  then
discuss both the increase and decrease in the power elements of
the MoF  in the selected cases in light of the indicators for power
gains in other fields, before presenting our conclusions.
2. Methodology
2.1. Analytical framework
2.1.1. Bureaucratic politics theory
Any internal and external actors1 keen to influence domes-
tic policy have to meet and deal with the state’s official system,
known as the “bureaucracy” (Peters, 2001; Biermann et al., 2009).
Bureaucracies have a formal goal in serving the public interest
and an informal goal in surviving and expanding organizational
interests, like maximizing power, budget and staff. Those orga-
nizational interests are prioritized if formal and informal goals
1 Actor is defined as an individual, a group of people or an organization with
the  capacity and legitimacy to exercise power, where legitimacy is achieved by
obtaining, formally or informally, the consent of the governed (Biermann, 2010 c.f.
Brockhaus et al., 2014).
cannot be achieved simultaneously (Niskanen, 1974; Krott, 1990;
Giessen and Krott, 2009; Giessen et al., 2014). Although this seems
to be logical, the behavior of a bureaucracy, as noted above, is not
homogenous because it depends on the capability of each bureau-
cracy to achieve its own  benefits (Blais and Dion, 1990). To pursue
those dual goals, bureaucracies can act as political institutions and
administrative bodies (Krott, 2005). As political institutions, they
are equipped with legitimacy, public mandate, financial resources
and competent staffs, and as administrative bodies, bureaucracies
have expertise and information, administrative ideology, decision-
making power, alliances, permanent positions, and a disregard for
politics.
Whether and how international or domestic actors affect pol-
icy change, however, are greatly influenced by the openness of
local bureaucracies to such policy change, as well as by their inter-
ests (informal goals) and formal tasks. Whether a given situation
is one in which a significant policy change might also influences
this process. These processes of changes are frequently transferred
by intentional actors, such as international bureaucracies, global
corporations and science networks (Biermann and Pattberg, 2012),
and by local actors, such as veto players and ruling political parties,
before being captured by local bureaucracies through policy learn-
ing, ideas and discourses, the internationalization of global issues,
policy networks, bureaucratic reform, and institutional change
(Giessen et al., 2014). However, those external interests should go
through five stages of policy cycle, namely agenda setting, policy
formulation, decision making, policy implementation and policy
evaluation (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995), before coming into force.
The absence of external actors, the implantation process of their
interests and the policy process to respond to these interests will
ensure no changes in public policy and that the bureaucracy tends
to be stable or pro status quo.
2.1.2. Power theory
The power of actors has long been discussed by sociology,
psychology, communications, management and political schol-
ars. A more advanced and influential concept of the power of
actors was  delivered by Lukes (2005) in his three dimensions of
power. According to Lukes (2005, p.29), power can be exercised
in three dimensions, namely (i) power over decisions, (ii) power
over non-decisions, and (iii) power over political agendas. Power
over decisions explains how powerful actors influence other actors
and control the decision-making process through its resources,
such as budget, knowledge, and sanction mechanisms. Power over
non-decisions is mainly used by actors equipped with a complete
understanding of the decision-making process and knowledge
about the inability or limitations of other actors involved in such
processes. Powerful actors block others’ involvements through,
e.g., hiding the meeting agenda, arranging meetings at conflict-
ing times for competitors and dismissing minutes from meeting
invitations. Therefore, this second dimension is also called agenda
setting. The third dimension of power is potentially used by knowl-
edgeable actors to alter other’ interests or even to restrain other’
interests as options by creating myths or offering judgments that
certain behavior should (not) be preserved (McCabe, 2013). Lukes’
three dimensions of power and previous works in which he criti-
cized, e.g., Dahl (1957) and Bachrach and Baratz (1962), are focused
on power as domination, widely known as power over (Haugaard,
2012), which may  be identified from observable (overt and covert)
and latent conflicts (Lukes, 2005: 29). Lukes, however, gives little
attention to power to,  which refers to power as property, such as
power to do something (McCabe, 2013: 52), regardless of whether
this power is used.
To fill this hole as well as to address the need for an analyti-
cal framework for assessing bureaucratic obstacles in succeeding
forestry program, Krott et al. (2014) offer the actor-centered
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power (ACP) approach. This approach has reportedly been suc-
cessfully tested in Nepal (Devkota, 2010), Indonesia (Maryudi,
2011), Namibia (Schusser, 2013), Germany (Schusser et al., 2013)
and Cameroon (Movuh, 2012). Unlike the previous ones, the ACP
approach focuses on the power of actors and their potential to cre-
ate, execute or even block any program posed by themselves or
other actors. Krott et al. (2014) define power as a social relationship
in which Actor A has the ability to alter the behavior of Actor B with-
out recognizing B’s will. In other words, power could be the ability
to shape a program according to one’s owns interests, even against
resistance from other actors. According to Krott et al. (2014), power
is empirically observable, explicitly appearing in organizational
documents and implicitly detected through actors’ interests or acts
in maximizing power resources. In this regard, power resources
are all capacities owned to implement one’s own programs or to
alter others’ behavior so that they correspond to the interests of
the potentate. An increase in power resources will automatically
increase the power of the owner, and vice versa, although power
resources are not always exercised by the owner.
According to Krott et al. (2014), power consists of three ele-
ments and can be ascribed to one actor or can be distributed
among several equal actors. The first element, coercion, is defined
as altering the behavior of the subordinate by force. In a social rela-
tionship, coercive power is associated mainly with bureaucracy,
where the people provide the bureaucracy with a mandate through
law for it to implement any agreed rules and to reinforce such
rules by applying sanctions to those who disobey them. The sec-
ond element is (dis)incentives,  which is defined as advantages or
disadvantages introduced to alter the behavior of the subordinate.
Authorities could direct others’ behavior by introducing a disad-
vantage, e.g., the revocation of permits for forest concessionaires,
for those who fail to perform harvesting operations in an ecolog-
ically sound manner. Advantages could also change subordinates’
behavior because all actors naturally desire to maximize their ben-
efits. The last element of power is dominant information, which
means unverifiable information. Information can be classified as
pure information, which can be easily verified by recipients, and
selected information, which recipients can verify only with difficulty,
or not at all, due to a lack of capacity, lack of will, or lack of simple
trust in the information provider. Dominant information becomes
an element of power because actors without valid information can-
not easily make appropriate decisions. In this context, dominant
information includes any information that can be provided only by
a state agency and that is needed by other stakeholders. In some
cases, the absence of such information for the public due to an
‘unwillingness to share’ or ‘unavailability to share’ could be used
to increase the bargaining position of the agency responsible for it.
The ACP approach can measure the elements of power that are
associated with actors (behaviorism), but it cannot address the
structural aspects of power, e.g., of institutions, as can, e.g., the three
dimensional model developed by Lukes (2005). The ACP approach
fully covers the first dimension of Lukes’ power concept. It also
covers the second dimension and partially covers the third one.
In particular, we are unable to assess, e.g., the hidden agenda of
bureaucracies, interests that do not appear in any policy action, and
latent conflicts among bureaucracies, but our approach is capable of
analyzing the distinct and empirically observable power resources
(coercive, incentive and information resources) a specific actor has
at hand.
2.1.3. Absolute and relative gains theorem
Major political reform in a country always generates conse-
quences affecting one or more players (Vis and Van Kersbergen,
2007), which could result in a zero, negative or positive sum
(Uhlaner, 1989). In a positive-sum situation, all players gain
benefits from their constructive interaction. However, the initial
capability of any player and the amount of absolute/ultimate gain
it obtains in cooperation can show which player is the real winner.
Halas (2008) compares the absolute gain of an actor with its initial
capability to find what he calls the relative gain. The actor with the
higher percentage of relative gain is deemed the winner, compared
to other actors with lower percentages of relative gains. There are
three conditions under which a player can be considered the win-
ner. First, it has lower capability but obtains the same amount of
absolute gain as obtained by others. Second, it has similar capabil-
ity to others but obtains more absolute gain. Lastly, it has a higher
capability and obtains more relative gain. The winner, in this con-
text, can be simply illustrated as a younger brother who receives
as much money as his older brother from their parents, although
the actual money he needs to spend is smaller than the cost of his
older brother’s needs.
In our studies, we  consider initial capability as a whole power
source held by any actors, such as budget allocation, number of
staff, strategic tasks, and exclusive information, whereas absolute
gain refers to strategic tasks. The selection of strategic tasks as sin-
gle indicator of absolute gain is based on the fact that every task
should be equipped by another source of power. Furthermore, we
choose status quo as a reference point in measuring the increasing
and decreasing power of state agencies, instead of using aspirations,
heuristics, analogies and emotion (Mercer, 2005).
2.2. Case selection and empirical methods
Indonesia was  selected as a study country for three reasons.
First, as a developing country, it is very influenced by international
actors in terms of gaining financial support from foreign countries
and international funding resources. Second, deforestation result-
ing from the development of forest plantations for pulp, paper
and palm oil generates market resistance to those products, which
influences the government’s other decisions pertaining to forests.
Third, the forestry sector is facing heavy pressure from agricultural,
mining and plantation sectors, as local governments seek sources
of income to fund their local development by converting forests
to other more marketable sectors, resulting in intense competition
among new and old state agencies.
The reasons mentioned above, along with the actors involved,
challenge the power stability of the MoF  as the bureaucracy in
charge of forests in Indonesia. To study the power dynamics
between the MoF  and other bureaucracies, we selected two cases
from international and national processes that currently are at work
in Indonesia, namely, the Norway–Indonesia REDD+ Programme
and the One Map  Policy. The case selection was based on the fact
that both processes involve new cross-cutting issues (e.g., forest-
climate, foreign affairs, and multi-sector land use) and both involve
new state agencies.
The primary data were policy documents containing tasks
assigned to bureaucracies, which were used as indicators of ele-
ment of power for these bureaucracies (see: Policy documents
cited). We  also conducted interviews with semi-structured ques-
tions to detail or verify these documents, catch up on the most
recent facts surrounding the issues, discover more information
about the near-future agenda of relevant actors (Schultze and
Avital, 2011) and confirm the data or statements from certain
actors in the public sphere. The interviews were conducted in
Jakarta and Bogor in June–September 2013 and involved 9 per-
sons from environmental organizations, 3 persons from business
groups, 11 persons from state agencies and 2 academics (see List of
interviewees). Because statements by staff do not necessarily rep-
resent the views of agencies, we avoided to put these statements
explicitly in our analysis. However, we interpreted their opinions
regarding organizational interests that are not written in policy
documents as their true thoughts/intentions.
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We  also carried out non-participant observations of national
conferences to ascertain the actors’ positions on selected cases
(Gillespie and Michelson, 2011). We  also analyzed the content
of the minutes from national or international conferences, legal
documents and the publications and websites of ministries, state
agencies and national and international organizations. Further-
more, we engaged in personal communications with state officials
to confirm the data and information up to April 2014.
3. Results
3.1. Historical background
The Basic Forestry Law of 1967 was employed by the gov-
ernment of Soeharto, who took power a year prior, to designate
nearly 120 million hectares of land, or 62% of Indonesian land, as
state forest area without a proper acquisition process (Galudra and
Sirait, 2009). Facing very high inflation, a deficit in the state bud-
get, unstable domestic politics, looming external debt and moral
crises (Pauker, 1967; Rock, 2003), the government believed that log
exports may  be the fastest way to gain cash (Barr, 2006). Until 1980,
the Ministry of Forestry (MoF) had assigned 43 million hectare of
forest to 438 concessionaires (Barr, 2006). A series of policies under-
taken by the MoF  during the 1980s to the 1990s accumulated forest
resources in the hands of some businesses, which enabled them
to produce plywood at very low costs. Indonesia accounted for
approximately 90% of tropical plywood trade in 1993 (Ngadiono,
2004).
The strong hegemony of Soeharto’s family, military, ruling polit-
ical party and Chinese-Indonesian conglomerates on Indonesia’
forest business (Kaoneka, 1999; Gellert, 2010a) undoubtedly lifted
gross domestic product, foreign exchange and government rev-
enue; created jobs and promoted development outside Java
(Simangunsong, 2004). However, the vast problems resulting from
massive and unsustainable forest extraction were also undeniable
and remain unresolved. Some of the most highlighted problems
are the rate of deforestation (Hansen et al., 2009), illegal log-
ging (Casson and Obidzinski, 2007), annual fires (Tacconi et al.,
2007), a loss of biodiversity (Lenzen et al., 2012) and land use con-
flicts (Sahide and Giessen, 2015; Fay and Michon, 2005). The MoF
has been blamed for these forest problems because its policies
have frequently been deemed inconsistent, inaccurate, inade-
quate and unfair. Other negative attributes attributed to the MoF,
such as corruption (Nellemann and Interpol Environmental Crime
Programme, 2012), a lack of transparency and data openness
(Simangunsong, 2004; Brown, 2002) and limited public partici-
pation in decision-making processes (Santosa et al., 2013), have
caused the public to lose trust in the MoF.
Momentum for better forest governance grew when Indonesia
hosted the thirteenth session of the Conference of the Parties of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC COP 13) in 2007, where the Bali Road Map, which contains
approaches to stimulate a reduction in emissions from deforesta-
tion in developing countries, was adopted. To maintain the spirit of
the Bali Road Map, strengthen Indonesia’s position in international
negotiations on climate change and coordinate all related actions
dealing with climate change, in 2008, the president of Indonesia
established the Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim, or DNPI (National
Council on Climate Change) (DNPI, 2013). The DNPI was tasked
with overseeing the implementation of climate change programs
and acting as Indonesia’s vocal point on climate change in inter-
national forums. One of the acknowledgeable achievements of the
DNPI is its success in gaining a 1 billion dollar commitment from
Norway for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (REDD) in 2010.
Norway–Indonesia cooperation in the next few years will become
mainstream for Indonesian policy on forest and environment and
affect national development, in addition to many state agencies and
local governments. This wave of development in environmentalism
was also utilized by the presidential office (UKP4) to synchronize
overlapping maps produced by sectoral ministries and reconstruct
them into one agreed upon and standardized map. Up to now, both
international and national initiatives have largely influenced the
role of the MoF  in maintaining forest area.
3.2. Power dynamics in the Norway–Indonesia REDD+
Programme
The land use change and forestry (LUCF) sectors are the main
source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Indonesia (Harris
et al., 2012). Reports produced by the Ministry of Environment
(MoE, 2010) and the DNPI and McKinsey (2009) confirm that LUCF
contributed approximately 51–85% of the total CO2-equivalent
released between 1994 and 2009, depending on the research meth-
ods and parameters used (to compare net emissions from forest
areas counted by other bureaucracies, see MoF, 2008). To address
this problem and create significant momentum in the reduction
of carbon emissions from all development sectors, especially both
sectors mentioned, the president of Indonesia announced at the
2009 G-20 meeting that the country intended to reduce its car-
bon emissions by 26% by 2020 (Yudhoyono, 2009). Indonesia also
welcomed international assistance and increased its rate of carbon
reduction to up to 41%. This ambitious pledge then attracted the
participation of the Kingdom of Norway, which granted 1 billion
USD in financial support, as stated in the agreement signed by both
countries in May  2010. Shortly after the announcement was made,
environmental NGOs and researchers questioned how Indonesia
could reach its target in the midst of the complexity of forest gover-
nance at the national level and of numerous unresolved forestland
conflicts in Sumatra and Kalimantan. Other questions that arose
in several discussions were what scientific reasoning was the
basis for this pledge and who  organized it (Resosudarmo et al.,
2013).
In April 2009, the DNPI, in cooperation with McKinsey, evalu-
ated the potential reduction of carbon emissions from eight major
sectors, namely land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF),
peatland, agriculture, power, transportation, petroleum and gas,
cement and buildings. An interim report on this study was issued
in September 2009, and the final report was  issued in June 2010.
The interim report stated that the projection for Indonesian emis-
sions in 2020 would be 2820 GtCO2e, 71% of it from the forestry and
peatland sectors (DNPI and McKinsey, 2009). However, the final
report of this study reveals that Indonesian emissions in 2020 are
estimated to be 2530 GtCO2e, with the share attributed to LULUCF
and peat reaching 64%, or 10% below the levels in the previous
interim report (DNPI and McKinsey, 2010). The president’s commit-
ment to Indonesia’s GHG emissions reduction, as he again stated
in the 2009 COP15 in Copenhagen, was  most likely based on the
interim report on this study because other options were unavail-
able.
In addition, beginning in 2008, the MoE, as an Indone-
sian focal point for the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (replaced by the DNPI in 2008),
began conducting a national greenhouse gas inventory to ful-
fill Indonesia’s Second National Communication to the UNFCCC.
A summary of this work became available to the public in
November 2009, and the complete report was published in
November 2010 (MoE, 2009, 2010). Both reports consistently pro-
jected that Indonesia’s net emissions under a “business as usual”
(BAU, without mitigation policy) scenario would be approximately
2950 GtCO2e by 2020 (MoE, 2009, 2010). This 2-year study did not
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Table  1
Targets in emissions reductions by 2020 by each corresponding bureaucracy (in MtCO2e).
Sector Responsible bureaucracy










Agriculture 0.2 130.6 130.7 0 131
Forestry and peat 5.2 204.7 600.7 810.7 62.4 873
Energy and Transport. 1.1 12.5 40.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 53.6 47 100
Industry 0.0 3.8 3.8 5.3 9
Waste  Management 19.2 19.2 47.2 66
Total  25.7 335.3 600.7 12.5 40.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 3.8 1018.0 161.7 1180
Source: Presidential Regulation No 61/2011 (calculated).
a Joint program with the Ministry of Transportation.
address the president’s commitment to national emissions reduc-
tions.
Following the president’s commitment, and considering studies
conducted by the DNPI & McKinsey and the MoE, BAPPENAS2 drew
up an academic paper on the national action plan for greenhouse
gas emissions reductions, which then was enacted as a presiden-
tial regulation (Perpres) 61/2011 in September 2011. BAPPENAS
fully adopted and only used the study by the MoE  to distribute
emissions reduction targets to each sector and the corresponding
ministry/agency responsible for each. However, the agency indi-
cated to each sector before the Perpres was issued that it was  not
the single agency responsible for that sector, according to the Per-
pres. In the forestry and peat land sectors, for instance, the MoF  has
the responsibility of reducing carbon emissions by 74%, whereas
the MoA  and the Ministry of Public Works (MoPW) are assigned
25% and 1% of the target, respectively (Table 1). BAPPENAS is also
in an important position, holding the authority, according to Per-
pres 61, to create guidelines for reporting the Regional Action Plans
for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction (RAD-GRK), facilitating
provincial governments to make RAD-GRKs, archiving them and
reviewing and revising RAN-GRKs in accordance to national needs
and developments in international dynamics. It appears that BAP-
PENAS has tried to be the leading agency in the greenhouse gas
issue (interviewees 19 and 24).
The Norway–Indonesia Letter of Intent/LoI (The Government of
the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Republic of
Indonesia, 2010) requires the government of Indonesia to establish
a special agency in addition to and in competition with the MoF
tasked with (i) reporting the progress of the REDD+ Programme
and activities to the president, (ii) completing the REDD+ national
strategy, (iii) preparing a measurement, reporting and verifica-
tion (MRV) institution, (iv) designing funding instruments and (v)
selecting a pilot province for REDD+ activities. These works have
been carried out completely by the REDD+ Task Force, a new agency
under UKP4 formed by Presidential Decree (Kepres) No. 19/2010
(Santosa et al., 2013; President of Indonesia, 2010). In addition,
the Task Force also successfully passed ‘the first forest and peat-
land moratorium by presidential instruction in 2011 (President of
Indonesia, 2011). In August 2013, the president established the
REDD+ Agency and appointed the Deputy of UKP4 as its head.
This appointment brought climate change business, especially all
REDD+-related programs, back to the people of UKP4.
In this stage, three intersectoral bureaucracies have risen and
head other bureaucracies through new regulations proposed them-
selves. In particular, the DNPI has its climate change policy,
BAPPENAS has its national action plan for greenhouse gas emis-
sions reduction (RAN-GRK) and the REDD+ Agency has its REDD+
2 BAPPENAS is a state agency in charge of designing and synchronizing the
national development agenda.
Programme. The climate change issue, of course, is more widely
discussed at an international level than greenhouse emissions
reduction and the REDD+ Programme. Thus, the DNPI repre-
sents Indonesia in many international negotiations. Furthermore,
because the DNPI is close to the president, any national policy on
climate change is more easily shaped3 (interviewees 15, 22 and
25). The REDD+ Agency and BAPPENAS, in contrast, work in more
domestic areas by coordinating other ministries, agencies and local
governments to carry out their assigned tasks and by having them
report their achievements periodically.
Accordingly, the power element of state agencies in the REDD+
Programme and its related policy is distributed among seven state
agencies, most of which are concentrated at the two new agencies,
i.e., the DNPI and the REDD+ Agency (Table 2). The MoF  and the MoA,
institutionally, have no significant mandate in shaping any policy
within the REDD+ Programme, although they are members of the
REDD+ Agency and have the highest reduction target for emissions
from forest and peatland. Instead, their staffs have to serve other
bureaucracies for this program to succeed.
3.3. Power dynamics in the Indonesian One Map  Policy
One of the prolonged and still unresolved problems in Indone-
sian forest governance is the obscurity of land and forest boundaries
that is induced by the presence of multiple and overlapping
maps made by bureaucracies that are closely associated to land
resource use, namely, MoF, MoA, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral
Resource (MoEMR) and the National Land Agency (BPN). This issue
is due to the absence of a single reference for a geospatial informa-
tion service used jointly by the ministries, the lack of a generally
accepted standard on thematic maps and the need for an agency
explicitly charged with compiling and integrating those maps.
The idea of having one standardized map for all of Indonesia
came from UKP4, when they persuaded the president by show-
ing differences in maps made by the MoF  and the MoE  and the
implications at the Cabinet Meeting on 23 December 2010 (REDD-
Monitor, 2012). At the time, the president said, “(there) should
be one authoritative map  for national reference” (Samadhi, 2013).
This policy is actually in line with Indonesia’s commitment to
a logging moratorium on forests and peatland, as stated in the
Norway–Indonesia LoI. A Moratorium Map  could be a good example
of a single and integrated map  over a designated area. To real-
ize the policy, UKP4, together with the corresponding ministries
and agencies, held a series of discussions defining the authority for
each thematic map, constructing a standard for thematic maps and
agreeing to it being used as a joint reference. For example, they
agreed to refer to the MoA  for peatland standards while approving
3 DNPI’s closeness to the President was revealed by Purnomo (2012), a Special
Staff to the President for Climate Change and Head of the DNPI Secretariat.
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Table 2
Dynamics of power elements in the Norway–Indonesia REDD+ Programme.
Power element Strategic task MoF UKP4 (REDD+
Task Force)
DNPI REDD+ Agency MoE  MoA  BAPPENAS
Coercion −
(Dis)-incentive Developing REDD+ national strategy +
Shaping forest and peat moratorium policy +
Improving REDD+ national strategy +
Mainstreaming REDD+ in national
development agenda
+ +
Managing REDD+ funding +




implementation of REDD+ Programme
+
Forming national strategy on climate
change
+







Reviewing and adjusting RAN-GRK +
Developing guideline for RAD-GRK
reporting
+
Dominant information Representing Indonesia at the UNFCCC + −
Negotiating the Norway–Indonesia LoI +
Establishing standard for emission
measurement
+
Archiving implementation report for
RAN-GRK and RAD-GRK
+
Conducting GHG inventory + +





(+) Gaining power resource(s) regarding the specific power elements due to the assignment of the strategic task to specific state agency.
(−)  Losing power resource(s) regarding the specific power elements due to the assignment of the strategic task to specific state agency.
RAN-GRK National Action Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction.
RAD-GRK Regional Action Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction.
the forestland cover criterion set by the MoF. All accepted stan-
dards then have to be listed in the Indonesian National Standard
Directory.
In May  2011, the government passed the Presidential Instruc-
tion (Inpres) No 11/2011 on the postponement of the issuance of
new licenses and improving governance of primary natural forests
and peatland, with special instruction to the MoE to reduce gas
emissions by improving business governance within forests and
peatland areas in an associated map. The Inpres 11/2011 came up
with a new interpretation of the 1999 Forest Law (Government
of Indonesia, 1999) by specifying the MoE  as “the agency that is
responsible for the governance of forest and peatland under the
Moratorium Map” rather than the MoF, which traditionally repre-
sents “the government” that rules forest resources. The president
also tasked the MoF, together with BIG, BPN and the REDD+ Agency,
with half-yearly updates on the forest and peatland cover map. As
the instruction opens for public input, the Directorate General of
Forest Planning of the MoF  will situate itself as a repository for
public feedback (MoF, n.d.). If the proposal is complete, the min-
istry will approve and accommodate it in the next revised map.
UKP4, BIG, BPN, the MoA  and academics will engage in the pro-
cess only if the proposal requires ground verification. A coordinated
meeting of the six agencies/ministries will then decide to include
or exclude such proposed amendments in the next moratorium
map.
3.3.1. Thematic maps
The One Map  Policy launched by UKP4 is beyond the morato-
rium map, which covers only approximately 69 million hectares
of forest and peatland (Sloan, 2014). The One Map  Policy is a
coordinated and integrated mapping program for the whole coun-
try involving 12 working groups from 18 ministries/agencies,
covering watershed management, space management, land con-
ditions, forest cover, climate change risks, ecoregions, disasters,
transportation, national defense and intelligence, cultural her-
itage, economics, and many other topics. Based on the Agreement
Document of the National Coordination Meeting for Geospatial
Information 2013, the ministries/agencies within the groups will
spend nearly USD 70 million for the 2014 thematic geospatial
information service from their own annual budget allocated for a
mapping program (Table 3). The MoF  alone will spend 31% of all
budgets (the largest budget) to produce 11% of the thematic maps,
whereas another 10 ministries and agencies with smaller mapping
budgets will spend only 15% of their budgets to produce 30% of the
thematic maps. Thus, although the MoF’s power is diminished in
the case of the moratorium map  issue, it still manages much of the
data on forest resources and has a strategic position in negotiations
on forest resources.
Though the One Map  Policy is expected to overcome the land
conflict problem, it seems that there will be a long process to
achieve its goal. The MoF, MoA  and MoE  will produce different and
similar thematic maps on the same forest and land areas, as agreed
upon in the document on the National Coordination Meeting. The-
matic maps that overlap may  give rise to conflicting interests. In
addition, the MoA  and MoEMR, based on Presidential Instruction
10/2011, have the authority to utilize areas under the moratorium
map  for vitally important national projects, e.g., those involving
electricity, geothermal energy, oil and gas, and paddy and sugar-
cane fields. Therefore, an overlap between those interests is difficult
to avoid.
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Table  3
Budgets of the 7 main state agencies for geospatial information services in 2014.
Ministry/agency Number of map  themes Expenses for geospatial information service (USD)a % of total spending
Ministry of Forestry 26 21,345 31%
Geospatial Information Agency 43 10,684 15%
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resource 29 9402 14%
National Land Agency 5 6188 9%
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries 10 4025 6%
Ministry of Agriculture 20 3769 5%
Ministry of Energy 22 3474 5%
Other 11 ministries/agencies 66 10,620 15%
Source: BIG (2013).
a The exchange rate for 1 USD is 11,700.00 IDR.
Table 4
Dynamics of power elements in the Indonesian One Map  policy.
Power element Strategic task MoF  UKP4 BIG REDD+ Agency MoE  MoA MoEMR
Coercion Postponing business license over primary forest and
peat land
− +





Employing own staff for One Map  Policy − + − + − −
Acting as leading agency on One Map Policy +
Acting as coordinator of technical aspects − +
Spending much of budget for thematic maps +
Dominant
information
Joint updating of moratorium map  twice per year + +
Producing thematic maps + + + + +




(+) Gaining power resource(s) regarding the specific power elements due to the assignment of the strategic task to specific state agency.
(−)  Losing power resource(s) regarding the specific power elements due to the assignment of the strategic task to specific state agency.
Until 2005, the MoF  kept 16 thematic maps to itself, and
only some parties could access them. Today, the Ministry has the
authority to release 29 thematic maps (layers), of which 17 are
open to the public and 12 are still secured (Rahayu, 2013). Although
there is a noticeable increase in the number of maps produced, the
number of maps available to the public is quite constant. A respon-
dent informed us that there is no regulation that would make all
maps available to the public. From the bureaucratic politics per-
spective, a series of political regulations surrounding this topic has
been reducing the power of the MoF, in the sense that the Min-
istry should share a part of the authority. Table 4 shows the power
dynamics of the MoF  and other bureaucracies that benefit from this
policy.
4. Discussion and conclusions
4.1. The Ministry of Forestry under threat?
Both of the observed processes occur in light of international
influences aimed at changing forest-related policy in Indonesia
(Nurrochmat et al., 2014). According to Bernstein and Cashore
(2012) the REDD+ case may  be considered one form of direct access
to domestic policy making, whereas with the One Map  Policy, this
type of relation with international actors and institutions is less
clear. Still, both cases suggest, to a reasonable extent, that in addi-
tion to the constant threats from domestic bureaucracies, it may
be international influences, in particular, that challenge the estab-
lished power sources of forest bureaucracies (Burns and Giessen,
2015; Ongolo, 2015; Mbatu, 2015; Ojha et al., 2009). This may  be
interpreted as a strategy that international actors use to circum-
vent an overly powerful and corrupt MoF, acting in coalition with
its rival domestic bureaucracies but potentially incurring losses,
e.g., critical information on forests. Thus, it does seem that interna-
tional influences, in coalition with other domestic bureaucracies,
attempt to reduce the power of the MoF, with limited success, as
our results suggest.
4.2. Declining relative power of the Ministry of Forestry?
The relative power of the MoF  declined in the cases observed,
mainly because its responsibilities and related tasks have been
gradually replaced or shared with other state agencies. The UKP4,
DNPI and REDD+ Agency are the new bureaucracies gaining both
relative and absolute power (similar Sahide and Giessen, 2015),
especially through the international influences created by the
Norway–Indonesia REDD+ Programme, which began in 2010. A
logging moratorium on virgin forests and peat areas since 2011 pro-
vides an impetus to improve forest governance in many aspects,
such as policy and regulation harmonization, forest area gazettal
acceleration and land conflict resolution, enabling other bureaucra-
cies (MoEMR, MoA, MoPW,  MoE, MoDA, MoFi, BPN, BIG, BAPPENAS,
MoLHR, and National Commission on Human Rights) to participate
in forest governance (KPK, 2013). These agencies apparently do not
fully assume the tasks of the MoF; rather, they are in charge of
some complementary work to help the ministry improve forest
governance. However, with approximately 50% of the emissions
reduction target assigned to the MoF  and 28% to the MoA  (see
Table 1), and with very limited authority to shape the policy on
this issue, it is sound to argue that both ministries have been losing
parts of their power over their original domain. Something similar
has happened with the One Map  Policy, as the UKP4 and the BIG
take the “incentive element of power” from the ministry and leave
the “informational resource element”. In general, the agencies that
gain notably in power at the expense of the MoF in both cases are the
UKP4, REDD+ Agency, the MoA, and the MoE. The DNPI and BAPPE-
NAS gain power slightly through the REDD+ Programme, whereas
the BIG and the MoEMR  gain it through the One Map  Policy. Thus, in
the selected cases, a decrease in the power of the MoF is observed.
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Although it loses much relative power in the two  cases observed
above, the MoF  may  still gain power in other fields, marked, among
other things, by the increase in annual budget allocations and the
number of staff (similar Brockhaus et al., 2012, 2014). According
to its own information (MoF, 2013), the MoF’s overall budget allo-
cation in 2009 was IDR 2.8 billion. This doubled to IDR 5.7 billion
in 2012, with the average spending realization reaching approx-
imately 84%. In addition, its staff increased slightly, from 14,234
people in 2001 to 17,521 in 2011, a 2.1% growth (MoF statistics
data, various years), whereas the global trend for the number of
people who work in public forest bureaucracies is a decrease of
1.2% annually (FAO, 2010). These numbers appear to contradict our
results. In fact, these findings imply that, outside of the MoF’s loss
of incentive and coercion power in the observed cases and in the
recent constitutional court decision on “state forest areas” (Sahide
and Giessen, 2015), it has done very well in maintaining and even
increasing its overall power in many other fields. Combining our
results with these alternative explanations suggests that it is the
MoF’s power source of dominant information in particular that
remains with the MoF  across cases. Such information includes that
on the legal aspects of forestry, the physical dimensions of forests,
existing logging rights and other competing land use concessions
and site conditions regarding growth potentials and degradation
(Sahide and Giessen, 2015). Consequently, the MoF  remains an
indispensable partner for all other agencies wanting to become
active in forest-related issues. In this way, discrete, non-verifiable
information enables an actor to attract additional staff and budget
funds, adding to its incentive power in absolute terms (Hasanagas,
2014). This suggests that the power element of dominant informa-
tion is a necessary precondition for the build-up and maintenance
of incentive and coercive power and can be seen as the last bas-
tion in bureaucratic power struggles, a potential thesis for future
research.
4.3. REDD+ doomed to remain symbolic?
In light of our results, Indonesia’s emission reduction effort
is likely to remain a symbolic policy only. We  now more clearly
define symbolic policy in the sense of a non-policy, which, besides
formulating goals and instruments, is not equipped with clear
responsibility in terms of implementing agencies, sufficient staff,
budget resources and necessary information (Krott et al., 1990;
Krause, 2011; Edelman, 1977; and similar to non-decision making
by Bachrach and Baratz, 19624). The two observed cases, we  con-
clude, are based on weak legal constructions, have no single strong
leading agency responsible for ensuring continuity and have only
weak long-term agendas with no stand-alone budgets or discrete
staff. First, the REDD+ Programme and instructions about the log-
ging moratorium were merely a policy at the presidential level and
did not involve parliament as a representative of the majority of the
nation (Luttrell et al., 2013). An amendment of presidential instruc-
tion or regulation is relatively easy, and it is possible to carry out
as the president wants. Indeed, the instructions about the logging
moratorium will automatically become invalid by May  2015, as it
is only applicable for 2 years after its first extension. Both the pol-
icy and the program will end without any additional intervention
from the president.5 Second, the emissions reduction target was  set
by the DNPI, the existence of which strongly depends on the new
president’s commitment. In fact, the elected president has placed
the DNPI under the newly formed Ministry of Environment and
4 Edelman (1977, cited by Boussaguet, 2015) expressed symbolic policy as ‘words
that  succeed and policies that fail’.
5 The President finally extended the logging moratorium for the third 2 years
through Inpres 8/2015 (President of Indonesia, 2015b).
Forestry; therefore, there is no longer a specific agency respon-
sible for the promised emissions reduction target. If real effects
on the ground are intended by means of REDD+, the presence of
a permanent and powerful agency is important (Brockhaus et al.,
2014); otherwise, the policy will remain merely symbolic, with-
out appropriate information and means (e.g., staff and budget) for
implementation (Sadath and Krott, 2012). Third, the opportunity
to use the primary forest and peat area covered by the morato-
rium map  for other purposes indicates that this policy has been
designed more with business (production) interests in mind, rather
than an ideological base, and signals that the government intends to
reassign the moratorium area to another purpose as it sees fit. We
conclude that, as long as no public agency has clear responsibilities
for policy formulation and implementation, sufficient regulatory or
incentive instruments and the best possible forest-related informa-
tion, REDD+ efforts are doomed to remain a symbolic policy only
(similar Irawan et al., 2014). Such a symbolic policy of course can
be very useful for pooling donor funds at national level, without
dedicating (further) staff and budgetary resources to the policy,
leading to more or less discrete funds resting with the bureaucracy
in charge.
4.4. Bureaucratic challenges in implementing the REDD+
Programme
Since its inception, the REDD+ policy has provoked controversy
as to which ministry will take the lead in framing the agenda
and supervising its implementation. The option to establish the
REDD+ Agency as an institution coordinating all REDD+-related
activities made implementation of the REDD+ Programme run
roughly. Some analysts (e.g., Hogl et al., 2009; Mulyani and Jepson,
2013; Dermawan et al., 2011; Resosudarmo et al., 2013) have
already warned that creating new state agencies to oversee cli-
mate change issues, including emissions reductions through the
REDD+ Programme, will raise significant bureaucratic conflicts,
e.g., difficulties in coordination, a lack of capacity, a low budget,
risk of corruption and an uncertain policy direction. This claim
was evidenced by Moeliono et al. (2014), who  revealed that the
most influential actors in the REDD+ Programme in Indonesia
tended to not seek or obtain information from other actors and
that the information exchange between them was weak. This
dearth of information exchange indicates that each bureaucracy
does not want to open its agenda regarding policy formulation
and will expose it to the public only when it is complete. Asking
for dominant information from opponent bureaucracies can raise
an organization’s bargaining position and give it material to pre-
pare an opposing agenda, one likely to harm the original agenda.
This problem exists whenever there are many bureaucracies with
similar assignments and balanced levels of power (Sulistiawati,
2013) and serves as an explanation as to why any bureaucracy
might abruptly issue an unpredicted decision without consulting
others.
4.5. Sectoral interests hindering an integrated One Map  Policy?
The aim of the One Map  Policy is technically achievable, and
the process still seems to run as planned without any significant
obstacles. The integration process of the forthcoming maps, how-
ever, will be the most crucial phase, and needs to be synchronized
through a national consensus, as an adjustment of Provincial Spa-
tial Planning (Rencana Tata Ruang Wilayah Provinsi or RTRWP)
and Forest Land Use by Consensus (Tata Guna Hutan Kesepakatan
or TGHK) (Wardojo and Masripatin, 2002). This future integra-
tion process poses major political obstacles, given the observed
bureaucratic politics and conflicts of interest of the different state
agencies involved. In addition, the literature on policy integration
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suggests that the policy sectors, i.e., the societal clientele and
sectoral institutions surrounding these very bureaucracies, inten-
sify these conflicts (comp. Hogl et al., 2009; Briassoulis, 2005; Hubo
and Krott, 2013; Giessen, 2012; Giessen et al., 2013; Rayner et al.,
2001; Krott and Hasanagas, 2006). In our case, the RTRWP pro-
vides a robust legal base for the provincial governments to manage
“areas under their authority”, whereas the TGHK legalizes the des-
ignation of such forest areas and places them under the supervision
of the MoF. Unfinished RTRWP-TGHK synchronization has resulted
in uncertain land use policy planning and obstructed local devel-
opment agendas because acting against overriding regulation is a
crime (ICW, 2013). The synchronization process, however, will con-
front the production-oriented sectors, such as logging, plantation
and mining, against the conservation-oriented bureaucracies and
sectors, including protected forests, conservation forests and high
conservation value forests. The production-oriented sectors and
extractive regimes (Gellert, 2010b) were found to prevail over their
adversaries frequently because they were able to use many unclear,
inconsistent and contradictory laws and regulations, exploiting
them to promote their interests (Kartodihardjo and Nagara, 2014;
Hapsari, 2011). In addition, they have strong supporting bureaucra-
cies and involve large-conglomerate private actors. Such extractive
regimes, which characterize recent Indonesian (local) development
approaches (Gellert, 2010b), could also be a real challenge for the
realization of the green (pro-environmental) development pro-
grams proclaimed by the central government. However, the MoF
can also obstruct this process by denying approval for spatial plan-
ning proposals submitted by provinces and municipalities (Santosa
et al., 2013). In addition to the conflictive bureaucratic and sectoral
interests at the national level, this latter point adds multi-level con-
flicts of bureaucratic interest (Marks, 1996; Giessen, 2010; Juerges
and Newig, 2015). Hence, even though the One Map  Policy seems
technically achievable and is expected to be the basis and refer-
ence for multi-sector development planning, it is obviously riddled
with multiple sectoral conflicts of interest from local and national
agendas. Consequently, it is likely to merely become a symbolic
policy.
4.6. Results in light of recent developments
Our analysis on power elements between the MoF and other
state agencies related to the REDD+ Programme and the One Map
Policy shows that President Yudhoyono, through his regulations
and instructions, had reduced the relative power of the MoF  by
transferring its power to other state agencies and creating new ones
to intervene in forest policy (i.e., UKP4, the DNPI and the REDD+
Agency). Other bureaucracies have found that this new balance is
better for forest governance and attempted to extend their influ-
ence. However, in January 2015, the new president, Joko Widodo,
interrupted this governance by disbanding the DNPI and the REDD+
Agency, together with their information, incentive and coercive
power resources, by reassigning their tasks to the new Ministry
of Environment and Forestry (MoEF), after dissolving the UKP4 in
December 2014 (President of Indonesia, 2014, 2015a). Hence, the
dispersed and newly created power elements related to forest gov-
ernance are now re-centered within the MoEF. The MoEF is in the
process of reclaiming 17 (77%) and 10 (75%) of its relative power
elements, compared to its initial 2 (9%) and 4 (27%) relative power
elements in the REDD+ Programme and the One Map  Policy, respec-
tively. As a result, the absolute power of the MoEF in 2015 is larger
than that of the MoF  in 2014. For any practical purpose, there is
currently no significant bureaucratic counterforce that could stop
forest policies endorsed by the MoEF, which will lead to a situation
similar to the MoF  prior to the REDD+ era.
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From voluntary private to mandatory state governance in Indonesian 
forest certification: Reclaiming authority by bureaucracies 
Abstract 
Forest certification has been introduced by non-state actors as a voluntary and market-based 
instrument addressing forest problems, which state policies failed to resolve. Lately, however, 
state-driven forest-related certification schemes can be observed, e.g. in Indonesia, through 
the EU FLEGT-VPA negotiation process. It is argued, specific state agencies in a struggle for 
power and authority develop mandatory certification schemes which are directly competing 
with private ones. Before this background, the aims of this study are: (i) describing the current 
trend from voluntary private to mandatory state certification schemes in Indonesia, (ii) 
mapping the main actors involved in certification politics, and (iii) explaining this trend with 
the interests of the main actors. The results confirm a trend from voluntary private to 
mandatory state-driven certification of forest management. The Ministry of Forestry, the 
Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Industry, wood producer and processing associations, 
European Union, local funding organizations, environmental organizations, certification 
bodies and international buyers are detected as the main coalitions and actors in the 
certification politics. The stronger coalition develops a mandatorily-timber legality 
verification system as strategies to counter their voluntary private competitor schemes.  
 




As a response to the failed negotiations among governments on a global forest convention in 
1992, forest certification has subsequently been introduced by non-governmental actor 
coalitions for promoting sustainable forest management (Boström, 2003; McDermott, 2014). 
There are two ideas underlying the emergence of the non-state-actor driven certification 
schemes, such as the Forest Steward Council (FSC). First, it was an effort by environmental 
non-governmental organizations to voluntarily certify well-managed forests in Europe and 
North America (Bartley, 2007). Second, such non-state, market-driven, and voluntary forest 
certification schemes also aimed to certify tropical and mega-diversity forests including 
problems such as vast deforestation, degradation and illegal logging (Gulbrandsen, 2004; 
Blackman et al., 2014). 
Shortly after the FSC was launched in 1993, other voluntary, non-state certification schemes 
that were better known locally and that had more support from industry groups were founded 
during the 1990s to better accommodate local forestry practices. These included e.g. the 
Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) and the American Tree Farm System (ATFS) in North 
America, the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC, ini tially the 
Pan-European Forest Certification) in Europe, the Sustainable Forest Management System in 
*Manuscript (without author details, acknowledgements or affiliations)
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Canada, and Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia (LEI) in Indonesia (Tosun, 2012; Maryudi 2006, 
2009). All these forest certification initiatives have been largely driven by non-state, private 
actors and voluntary subscription and are consequently regarded as private institutions 
(Pattberg, 2007). They, yet, mirror an underlying competition between public and private 
actors over the authority to regulate forest management practices (Sikor, 2013). 
However, the success of private certification schemes in tackling specific forestry problems 
like illegal logging, forest encroachment and deforestation, and in improving forest 
governance in developing countries thus far has been limited (Durst et al., 2006; Tacconi, 
2007; Espach, 2006). As a consequence, a state-driven, inter-governmental cooperation 
between timber producer and consumer countries was initiated by the European Union (EU) 
in 2003, known as Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT), aiming to 
certify the legality of harvested timber (Wiersum and Elands, 2013). Such state-based forest 
certification initiatives now counter-compete with private ones and are assumed having the 
potential to dominate and even replace private certification schemes (Nurrochmat et al., 2014; 
Malets, 2015). 
Recent empirical findings support this latter perspective and suggest even a crucial role for 
state agencies in forest certification and related politics (Gale and Haward, 2011; 
Gulbrandsen, 2014). According to these literatures state agencies can obstruct (Gale and 
Haward, 2011) or support certification initiatives (Hysing, 2009; Bell and Hindmoor, 2012). 
More importantly, however, specific state bureaucracies, due to their formal mandate and 
ability to develop binding regulatory policy instruments, may even develop own certification 
schemes, as currently observed under the FLEGT process and regarding timber legality 
certification in Indonesia (Nurrochmat et al., 2014). In so doing, it is argued, state agencies 
develop mandatory certification schemes which are directly competing with private ones, and 
by this reclaim authority over forest certification through legitimized public actors. Before 
this background, the aims of this study are (i) describing the current trend from voluntary 
private to mandatory state certification schemes in Indonesia, (ii) mapping the main actors 
involved in certification politics, and (iii) explaining this trend with the interests of the main 
actors. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
2.1. Voluntary private forest certification 
The FSC and PEFC forest certification systems have grown significantly and have become the 
largest in world, with a share of about 98% of all certified forest and chain of custody (CoC) 
certificates (FSC and PEFC, 2013). This amounts to 417 million hectares, or 10.3% of global 
forests area and a share of about 28% of the total round wood production (UNECE/FAO, 
2013). This approach has successfully built a new mechanism in timber product trade by 
requiring all traded goods to meet a balance of ecological, social and economic requirements. 
By creating its own rules and simultaneously increasing public awareness of certified 
products, forest certification initiative governs the interaction between actors in forest product 
trade, and replaces the role of governments which failed to sign a global convention on 
forestry at the Earth Summit in 1992 (Bernstein and Cashore, 1999; van Kooten et al., 2005). 
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This private forest certification has transformed into real governance
1
 (Pattberg, 2007). 
Depending on their viewpoints in specific studies, forest policy analysts refer to this 
phenomenon using various terms, like non-state global governance (Bernstein, 2011), non-
state market driven (NSMD) governance (Cashore, 2002; Cashore et al., 2007), non-state 
authority (Cashore et al., 2005), transnational (business) governance (Bartley, 2010), private 
forest governance (Pattberg, 2005), global forest governance (Gan et al., 2013), and global 
private meta-governance (Derkx and Glasbergen, 2014). 
2.2. Mandatory state certification 
At the 1998 G8 foreign ministers meeting, there was an agreement to cooperate with timber-
producing countries in the development of their own measures to counter illegal logging and 
trading in illegally harvested timber (G8 Action Programme on Forests, 2002). Following this 
agreement, in 2003 the European Union (EU) declared the Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade (FLEGT) action plan, which enabled producers from partner countries 
that had already signed FLEGT-voluntary partnership agreements (VPAs) to sell freely their 
legal products in EU territory (Brack, 2005, 2012). The agreement gave authority to partner 
countries to define “illegal timber” based on their own regulations, so that it acknowledged 
partner countries’ sovereignty over their forests. To date, six countries, including Indonesia, 
have signed FLEGT-VPA, while nine others are in negotiations (EU FLEGT Facility, 2014). 
The FLEGT-VPA is seen as a more equitable type of cooperation, since it binds both 
producers and consumers to sell and to buy only legally harvested timber. In addition, the 
direct participation of consumer countries in the penalization of the sale of illegal wood-based 
products in their territory, as promised by the US through the Lacey Act (2008) and the by 
European Parliament through EU Timber Regulation (2010), is expected to diminish the space 
for illegal timber trade (Bartley, 2014). This is what cannot be addressed by voluntary forest 
certification initiatives such as FSC, PEFC, ISO 14000 or other more domestic initiatives 
(Solutions, 2003). Especially in Indonesia, the government has been forcing all forest logging 
companies and timber manufacturers to be certified under SVLK, a national timber legality 
assurance agreed upon in FLEGT-VPA. 
2.3. Bureaucratic politics and the power of actors 
We use bureaucratic politics theory in order to cover more broadly those actors that may be 
influencing policies related to forest certification at the national level. Bureaucracies are 
defined as “agencies that have been created by governments or other public actors with some 
degree or permanence and coherence and beyond formal direct control of single nation 
governments and that act in the international arena to pursue a policy” (Bauer e t al., 
2012:28). Bureaucracies are different from organizations, which are institutional 
arrangements built upon normative frameworks, members, and bureaucracies as 
administrative core institutions. They are also different from institutions, which are merely 
sets of principles and norms (Bauer et al., 2012). Studies on bureaucracies’ behavior (e.g. 
Krott, 1990; Peters, 2002) reveal that although bureaucracies have a formal mandate to serve 
                                                          
1 ‘Governance’ is all about establishing, promoting and supporting a specific type of relationship 





public interests, they will prioritize their own interests and compete with other bureaucracies 
for more resources, political domain and influence. To develop and direct specific policies, 
bureaucracies are equipped with power, which is defined as the ability to shape a programme 
according to own interests, even against resistance from other actors (Krott et al., 2014). 
According to Krott et al. (2014), power consists of three elements, namely (i) coercion, 
associated mostly with the ability to force an outcome, (ii) (dis-)incentives, the ability to offer 
(dis-)advantages to subordinate actors, and (iii) dominant information, selected information 
that is difficult or impossible to verify by another party. These power elements may be 
acquired through sanction mechanisms, transfer funds, and the expertise of bureaucracies. 
Given the rise of mandatory state forest certification systems and the obstructions faced by 
voluntary private systems, state bureaucracies now have the following options: (i) increasing 
their power vis-à-vis other bureaucracies by developing own certification schemes, and (ii) 
reclaiming authority from private certification schemes to regulate forest management. Before 
this theoretical background this article will scrutinize these propositions using the following 
methods. 
3. Methods 
We employed document analysis, interviews, and observations to acquire solid data to meet 
our objectives. First, trends in the numbers of certified forest areas and certified companies 
under private (FSC and LEI) and state (Ministry of Forestry) certification schemes were 
drawn from the website of those bodies and were placed in charts to gain an overview of each 
initiative’s progress and to make comparisons possible. Any information from professional 
journals or professional mailing lists, and position papers from international organizations and 
associations were also considered to be valuable sources. 
Second, semi-structured interviews (Halperin and Heath, 2012) to identify the main actors 
within this issue and their positions were conducted in Jakarta and Bogor, Indonesia, during 
August 2013-February 2014, and were followed by online interviews until April 2014. The 
interviewees were staff from the Ministry of Forestry (MoF), the Ministry of Trade (MoT), 
and the Indonesian Woodworking Association (ISWA), the Forest Concessionaires 
Association (Asosiasi Pengusaha Hutan Indonesia or APHI), the Multistakeholder Forestry 
Programme (MFP), FSC Indonesia, certification auditors, and environmental non-
governmental organizations (ENGOs). We were also involved as observers in the respective 
meetings during that period to listen to each actor's ideas and to find out what expectations the 
actors had from others. 
Third, actors’ positions and their prospective coalitions were raised from theory of interest in 
environmental politics study. In analyzing actors’ positions we assumed that every actor 
behaved rationally, meaning that actors tried to maximize their own benefit rather than to 
promote a general goal, like maintaining environmental sustainability and equality. To contest 
norm- and interest-driven is acceptable (see: Van Schaik and Schunz, 2012; Gulbrandsen, 
2003) since each actor (which can be an individual, organization or state) has its own interest, 




4.1. Voluntary private and mandatory state certifications’ progress in 
figures 
Currently there are three forest certification schemes in Indonesia, namely the LEI and FSC, 
both of which are voluntary-private initiatives, and the PHPL (Pengelolaan Hutan Produksi 
Lestari or sustainable forest production management, a standard under SVLK) which is a 
mandatory state scheme. Forest certification assignment under the FSC was first conducted in 
1998 and successfully certified three out of five assessed FMUs in Java, which was then 
followed by seven others within the next two years. However, all of these certificates were 
suspended and withdrawn in 2003 due to unsatisfactory management improvement and non-
compliance with FSC standards (Muhtaman and Prasetyo, 2006). A new era of FSC 
standards-based certification was introduced in 2008, when six FMUs, with a total managed 
area of 707,709 ha, obtained sustainable certificates (FSC, 2008). This grew to 1,089,942 ha 
in 2009, then dropped to 638,455 ha in 2011, and peaked again at 2,002,710 ha in November 
2014, representing the certified area of 29 FMUs (FSC, 2009, 2011, 2014). 
Similarly, the first certification process using LEI standard was also conducted in 1998, and 
putting PT Diamond Raya Timber who managed 90,956 ha of natural production forest as the 
first cooperation obtained the certificate a year later (Muhtaman and Prasetyo, 2006). Since 
then, there has been no serial data available to the public until the LEI released FMU and 
manufacture LEI certified document (LEI, 2013), which mentioned that there were 1,873,428 
ha of certified-forests, consisting of 411,690 ha of natural production forests (22%) from two 
FMUs, 1,429,055 ha of plantation forests (76%) managed by 15 FMUs, and 32,683 ha of 
community forests (2%) from 22 community groups. Furthermore, the LEI (2014) informed 
that the certified natural forest area had dropped about 80% within the period 2009-2014, and 
that the plantation forest area had increased 400% during that time. 
Unlike the two previous voluntary schemes, PHPL is a mandatory state scheme enacted by the 
government in 2012, and effectively applied to all forest concessionaires and FMUs in 2013. 
The PHPL (SVLK)-certified forest area until May 2014 was 2,542,091 ha, representing an 
area managed by 40 FMUs (calculated from MoF, 2014). The certified forest area under the 
PHPL scheme was higher than those under FSC and LEI, even though the PHPL started in 
2013 (Figure 1). It is likely that FSC- or LEI-certified FMUs are also certified under SVLK, 
since the processes to obtain such certificates are quite similar, and same certification body 
may carry out the late assessment. Consequently, the total certified forest area under the three 
schemes cannot represent the total sustainably managed forest area in Indonesia. 
In respect of the chain of custody (CoC) certification, there were six companies which held 
LEI certificates in 2009, and one of them did not reengage with the LEI in the second round 
(LEI, 2014). Conversely, the number of FSC CoC certificates doubled, from 87 in 2009 to 
175 in 2012, and reached 193 by November 2014 (FSC, various years). A significant number 
of SLKs (sertifikat legalitas kayu or timber legality certificate; a form of certificate under the 
SVLK) were also issued by certification bodies, as the government started to force all 
exporters to provide V-legal documents for their wood products. By 2013, this number 
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reached 726 companies (MoF, 2013) or almost four times the FSC holders, and grew 
continuously to 894 firms in 2014 (Table 1). 
------------Figure 1. Size of certified forest area under FSC, LEI and SVLK schemes in the 
period 2006-2014-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------- Table 1. Number of companies holding FSC, LEI and SVLK certificates ----------------- 
 
4.2. Cost of sustainable forest certification and legality verification 
The cost of forest certification and timber legality verification are vary, depends on the size of 
forest area, investment capital, and production capacity of the company. This cost applied at 
first assessment to gain the certificate and at yearly surveillance within certificate’s validity 
period. Cost component charged by certification body to the company including fee for 
auditors, data and information collection, field assessment, reporting fee, documentation, and 
security assistance for auditors if needed. For SVLK scheme the Minister of (Environment 
and) Forestry released the Ministry Regulation P.13/2013, which amended by P.96/2014, on 
the standard cost for sustainable forest management assessment and timber legality 
verification. It is mentioned that the total cost for legality assessment for small and medium 
scale-wood processing industry could reach 6.6 million IDR, and up to 28.8 and 170 million 
IDR for bigger industry and large forest management units, respectively. In the meantime, the 
cost for forest sustainability assessment is around 222-280 million IDR and up to 132 million 
IDR for its yearly surveillance. All these costs are excluding travelling cost for auditors from 
Jakarta to the field. From private certification side, there is no official data on the cost of 
assessment and surveillance processes available for public. Pratiwi (2015) reported that the 
costs paid by the companies for gaining FSC, LEI and PHPL-SVLK certificates are at least 
31, 60, and 75 million IDR, respectively, depends on the scale of company. 
4.3. Mapping main actors and their interests 
Actors involved in forest certification in Indonesia are found along the production-
consumption chain, starting with the actors initiating certification schemes and ending with 
buyers in consumer countries. The following are three groups of influential actors and their 
roles in shaping recent construction based on their tendencies and interests. 
4.3.1. State certification supporting group  
The Ministry of Forestry 
The Ministry of Forestry (MoF) was the main state agency responsible for establishing the 
national timber legality assurance system called SVLK. The SVLK installation process began 
in 2003, when the MoF organized some civil social organizations, i.e., Telapak, 
Environmental Investigation Agency, Indonesian Ecolabel Institute, and the Nature 
Conservancy to hold a series cross sectoral dialog in developing SVLK (MFP, 2014). SVLK, 
which enacted through the Minister of Forestry Regulation No P.38/2009, and up to 
December 2014 was already five times amended (MoF, 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014a; MoEF, 
2014a), has become the core of Indonesia-EU FLEGT-VPA negotiation. The MoF tried to 
apply the SVLK comprehensively to all forest industry and timber manufacturers 
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immediately, in order to maintain the credibility of the SVLK and the MoF. However, due to 
external pressure, the MoF (which was transformed into the Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry or MoEF in October 2014) extended the deadline for obtaining the certificates and 
simplified some provisions in the SVLK so that small and medium-sized enterprises could 
join it (see MoF, 2014b; MoEF, 2014b). 
The Ministry of Trade 
The Ministry of Trade (MoT) has the mission of increasing the added value and volume of 
exported goods by setting up regulations to support progressive export activities. Regarding 
wood legality, the MoT issued a regulation on the export of forestry industrial products, 
whereby one group of export timber products had to have V-Legal documents in 2013, and 
another group had to have these in 2014 (MoT, 2012). However, since the small-scale 
enterprise group was not ready by the deadline, the MoT delayed the inclusion of V-Legal 
documents in export requirements until 2015 (MoT, 2013a), and postponed it again until 2016 
(MoT, 2014a). The latest delay was taken to meet the MoT’s ambition in increasing the export 
value of wood products by 300% within the next 5 years (Kompas, 2014). Aside from setting 
up regulations for ease of export, the MoT was also actively involved in SVLK negotiation 
with the EU and in promoting SVLK so that Indonesian furniture demand grew up by 15-20% 
in 2014 (MoT, 2014b). 
The Ministry of Industry 
The Ministry of Industry (MoI) supports the SVLK as the way to expand overseas markets for 
wooden industrial products. However, the small-scale industry's unreadiness for certification 
and the high cost associated with it forced the MoI to ask the MoF and MoT for a delay in 
SVLK implementation of one year and for simplification of the SVLK verifier, mainly for 
wooden furniture and handicraft products (AMKRI, 2014). Previously, in March 2013, the 
MoI had also accommodated SMEs’ scruple on SVLK and vowed to discuss a relief for them 
with the MoF (AgroIndonesia, 2013). 
Indonesian Forest Concessionaires Association (APHI) and the Indonesian Pulp and Paper 
Association (APKI) 
The Indonesian Forest Concessionaires Association (APHI) and the Indonesian Pulp and 
Paper Association (APKI), as representatives of big players in the Indonesian wood industry, 
actually support the SVLK, in order to improve their product image in the global market 
(Agrofarm, 2013). Nevertheless, since end buyers ask for FSC-certified products, local 
industries have to opt exclusively for FSC-certified timber in their production line. 
Consequently, SVLK-certified intermediary goods cannot be sold locally, let alone in the 
global market (The Jakarta Post, 2014b) and the producers have to bear a double cost to tackle 
the problem (Hutan Indonesia, 2013). Since the SVLK is designed to comply with an 
agreement with the EU (Pohnan and Stone, 2013), the policy of making the SVLK obligatory 
for all logging companies and wood-processing industries is considered detrimental to local 
businesses and industries not oriented towards the European market. Both associations have 
already asked the government to open more local markets for SVLK-certified products and to 
promote the SVLK more broadly. 
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Indonesian Sawmill and Woodworking Association (ISWA), Association of Indonesian 
Furniture and Crafts Producers (Asmindo) and small tree growers 
Small wood industries and small tree growers support the SVLK, associating it with better 
market access in Europe and other countries (The Jakarta Post, 2014a; Agroobserver, 2015). 
However, they warn that the requirements for small industries should be simpler than those 
for big ones, since small tree growers work in private land parcels, and they do their own 
planting and harvesting (AgroIndonesia, 2014). They also may change the use of the land or 
sell it in a traditional way, without permits from anybody else. Hence, they don’t have to 
“formalise” their business by means of legal permits, taxation, environmental assessment and 
other administrative documents, which are costly (Obidzinski et al., 2014). 
European Union (EU) 
EU efforts to halt illegal timber circulation inside and outside the region are evident in the two 
main regulations under the FLEGT Action Plan, namely the FLEGT-VPA and the EU Timber 
Regulation (EUTR). The EUTR can be seen as an economic tool to strengthen the position of 
European timber against its competitors, since any wood products to be exported to Europe 
have to pass a due diligence investigation by operators (van Heeswijk and Turnhout, 2013). In 
contrast, the FLEGT-VPA, which includes a timber legality assurance system (TLAS) from 
the producer country, ignores the due diligence process for FLEGT-licensed products. In the 
case of the SVLK, both Indonesia and EU parties signed and ratified the VPA in 2014 and 
acknowledged SVLK as Indonesian TLAS. However, the EU support for the SVLK cannot be 
seen simply as a passport of sorts for Indonesia’s wood products entering EU territory, since it 
could be suspended once a SVLK-licensed product is discredited (Hawin et al., 2010). 
The Multistakeholder Forestry Programme (MFP) and Kehati Foundation 
The MFP is a UK-funded program that assists the MoF in developing and promoting the 
SVLK, and in helping FMUs and small enterprises to obtain SVLK-based certificates through 
its coaching program (Raharjo, 2013). Together with the MoF, the MFP was engaged in 
SVLK negotiations with the EU. The MFP also strongly encourages the government of 
Indonesia to implement SVLK and rejects its delay, which the industry sector has requested 
often. The Kehati foundation, on the other hand, is a national funding agency that supports 
activities related to biodiversity conservation. Both the MFP and Kehati reckon that SVLK is 
in line and could be the way to succeed REDD+ program (Dharmawan et al., 2012). 
4.3.2. Private certification supporting group Environmental Non-Governmental 
Organizations (ENGOs) 
Most leading ENGOs support private certification initiatives to achieve better forest 
governance. These include: the Borneo Initiative, the Tropical Forest Foundation and the 
WWF-Global Forest and Trade Network, which work on the LEI and FSC schemes, and 
Greenpeace and the Nature Conservancy, which work on the FSC (Greenpeace, 2014). These 
ENGOs promote schemes they support and decline others for reasons of lack of 
accountability, poor sustainability standards and double costs consequence, among others. A 
network of ten ENGOs, called the Anti Forest-Mafia Coalition has criticized the SVLK, 
judging it to be flawed and a new form of "greenwashing" illegal timber (Anti Forest-Mafia 
Coalition, 2014). However, their members also help small enterprises to obtain SVLK 
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certificates (Antara, 2015). Some of them publish SVLK’s weaknesses repeatedly, even 
though they do not show their partiality to private forest certification schemes. 
4.3.3. Hybrid group Certification Bodies 
Currently there are 18, 2 and 4 certification bodies working on the SVLK, the FSC and the 
LEI, respectively (MoF, 2013; various sources) where some of them work with more than one 
scheme. Certification bodies have the right to issue certificates of sustainable forest 
management practice or chain of custody and the right to withdraw such a certificate during 
an annual inspection if the holders no longer comply with the standards of a given 
certification scheme. Due to a disproportional ratio between the certification body and number 
of areas/companies to be certified, the certification cost is increasing and is becoming 
unaffordable for small industries (Obidzinski et al., 2014). The principle of transparency in 
the audit process makes it possible for one certification body to know what other bodies do, 
what auditor works for which body, and the certification fees applied to particular audit 
process. Furthermore, once a certification body has conducted an audit, it has to announce the 
plan or the results on determined website so that it is open to input from independent 
observers, NGOs, and other stakeholders. The transparency principle allows the work of the 
certification body to be criticized; hence, the certificates already issued may be withdrawn for 
many reasons. Frequently revocations of certificates will affect not only the certification 
body, but also the certification scheme they use. 
International buyers 
After FLEGT-VPA signation, timber certified for sustainability and timber certified for 
legality compete for consumer demand for eco-friendly products. International buyers, as the 
end users of such products, will choose between state-based certified products and private-
based certified woods. Accordingly, it is important to provide potential buyers with 
appropriate information on own products’ superiority (Cashore, 2002). Potts et al. (2010) 
point out that major retailers in North America have decided to choose forest products derived 
from sustainable sources, whereas EU countries require importers, manufacturers, and 
retailers to have chain of custody (CoC) certification that clarifies the origin of their timber. 
Cai and Aguilar (2013) compiled 19 studies on consumer’s willingness-to-pay for certified 
wood products, and found that 1- 39% of consumers were willing to pay premium prices for 
these products, no matter what kind of label it had. This means that the number of consumers 
willing to pay a higher price for certified products was less than that of those unwilling to pay. 
Consumers do not care whether products are certified or not, let alone whether the 
certification initiatives are private or governmental. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Fragmented certification schemes and their coalition alliances 
Based on policy-making authority, Cashore (2002) divides environmental governance into 
three categories, namely, “non-state market driven governance”, characterized by the lack of 
government involvement in the policy-making process; “shared private/public governance”, 
in which policy-making is shared with the government; and “traditional governance”, where 
policy-making authority belongs fully with the government. Gulbrandsen (2004) uses the term 
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"private governance" to refer to NSMD governance, and "public governance" (meaning state 
governance) for traditional governance. Gulbrandsen (2004) adds hybrid private-public 
governance to denote industry-dominated involvement in mixed private and public 
governance. Following categorization by Cashore (2002) and Gulbrandsen (2004) we found 
that there are now four clusters of forest certification governance present in Indonesia, namely 
environmental-private governance, hybrid private-public governance, producer-private 
governance, and state governance, with the FSC, the LEI, the PEFC and the SVLK 
representing each scheme, respectively (Table 2). 
----------------- Table 2. Cluster of forest certification governance in Indonesia------------------ 
Except for the LEI, the other three schemes have their supporting actors who promote the 
schemes’ excellence. Due to the lack of capital, human resource and interest affinity, and 
therefore we argue that the hybrid private-public government will disappear, and the FMUs 
and wood industries will make alliances with the government to support traditional forest 
governance. The PEFC could join the SVLK, since the PEFC originally devoted for forest 
owners and forest managers. Consequently, there will be only two certification schemes 
competing for authority in the future, namely, the pro-environment and pro-business schemes. 
The first scheme is represented by the FSC and would be supported by ENGOs, academics 
and the pro-environmental community, and the LEI, since LEI already signed a joint 
certification protocol with the FSC. With this collaboration, the FSC has a local partner to 
introduce its more local-value adapted scheme, and the LEI could maintain its presence in the 
forest certification field. Conversely, the pro-business scheme consists of SVLK and PEFC 
will mutually reinforce and possible to make joint recognition for effective certification 
process, and wider market access. This scheme is supported by the government, landowners, 
and FMUs. Due to the wider stakeholder involvement and its mandatory nature, this scheme 
seems to flourish continuously, as indicated by its progress in the year of early 
implementation. 
Through this process, the forest certification regime becomes less complex, since national 
political processes replace and reduce the international element of international forest 
regimes, and standard of these schemes may less different (McDermott et al., 2008). Industrial 
groups, as the users of the certification scheme, have to engage with the SVLK to maintain 
their business continuity and to enter the market, and only add the FSC to improve their 
reputation. However, the solidity of this pattern will become more stable under the following 
conditions. First, if the government of Indonesia promotes the SVLK and its acceptance in 
other consumer countries, hence industries will need no other certification scheme when 
exporting their products to such countries. Second, if the government preserves the SVLK as 
a reputable certification scheme by publishing data having to do with the ways in which the 
SVLK contributes to the deforestation rate reduction and to the enhancements of society and 
ecology. Third, if there are fewer or no objections from other stakeholders about the 
performance of industries that are SVLK-certified, indicating that these companies do 
business in legal and sustainable ways. 
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5.2. Mandatoriness and cost of SVLK as strategy for reclaiming authority 
over other actors 
By making the SVLK mandatory for all FMUs and timber manufacturers, the MoF may gain 
at least three benefits. First, it could increase its presence in downstream industry circles by 
financing the first SVLK-certification process for small enterprises (Neraca, 2014). Through 
this assistance, the MoF would gain power over small enterprises, which in the past have 
belonged in the domain of the MoI. Second, compelling the enterprises to choose SVLK only 
or either SVLK and private schemes. The high cost of legality verification and forest 
certification is the main factor obstructing companies to engage with those processes 
(Tacconi, 2007; Obidzinski, 2014), although it does not always correspond to its benefits. 
Pratiwi (2015) shows that only around 24% of industry, forest companies and their related 
associations state that the cost of SVLK-certification is worth its benefits, while only 26% of 
them acknowledge that they always receive premium prices from their certified products. The 
gap between the cost and the benefits resulting from certification process forces business 
actors to be realistic in choosing appropriate certification scheme. This selection strongly 
depends on their market target and value of the exported products (see Fikru, 2014). If 
combination of mandatory and voluntary certification costs were higher than the profit, 
business tended to choose only the SVLK for their products. Third, as consequence of the 
previous point, the SVLK may be better known and legitimate in domestic and overseas 
markets. With only around 10% share of Indonesian timber export value goes to Europe 
(MoF, 2014c), the obligation to put V-legal sign (sign for SVLK-certified products) in all 
exported timber products will make SVLK better known in other major destination countries 
like China, Japan, and South Korea. 
5.3. Granting privileges to large-scale industries over smallholders? 
It is widely known that small scale wood industries and tree growers are characterized by 
limited administration records, production-by-demand orientation, simple management 
practices, and have less capacity to follow market dynamics (Nurrochmat, 2004). Obidzinski 
et al. (2014) point out the major challenges to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in 
obtaining SVLK-based certificates, namely: business legality status; limited supply of legal 
timber; small profit margins spread over a long value chain; high certification costs; and small 
volume and unpredictable harvest times. Under these circumstances it is hard for them to 
obtain wood legality certificates (S-LK; SVLK-based certificate) even if the trees grown in 
home yards and their transfers to processing industries are truly legal. The lack of verification 
bodies and the limited financial support by government are other obstacles for the engagement 
of small industries in SVLK schemes (Obidzinski et al., 2014). Hence, the policy of 
implementing SVLK certification in all wood industries is thought to be a simple way to 
increase export value to European markets by large industries, at the expense of SMEs. On the 
other hand, the export ban policy for non-certified industry will cut USD 900 million in 
annual income for SMEs, which amounts to 30% of the total wood export value to non-
European markets, excluding pulp and paper (Agroindonesia, 2014). To avoid this loss, the 
MoT has postponed the implementation of such a policy twice already, and vows to 
implement it in January 2016. 
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It seems that the MoT places foreign market access and trade performance as the top priority, 
followed by the survival of large scale industries, wood legality, the subsistence of SMEs, and 
facility of sales for small tree growers. This policy might limit the circulation of illegal wood, 
facilitate the supervision of the industry and increase the trust in the SVLK; but it suppresses 
small and very locally-oriented industries, and creates a disincentive for small tree growers. 
Small tree growers face legal consequences and may even be found guilty of criminal charges 
when they harvest and transfer wood from their garden to small wood industries. A more local 
and adaptive policy that is able to distinguish illegal timber and -incomplete documented 
timber –like a conformity declaration already being considered– is needed for this kind of 
business (Kemitraan, 2014), in order to avoid negative social consequences. 
6. Conclusions 
The Ministry of (Environment and) Forestry was under political pressure from other 
bureaucracies, and was asked to improve its performance in generating income from forest 
areas. The Ministry then used its authority to govern forest product circulation and trade in 
domestic and global markets through the forest certification initiative. This program has at 
least four goals: first, to show the public its efforts in reducing illegal logging and the 
deforestation rate; second, to restore the forestry sector as the main contributor to state 
income, as it was in 1990s; third, to preserve its existence by obliging all FMUs and wood 
industries to be certified by such a scheme and to become the agency in charge of the 
Indonesia-EU agreement on FLEGT; and lastly, to increase the state sovereignty over forests, 
by being the institution to decide on the legality of timber. The involvement of the MoF in the 
forest certification arrangement indicates that private governance is not the final and stable 
form of this regime, as is argued by some scholars (e.g. Hackett, 2013; Overdevest and 
Zeitlin, 2014). In addition, the MoF uses its authority to reclaim authority over private actors. 
The MoF is likely to succeed, due to the ease of implementation and simple standards of the 
scheme, which also account for the relatively inexpensive cost of certification assessment fee, 
in comparison to its competitors. Furthermore, the mandatory nature of the SVLK means it 
has fixed a downstream market, i.e., FMUs and wood industries, whilst upstream it can profit 
from an educated market that has already been created by private governance. In this case, the 
state governance seems to be the free rider. 
A remaining question needs to answer by both governances is whether their presence is able 
to reduce forest loss and to sustain forest management. Since 18% of deforested area in 
Indonesia is open land and the rest is designated for development purposes (Kissinger et al., 
2012), we argue that the certification regime will be unable to reduce forest conversions. Most 
of the forest conversions were planned and allowed by the government, and that is why these, 
together with other “deforested areas”, were not included in the calculation of the 
deforestation rate (Bellot et al., 2014). In addition, the sustainability criteria of certification 
regimes do not reflect the fact that small tree growers do clear-cutting when they need cash 
for unforeseen expenses, like a marriage or educational costs, and that they do not replant 
their gardens. Hence, legality verification and sustainability certification are disconnected 
from forest (land) management performed by small tree growers or forest companies. Based 
on these points, we argue that the certification regime and legality verification are merely 
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instruments to govern timber trade (indicated as transnational business governance by 
Lesniewska and McDermott, 2014) at the expense of small and traditional tree growers, rather 
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Table 1. Number of companies holding FSC, LEI and SVLK certificates 
Year   Number of certified companies under each scheme 
FSC LEI SVLK 
2009 87 6 - 
2010 136 6 - 
2011 161 6 - 
2012 175 6 - 
2013 188 6 726 
2014 193 5 894 
Source: FSC (various years), LEI (2013, 2014), MoF (2014). 
 
 













Rule maker Environmentalists  Academics Land owners Government  
State 
involvement 
No Partially Limited  Full 
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actor 
ENGOs No Industry Government 
Territorial focus International  National 
(Indonesia) 
International  National 
(Indonesia) 
Auditor Third party Third party Third party Third party 
Public 
examination 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Certificate 
acceptability 
International National  International EU and National 
Brand image Strong Weak Quite strong Weak  
Industry 
participation 
Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Mandatory  


















Source: FSC (various years), LEI (various years) and MoF (various years). 
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The existence of third-party forest and timber certification schemes in Indonesia has created benefits and challenges, 
mainly for forest industries. In the end, the interests and objectives of those industries will determine whether they 
decide to get certified and if so, what certification schemes they will use. This study analyses the stakeholder 
recognition of the competing forest legality and sustainability certification systems and describes the preferences for 
particular schemes based on stakeholder interests. Online questionnaires were distributed to relevant stakeholders, 
namely logging companies, wood processing industries, wood processing associations, auditors, academics, 
environmental organisations and government officials. The results indicate that there are different scheme 
preferences based on the stakeholder's interests. Sistem Verifikasi Legalitas Kayu (SVLK) is the most frequently 
preferred scheme due to the simplicity of its requirements and the low cost of its certifying process, while the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) is valued for its reputation and very high standards. Furthermore, Lembaga Ekolabel 
Indonesia (LEI) was least preferred because of its complexity and because it was unpopular with foreign end buyers, 
and the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC) was identified as being a complex scheme 
that was expensive and subject to high standards, and also appeared to have the least demand. Each scheme should 
be improved based on stakeholders' expectations, that their popularity with end buyers of timber products should be 
improved, and that this should be done in a way that allows logging and wood processing industries to choose freely 
the scheme that is most advantageous to them
Introduction
Forest certification is an information tool and a market-
based instrument (Upton & Bass 1995; Rametsteiner & 
Simula 2003) that ensures that the forest and its management 
conform to a particular standard (Nussbaum & Simula 2005). 
Forest certification was initially advanced by environmental 
groups as a response to the consequences of deforestation and 
forest degradation in the early 90s (Rametsteiner & Simula 
2003; Leslie 2004). A massive campaign to produce and use 
only certified timber products has turned forest certification 
into a new form of governance in international trade and 
business (Haufler 2003; v ). 
Currently, there are 3 entities providing voluntary-private 
forest certification schemes in Indonesia, namely the forest 
stewardship council (FSC), the programme for the 
endorsement of forest certification (PEFC, implemented by 
the indonesian forest certification cooperation or IFCC), and 
an Kooten et al. 2005
the Indonesian ecolabelling institute or lembaga ekolabel 
Indonesia (LEI). In addition, there is one mandatory state 
forest and timber legality certificate system, namely the 
timber legality verification system or sistem verifikasi 
legalitas kayu (SVLK, including the sustainable production 
forest management scheme or pengelolaan hutan produksi 
lestari/PHPL). By 2014, there were 2,002,710 ha of forest 
that had been certified under the FSC scheme, adding 193 
chain of custody (CoC) certificates for wood-based 
industries across the country (FSC 2014). In the same year 17 
PEFC-based CoC certificates (PEFC 2014) were also issued, 
as were 39 sustainability certificates for 1,970,175 ha of 
forest and 6 CoC certificates using the LEI scheme (LEI 
2014), in addition to 826 legality certificates for wood 
processing industries (SILK 2014). 
The existence of many third-party certification schemes 
has created benefits and barriers for the stakeholders 





involved ( Hansen et al. 2005), 
especially logging companies and the wood processing 
industry. In theory, the existence of many options would 
make it easy for stakeholders to choose a scheme that best 
suits their interests and needs (Gulbrandsen 2003). Tuppura 
et al. (2015) have described a number of motivations forest 
companies may have for becoming certified, namely 
authorities' orders, clients' wishes, improving their image, 
distinguishing themselves from their competitors, opening 
new markets, increasing internal control, and risk 
management and long-term profitability. The selection of 
favourable certification schemes by the companies is not 
always easy, due to some of the constrains they face, e.g., 
complexity of certification requirements, lack of 
verification/certification bodies, limited amount of financial 
subsidies ( , unclear land use regimes 
(Sahide et al. 2015), the cost of certification, schemes' 
legitimacy (Nurrochmat et al. 2014), market orientation and 
the schemes' acceptability (Wibowo et al. 2014).
The dilemma faced by industries has become more 
complicated since the government decided to make SVLK 
mandatory for all logging companies and wood processing 
industries (MoE Regulation Number 38/2009). It is within 
this context that we assess stakeholders' recognition of and 
preferences for third party forest certification schemes in 
Indonesia. Our main research questions are: 
(i) what schemes do businesses prefer?  
(ii) what criteria do businesses consider, in making their 
selection?
Businesses' motivations for becoming certified were 
gleaned from the FSC (2008), Faggi et al. (2014), Lozano 
(2013) and Tuppura et al. (2015).  From this close-ended 
questionnaires that included additional aspects that may 
apply in Indonesia. In addition, an open space for personal 
opinion 
The key respondents were those who had been involved 
with the legality verification system in Indonesia and were 
therefore familiar with it. The respondents were categorised 
into main respondents, which consisted of those from 
logging companies (LC), from the wood processing industry 
(WPI) and from the wood processing association (WPA), and 
supporting respondents, which consisted of auditors, 
environmental organisation representatives, academics, and 
government officials. These respondent groups were chosen 
due to their strong interests (Krott 2005) and influences 
(Steffek 2009) in forest governance.
The questionnaires were divided into 3 types, one each 
for (i) LC and WPI, (ii) WPA, and (iii) supporting 
respondents. The questionnaires consisted of two sections. 
The first, General Information, included the name of the 
respondent, the type of respondent (type of stakeholder), 
workplace, and contact information. The second, 
Stakeholder Preferences, consisted of the respondents' 
experiences and perceptions of each of the four schemes' 
characteristics, e.g., their market acceptance, the complexity 
of their requirements, and the ease with which certificates 
from each could be obtained. The questionnaires were sent to 
Thornber et al. 1999; 
Obidzinski et al. 2014)
Methods
were provided. 
the respondents along with introductory and personal 
information in the body of an email. The online 
questionnaires were distributed in January and February 
2015 through personal email, mailing lists, association 
channels, and social media. Out of 508 personal emails sent 
108 replies (21%), comprising stakeholders from logging 
companies (23 persons), from the wood processing industry 
(23 persons), from the wood processing association (7 
persons), auditors (22 persons), environmental organisation 
representatives (18 persons), academics (11), and 
government officials/Ministry of Environment and Forestry 
employees (MoEF) (4 persons). Eight respondents replied 
and did not fill the questionnaires due to lack of updated 
knowledge and company privacy. The data obtained from the 
questionnaires were tabulated into an Excel file database and 
the answers for each of the closed questions were 
transformed into bar and pie charts.
The key stakeholders believed that 
the SVLK and LEI certificates were easier certificates to 
obtain than the FSC and PEFC certificates (Figure 1). About 
91% and 69% of the logging company respondents expressed 
that SVLK and LEI were the easiest certificates to obtain, 
while only 31% and 22% of them said the same for PEFC and 
FSC, respectively. The ease of access to the information on 
how to apply for SVLK certification is a key reason for this. 
This finding contradicts the research by Obidzinski et al. 
(2014), which indicated that achieving SVLK compliance 
was not easy due to the many challenges involved. According 
to the respondents, LEI is easier because of its assessment 
system. 
A similar trend is seen in the WPI group, where 69% and 
57% said that SVLK and LEI are easier to obtain. The rest of 
the group, 48% and 31%, said that the FSC and PEFC are 
easier to obtain. The trend is quite different for WPA 
respondents, where SVLK (71%), FSC (58%), LEI (57%) 
and PEFC (29%) were considered to be easy to obtain. The 
WPA and WPI respondents believe that SVLK is the easiest 
certificate to obtain, because the SVLK is a mandatory 
arrangement established by the government, has clear 
indicators, criteria and verifiers and is easier to apply. The 
SVLK is also cheaper because the cost of certification for a 
smallholder company can be paid by the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry (MoEF Regulation Number 
95/2014). In addition, SVLK standards are simpler. 
Almost all respondents in the 
four groups agreed that FSC standards are more complex 
than those of the PEFC, LEI and SVLK (Figure 2). In the 
auditors group, all respondents (100%) thought that the FSC 
is the most complex standard, followed by the LEI (86%), 
PEFC (82%) and SVLK (55%). A similar trend was shown 
for the environmental organisations, where the respondents 
thought that the FSC (89%) and PEFC (72%) were more 
complex than the LEI (61%) and SVLK (39%). The same 
trend is observed in the academics group, where the 
respondents answered that the FSC (73%) and PEFC (73%) 
are more complex than the LEI (54%) and SVLK (45%). The 
respondents from the government official group thought that 
Results and Discussion
Ease of procurement  





















the LEI (75%) and the SVLK (75%) are more complex than 
the FSC (50%) and PEFC (50%).
The FSC is the most difficult certificate to get, and the 
scheme involved is even impossible for some industries. One 
of the respondents said that FSC uses political judgments in 
establishing forest certification rules so as to protect their 
market from the new certification schemes, so that the 
environmentally friendly wood products had to be associated 
with and certified by the FSC. This opinion is also supported 
by the results showing that the FSC has the highest standards 
of all schemes, which implies difficulties in procuring the 
corresponding certificate (Taylor 2005, Nukpezah et al. 
2014). FSC standards are complex and adhere strictly to the 
principles, criteria and indicators of FSC International. 
However, the certification body can make FSC standards 
become easier or more difficult to comply with, since it has 
authority to interpret the ways in which those standards must 
be met. Hence, one certification body can have easier 
assessments and another can have more complicated ones 
(Gulbrandsen 2004). The challenges for the FSC in becoming 
a friendlier scheme for industries are the limited amount of 








Figure 1 Difficulty of procuring certification, under specific schemes, according to stakeholder type. Very easy ( ), easy ( ), 

























































































































































































Figure 2 The perceived complexity of the schemes, according to stakeholder type. Very complex ( ), Complex ( ), Intermediate 








interpretation of its standards and its strict evaluation system 
(Stewart et al. 2003). The PEFC and LEI have intermediate 
standards and the SVLK has lower standards for sustainable 
forest management. The LEI standard has detailed 
requirements and its decision-making process (using AHP) is 
quite complicated. The SVLK is considered to be the least 
complicated scheme, since it only requires the presentation 
of documents establishing legality. 
The 4 groups of respondents were of 
the opinion that the FSC has a higher quality of standards than 
other schemes (Figure 3). The FSC is known as the golden 
standard because of its high standards of environmental and 
social responsibility (Magin 2008). Respondents from the 
auditor group thought that the FSC (91%) and PEFC (82%) 
have higher standards for sustainable forest management 
(SFM) as compared to the LEI (68%) and SVLK (46%). 
Quite different results arise from environmental 
Quality of standards 
organisations, where about 83% and 73% of the respondents 
say that the FSC and LEI, respectively, have higher standards 
for SFM than PEFC (44%) and SVLK (11%). A similar result 
can be observed for the group of academics, for whom the 
FSC (72%), PEFC (72%) and LEI (54%) had higher 
standards than the SVLK (36%). In contrast, respondents 
from the MoEF opined that the PEFC (75%) and LEI (75%) 
have higher standards than the FSC (50%) and SVLK (50%).
The schemes preferred by customers differ according to the 
type of respondent (Figure 4). Logging company 
respondents convey that their customers prefer FSC and 
SVLK schemes to those of the PEFC and LEI. Something 
similar happens in the industry group, where 56% of the 
respondents express that their customers prefer FSC most 
often. The FSC was selected by timber producers' customers 
due to its well-known reputation, internationally-market 
The schemes preferred by customers of timber producers 
 
  











































































































































acceptance, and because no buyers reject. LEI has detailed 
standards that are suitable for SFM in Indonesia. However, 
respondents convey that there is a lesser demand for LEI 
among customers than there is for other schemes. A 
respondent from the industry group said that he did not want 
to engage with the LEI, as it has complicated requirements 
and is not accepted worldwide (it is only accepted in some 
countries). Even though LEI-certified products are accepted 
in Japan, Belgium, French, Italy, Spain, Finland and US 
(Purbawiyatna & Simula 2008), the development of LEI 
certification tended to stagnate in the last 5 years. Wibowo et 
al. (2014) revealed that LEI's weaknesses originate from its 
narrow acceptance by buyers, its ineffective form of 
organisation and the penetration by stronger schemes. 
The four groups 
of respondents indicated that end buyers prefer the FSC and 
PEFC as compared to LEI and SVLK (Figure 5). The 
respondents from the auditors group express that the FSC 
(96%) and PEFC (72%) have a higher market demand than 
the SVLK (50%) and LEI (9%). A similar opinion came from 
environmental organisations, where the respondents convey 
that the FSC (72%) and PEFC (50%) have a higher demand 
than do the SVLK (12%) and LEI (11%). The respondents 
from the academics group have a different view, where 82% 
and 63% of them say that the FSC and SVLK, respectively, 
have higher market demand than do the PEFC (45%) and LEI 
(18%). The respondents from the MoEF share the opinion of 
the auditor and EA groups, where all of them (100%) convey 
that the FSC and PEFC schemes have a higher market 
demand than do the SVLK and LEI. However, according to 
the respondents, the certification only belongs in the 
international market, and the local market has not really been 
made aware of the certified and non-certified products. 
According to a survey by Elliot (2014) in North Carolina, 
The schemes demanded by the end buyer 
consumers are generally unaware of the concepts of forest 
certification and certified products.
Almost all respondents from the 
4 different groups acknowledge that the FSC and PEFC are 
schemes that are more helpful to the logging companies than 
are the LEI and SVLK (Figure 6). In the group of auditors, 
about 91% and 78% of respondents expressed that the FSC 
and PEFC are more helpful than are the SVLK (54%) and LEI 
(50%). Similarly, environmental organisations express that 
the FSC (83%) and PEFC (55%) are more helpful than the 
SVLK (50%) and LEI (39%). The results are quite even 
across the schemes for the group of academics, where a total 
of 81%, 72%, 63% and 63% of respondents consider the FSC, 
PEFC, LEI and SVLK, respectively, to be the helpful scheme. 
In contrast with the other groups, the respondents from the 
MoEF stated that the SVLK is more helpful when compared 
to FSC, LEI and PEFC. According to a study by Nukpezah et 
al. (2014), about 63% of logging companies in Cameroon are 
certified by FSC. The main incentives for pursuing FSC 
certification were easy penetration into international 
markets, tax holiday benefits and the enhancement of the 
corporate image of the logging companies through corporate 
social responsibility fulfilments.
About 100% and 82% of the 
respondents from the auditors group, respectively, express 
that the FSC and PEFC provide better image branding than 
the SVLK (46%) and LEI (8%) (Figure 7). Something similar 
happens with environmental organisations, where 89% and 
61% of respondents reported that FSC and PEFC, 
respectively, have good image branding, while only 22% and 
22% said the same about SVLK and LEI, respectively. In the 
group of academics, 91% of respondents said that the FSC 
The schemes that help the sustainability of logging and of 
wood processing industries 
Image branding of the schemes 
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has the best image branding, followed by the PEFC (63%), 
SVLK (55%) and LEI (55%). The MoEF also showed 
similar results, where 100% and 75% of respondents 
acknowledge that the FSC and PEFC, respectively, have 
good image branding. Research has shown that FSC 
certification can achieve improved market access, higher 
revenues, and an enhanced public image ( 2006). 
About 82% and 77% of respondents from the auditors group 
said that the LEI and SVLK are more suitable to Indonesia 
than are the PEFC (68%) and FSC (63%) (Figure 8). As a 
national scheme, LEI and SVLK standards fulfil government 
Fonseca 
The suitability of the schemes to Indonesia's conditions 
regulations, adapt to local conditions and are compliant with 
international standards. Something similar can be seen in the 
environmental organisations, where 89% of respondents 
express that the LEI is more suitable than SVLK (61%), FSC 
(56%) and PEFC (45%). In the group of academics, the 
respondents said that the SVLK (91%) and LEI (90%) are 
more suitable than the other two schemes, PEFC (46%), and 
FSC (37%). Similarly, in the MoEF group, 100% of 
respondents believe that the LEI and SVLK are more suitable 
than the PEFC and FSC. 
The LEI is the most suitable than the PEFC and FSC. The 
LEI is the most suitable scheme for Indonesia according to 
the stakeholders as a whole, followed by the SVLK. The LEI  
70
Figure 6 Schemes' support for the sustainability of logging and industry, according to stakeholder type. Very supportive ( ), 














































































































Figure 7 The perception of image branding for each scheme, according to stakeholder type. Very good ( ), good ( ), 



























































































































has produced high quality documentation of its extensive and 
carefully structured systems for forest certification (Hinrichs 
2005). LEI standards are specific to local conditions and have 
strong national stakeholder support (Maryudi 2009). IFCC 
standards are also suitable to the plantation forests in 
Indonesia and more flexible than those of the FSC. The 
PEFC, LEI and SVLK focus more on implementing the CoC 
system with forest conservation, which is limited in FSC, 
making them therefore more suitable to be applied within the 
competition in business/industry. With its harmonisation 
standards, the FSC is not easier to apply. One respondent said 
the harmonisation standards are helpful, but some verifiers 
are not applicable to forest management in Indonesia, such as 
the requirements of High Conservation Value Forests 
(HCVF), non-timber product management, and worker 
regulations.
Forest certification caters to many peers and their 
respective interests (Rametsteiner & Simula 2003). By 
obtaining certification, manufacturers are more likely to 
maintain their current markets (the alternative being to lose 
Figure 8 The suitability of each scheme to conditions in Indonesia. Most suitable ( ), suitable ( ), intermediate ( ), Less suitable 
preferred ( ).
Figure 9 The motivation for pursuing certification. Preferred by business partner ( ), support for environment and social aspects 
( ), Scheme credibility ( ), recommended by NGO ( ), Image branding ( ), Mandatory/government product ( ), 









































































































































them) or enter a new, more environmentally-conscious 
market (Chen at al. 2011). Figure 9 shows that an improved 
market and image branding is the main motivation of 
respondents for procuring certification (similar result to a 
study by Bowers et al. 2012). Image branding and support for 
the environment and society were the main motivations for 
respondents from the WPA group for seeking certification 
(26%). Other reasons are the preferences of business 
partners, mandatory requirements and scheme credibility 
and suitability to the company profile. Similar trends happen 
in the group of logging companies, where 22% and 21% of 
respondents stated that image branding and support for the 
environment and society were the main motivations. Other 
motivations were mentioned, namely mandatory 
requirements, preferences of business partners, scheme 
credibility, and suitability to the company profile. Astana et 
al. (2014) show that companies that are involved in voluntary 
certification see it as a marketing strategy, due to the limited 
amount of available certified wood. Opinions from the WPI 
group show the same result, where 24% of respondents 
express that image branding and support for the environment 
and society are the main motivations for becoming certified. 
Other motivations account for less than 20% each, namely 
scheme credibility, preference of business partners, 
mandatory requirements, and suitability to the company 
profile. There are also other reasons mentioned by the 
respondents, such as specific wood, international rules and 
clear indicators and criteria. Interestingly, 17% of 
respondents from logging companies and WPI mentioned 
that recommendations from environmental organisations 
also increase their motivation to become certified.
The scheme preferences based on stakeholder interests 
As can be seen in Figure 10, about 78% and 61%, 
respectively, of the respondents from the logging company 
group indicate that SVLK and LEI are preferred over FSC 
(61%) and PEFC (52%). The industry group shows a 
different trend, with 65% and 57% of respondents expressing 
their preference for FSC and SVLK, respectively, while the 
other 35% and 26% prefer PEFC and LEI, respectively. 
Similarly as with the logging company group, the 
respondents from the wood processing association group 
preferred SVLK (86%) and FSC (71%) to PEFC (67%) and 
SVLK (43%). In addition to it being easy and cheap to obtain, 
another reason for selecting SVLK is because it is a 
mandatory system, and it is obligatory for them to use it. The 
standards for the SVLK are achievable for the conditions of 
forest management in Indonesia. The government supports 
the implementation of SVLK by providing a guidance 
manual and public consultation. The reason for preferring the 
FSC is because it is accepted in markets worldwide, even if 
its standards are more complicated. The FSC may be an 
attractive marketing imperative for companies that seek to 
penetrate markets in the logging industry (Nukpezah et al. 
2014). In Indonesia, the FSC is considered to be closer to 
natural forest management and community forestry (small 
holders). 
On the other hand, the wood processing group 
preferred PEFC and SVLK to FSC and LEI. Almost no 
respondents preferred LEI as their scheme because of its 
complexity and low demand. 
The FSC scheme, as the most satisfactory scheme 
from the point of view of end consumers, on the other hand, 
needs to adopt local business customs to increase its 
acceptance by domestic industries (Klassen et al. 2014, 
Hajjar 2013). 
 
Respondents' feedback on our questionnaire can illustrate 
how Indonesian stakeholders, mainly in the business sector, 
recognise four forest certification schemes currently used in 
Indonesia. In general, respondents consider SVLK to be the 
easiest scheme to obtain certification, and the most in-
demand by industries. The reasons for choosing SVLK are: 
(i) standards suited to forest management practices in 
Indonesia, (ii) the requirements are easy to fulfil and 
Conclusion
















































































understand, (iii) the government has made it mandatory, (iv) 
there are enough certification/verification bodies, and (v) the 
low cost of the certification process and the availability of 
subsidies. In contrast, the FSC was identified as the most 
costly scheme with the most requirements and the most 
complex standards, but also as the most often demanded by 
the customers. In brief, the SVLK is evidently preferred by 
industries for economic and technical reasons, while FSC is 
preferred due to its good image branding and wide market 
acceptance. However, this view has to be analysed further to 
determine whether it is really based on experience or whether 
it is the result of the influence of the promotion of the FSC by 
environmental organisations like Greenpeace, the WWF, and 
others, which regularly produce material that presents the 
FSC in a positive light. The respondents placed the LEI in 
between these two schemes, by characterising it as having 
high standards, a low market demand, complex requirements 
and a high cost. Although the PEFC scheme is quite new in 
Indonesia and there are no reports on the companies that have 
been certified using it, respondents acknowledge that the 
PEFC is a forest certification scheme with high standards.  
Surprisingly, the LEI, which most stakeholders do not prefer, 
was chosen as being the most suitable scheme for sustainable 
forest management in Indonesia, followed by the SVLK. 
Both are national forest certification initiatives. 
The existence of many third-party forest certification 
schemes opens up opportunities for the timber industries to 
choose the most suitable for them. However, financial 
constraints, the export orientation and the compulsory nature 
of the SVLK mean that this selection is not always easy. To 
overcome this complexity, the Ministry of Environmental 
and Forestry needs to improve the SVLK continually to 
maintain its status as a credible scheme, ensuring it aims to 
better forest governance. Comprehensive and proper 
responses to any objections about the implementation of 
Recommendation
SVLK and its certification processes should be properly 
addressed by the government. The FSC and SVLK should be 
allowed to compete freely and have the same chances to gain 
broader market recognition. In addition to these well-
established schemes, the LEI and PEFC are still necessary as 
an alternative and counterweight for the appropriate 
enterprises. Synchronization or mutual recognition of the 
schemes could be more profitable for the forest industries and 
could help avoid the cost of multiple certifications
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Comparing Forest Certification and Timber-Legality Verification Systems in Indonesia: 
Complementary or Competitive? 
Abstract 
Indonesian small-scale forest holders are facing a dilemma due to the implementation of a mandatory national 
timber- legality verification scheme and an internationally popular forest certification scheme. The problems arise 
from limited financial, technical, and administrative information concerning the most preferred scheme and the 
“imperfection of such a scheme” for long-term business needs. Using the Forest Certification Assessment Guide 
(FCAG) this paper identifies the characteristics of four third-party forest certification schemes currently working in 
Indonesia. An online questionnaire was used to survey a wide range of respondents about the future development of 
contested schemes and those preferred by small-scale forest holders. Our findings show that although the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) scheme obtained the highest score and is considered the best scheme according to the 
FCAG, small-scale forest holders prefer the Indonesian timber legality verification system (SVLK), which had the 
lowest FCAG score because of its mandatory nature and available subsidies. Statements by the four schemes’ 
proponents, which delegitimize other schemes, reveal they are in competition. Finally, we suggest proponents to 
enhance aspects where their schemes are lacking and contrive a comparable certification scheme in order to induce 
willingness to be certified.  
 
Keywords: forest certification schemes; timber-legality system; comparison; FCAG; Indonesia  
1 Introduction 
Private and voluntary forest certification aiming to promote equitable social, environmental, and business outcomes 
in forest management is a new initiative in the private regulation of international timber product trade (Bartley 2003; 
Meidinger 2003; Cashore 2005) because of increased global concerns about forest degradation by massive forest 
operations. Timber-legality verification, on the other hand, is a state-based timber-legality measurement assembled 
under the Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade-Voluntary Partnership Agreement (FLEGT-VPA) 
between the European Union (EU) and governments of partner countries. This aims to ensure any timber products 
imported by and traded in EU countries have passed a set of criteria containing the agreed partner timber-legality 
assurance system (Wiersum and Elands 2013). Although forest certification and timber-legality verification have 
similar goals, namely to reduce forest degradation, maintain remnant natural forest, enhance local benefit, and 
promote the green economy (McDermott et al. 2015), both mechanisms are disparate in image, legitimacy, power 
(Berstein and Cashore 2004; McDermott 2012), and public acceptance. This makes decisions by timber and forest 
industries difficult (Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014). 
On the timber-producer side, however, economic motives in joining forest-certification and legality-verification 
processes, which include fulfilling demands from business partner, marketing aspects, and improving product image 
and credibility are stronger motives than preserving the environment (FSC 2008; Lidestav and Lejon 2011; Crow 
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and Danks 2010). Of course, the option to engage with a certification process could be taken only if long-term 
economic benefits gained by the producers are greater than ignoring it (Gulbrandsen 2003). Some studies (for 
example, Nurrochmat et al. 2014; Obidzinski et al. 2014; Harada and Wiyono 2014; He et al. 2015; Alemagi et al. 
2012) reveal that reasons to participate in forest certification varies and are more complicated for the small-scale 
timber producer. This is due to their limited production scale, market orientation, and financial capacity for 
certification, traditional management, tenure uncertainty, lack of information, and the number of group certification 
members. Hence, accurate information about the comparison of forest certification and legality-verification schemes 
should assist potential firms in making a decision. 
Taking its example from Indonesia, this paper compares three voluntary forest-certification schemes and one 
mandatory timber-legality verification scheme imposed by the government. Our objectives are to identify lead 
aspects of these schemes and whether these aspects are important for forestry firms. The results will provide an 
alternative source of claims concerning the veracity of schemes. Furthermore, we try to answer whether contesting 
schemes are working to achieving common goals or they are competing in capturing market share of forest/timber 
enterprises. 
2 History and current status of forest and timber certification in 
Indonesia 
Currently there are three voluntary private forest-certification schemes in Indonesia, namely the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC), the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC), and Lembaga Ekolabel 
Indonesia (LEI); and one mandatory state-based timber-legality verification system, Sistem Verifikasi Legalitas 
Kayu (SVLK). The first forest certification initiative under the FSC scheme was conducted in 1998. It successfully 
certified three out of five assessed Forest Management Units (FMUs) in Java. This was followed by six FMUs in 
Java, and one in Sumatera within the next two years. However, all certificates were suspended and withdrawn in 
2003 due to unsatisfactory management and non-compliance with the FSC standard (Muhtaman and Prasetyo 2006). 
A new era of FSC standard based-certification began in 2008 when six FMUs managed areas of 707.709 hectares 
obtained certificates (FSC 2008). This grew to 2.002.710 hectares in 2014, representing a certified area of 29 FMUs 
(FSC 2014a). In the same period, the number of FSC Chain of Custody (CoC) certificates in Indonesia grew to 193 
by December 2014 (FSC 2014a). 
In 2014, the PEFC endorsed the Indonesian Forestry Certification Cooperation (IFCC) as its official national 
governing body in Indonesia. The IFCC is a national organization established on October 19, 2011, responsible for 
the development of forest certification in Indonesia using the PEFC scheme. The process for setting the IFCC 
certification standard started in 2012. Drafted in partnership with members of the standardization committee, it was 
approved by the IFCC board of directors in 2013, and submitted to the PEFC Council for endorsement in 2014. The 




































































standards. Currently there is still no forest certified by PEFC/IFCC, and only 17 CoC certificates were awarded by 
PEFC in Indonesia (PEFC 2014). 
The development of the Indonesian certification system for natural forest as the embryo of LEI, its institutional 
arrangements, and other required supporting systems took place during 1994-1998. The process was led by Pokja 
Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia (the LEI Working Group) involving a range of interest groups including the 
Association of Forest Concession Holders of Indonesia (APHI), an expert team, the National Standardization Board 
(BSN), NGOs, and university representatives (Purbawiyatna and Simula 2008). LEI standards for sustainable 
production forest management and its guidelines for implementation were approved and listed in the Indonesian 
National Standard and Guideline directory by the National Standardization Agency in 1998 (Suntana et al. 2000). 
LEI members were organized into four chambers representing all the relevant non-governmental stakeholder groups: 
NGOs, private sector, independent experts, and indigenous communities. The first certification process using the 
LEI standard was conducted in 1998, and PT Diamond Raya Timber, who managed 90.956 hectares of natural 
production forest, obtained the first certificate a year later (Muhtaman and Prasetyo 2006). LEI (2013) released 
FMU statistics of LEI certifications in the period 2004-2013 showing that were 1.873.428 hectare of forest areas, 
comprising 411.690 hectares of natural production forest (22%) by two FMUs, 1.429.055 hectares of plantation 
forest (76%) managed by 15 FMUs, 32.683 hectares of community forest (2%) by 22 community groups, and 6 
CoCs already certified by July 2013. 
SVLK is the Indonesian Timber-Legality Assurance System (TLAS) agreed under the FLEGT-VPA pact between 
Indonesia and the EU. The SVLK came into force in June 2009 when the Minister of Forestry (GoI) issued 
Regulation No.P.38/Menhut-II/2009 concerning standards and guidelines for performance assessment of sustainable 
forest management and timber-legality assurance. The four generic TLAS elements of the EU-FLEGT scheme are 
clearly addressed in the SVLK, which covered legal definitions, timber supply-chain control, verification, and 
independent monitoring. SVLK applies to all types of forest management in Indonesia: the production of natural 
forests, planted forests, community forests, and indigenous forests. It is based on management units or timber permit 
holders. In SVLK, there are two kinds of certificates: Sustainable Production Forest management or Pengelolaan 
Hutan Produksi Lestari (S-PHPL) and Sertifikat Legalitas Kayu (S-LK). S-PHPL (certificate for sustainable 
plantation forest management) applied to all forest concessionaires and FMUs in 2013. The PHPL-certified forests 
in 2013 comprise 14.379.701 hectares, representing an area managed by 130 FMUs (CIFOR 2013). The S-LK 
(certificate for timber-legality) has been awarded to 766 companies (CIFOR 2013) since the government mandated 
FMUs and industries to have V-legal documentation, a sign specifies that exported timber products have met 
Indonesian timber legality requirements. In January 2015, the government fully implemented the SVLK with the 
issuance of Regulation P.95/Menhut-II/2014 (Hereinafter referred Regulation 95) of the Minister of Environment 
and Forestry (MoEF) and Regulation P.1/IV-BPPHH/2015 of the Director General of Forest Enterprises of the 
MoEF. Lately, the MoF worked together with the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Trade to simplify the 
requirements of the SVLK especially for small and medium companies. For small companies, the government 
subsidies the cost of certification and supplies a conformity declaration (export declaration) free of charge for a 





































































The Forest Certification Assessment Guide (FCAG) developed by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) in 
collaboration with the World Bank (WWF and WB 2006) was used as framework in comparing the strength of 
forest sustainability certification and timber-legality verification schemes currently working in Indonesia. The 
FCAG consists of three parts, namely, (1) compliance with international norms and standards, (2) standards and the 
standard-setting process, and (3) conformity assessment, certification, and accreditation. Within these parts there are 
11 criterion and 55 requirements based on the Global Forest Alliance requirements and criteria. The FCAG, which 
tends to financial institutions’ views1, also acknowledges other existing standards for conformity assessment such as 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the International Social and Environmental Accreditation 
and Labelling (ISEAL) Alliance. Hence, although FCAG was formulated by the WWF, a proponent of FSC, one of 
certification scheme assessed in this study, the FCAG framework is internationally accepted and used by analysts 
(for example, Hinrichs and Prasetyo 2007; Maryudi 2009; Walter 2006; 2011) in comparing contested schemes. 
In this study, each scheme (FSC, IFCC, LEI and SVLK) were analyzed against the requirements of the FCAG 
framework. Evaluation focused on forest management standards and systems established by these schemes in the 
Indonesian context. The analysis was carried out as a desk study, based on the publicly available documentation of 
the schemes as well as key literature (see: Empirical materials). Furthermore, it assess the schemes ability to satisfy 
the FCAG framework scored by: fulfilled (1 point), partly fulfilled (0.5 point), not fulfilled (0 point), and not 
applicable (-). The schemes were graded by their scores as to which best conforms to the FCAG criterion. However, 
the better schemes are not always most suitable for small and medium forest growers.  
To capture a broader view regarding the schemes’ suitability for small and medium forest growers, during January 
and February 2015, an online questionnaire was sent to relevant stakeholders including logging companies (23 
respondents), wood-processing industries (23 respondents), wood-processing associations (7 respondents), auditors 
(22 respondents), environmental organizations (18 respondents), academics (11 respondents), and staff from the 
MoEF (4 respondents). The respondents were asked to share their opinion and experiences about existing schemes, 
to what extent they complement or compete with each other, and the impacts on these firms. 
4 Results 
The main findings highlighting the characteristics of the four certification and verification schemes against the 
FCAG requirements are presented. Detail assessment results and the weight of each scheme for each FCAG 
requirement are presented in Appendix. 
                                                          
1 Besides FCAG, there are other frameworks for assessing certification schemes representing the view of specific interests 
(Purbawiyatna and Simula 2008). That is,  the International Council of Forest and Paper Associations (forest industry), the 
Performance Standards of International Finance Corporation (financing institutions), public procurement policies of Denmark 




































































4.1 Compliance with international frameworks 
The FSC fulfilled criterion compliance with international rules, namely International Standard Organization (ISO) 
Guide 62 or 65 and the International Social and Environmental Labelling (ISEAL) Alliance Code of Good Practice, 
while the IFCC, LEI, and SVLK as national level bodies cannot be an IAF or ISEAL member. However, the IFCC 
requires its certification members to comply with ISO/IEC 17011:2004 (IFCC ST 1002 2013). The IFCC also 
cooperates with the National Accreditation Committee (KAN), which represents Indonesia in the IAF. IFCC’s 
standards are based on international frameworks including International Timber and Trade Organization (ITTO), 
ISO Guide, ILO, and PEFC standards (IFCC ST 1000 2013). Hence, the IFCC is considered partly compliant with 
international frameworks. The LEI carries out accreditation processes for certifying bodies (CBs) providing onsite 
certification systems, training institutions, and personnel for CBs. The CB is a legal entity competent in providing 
certification services and is recognized and accredited by national and international accreditation bodies (LEI 99-
01). The LEI accreditation manual refers to the Guideline No.3 of Indonesia’s National Standardization Body 
(BSN), which refers to ISO documents. The SVLK, on the other hand, is a national government system assessing 
sustainable forest management and timber-legality verification. The Assessor and Verifier Independent Body 
(LP&VI) is a legal company accredited by KAN (MoF 2012), which represents Indonesia in IAF, to assess the 
performance of sustainable production forest management. Regulations to assess the performance of sustainable  
4.2 Compatibility with globally applicable principles 
All schemes fulfilled Criterion 2 by mentioning all sub-criteria in their principles, criteria, and indicators. FSC 
principles have the same wording and thus comply with this criterion (Principle 1 to 10, FSC-STD-IDN-01-01). The 
IFCC, LEI, and SVLK are developed in accordance with all national and international rules and regulations. The 
IFCC fulfilled all FCAG Criterion 2 requirements, but used different wording. It covers production, ecological, and 
social aspects that are widely agreed as core principles in sustainable forest management (IFCC ST 1001 2013). The 
LEI has three different standards for different FMUs and tries to comply with SVLK, which is a government 
mandatory ruling. The LEI standards of natural, plantation, and community-based forests fulfilled all the FCAG 
Criterion 2 requirements. According to LEI 5000 (standardized to PHPL), LEI standards were developed in 
accordance with the International Timber and Trade Organization (ITTO) Criteria & Indicator, ISO Standard 14000 
series, and FSC Principles & Criteria. LEI’s standards were also developed with full accordance to the relevant 
Indonesian laws and regulations for forest management. The SVLK also has different standards for different FMUs 
and forest industries. The LEI and SVLK do not use “indigenous people,” but “traditional or local communities.” 
Instead of “critical natural habitats,” the FSC uses “high-conservation-value forest,” while the IFCC, LEI, and 
SVLK mention protected areas and endangered/rare/endemic species. The FSC regulates against conversion of the 
high-conservation value forest, while the IFCC, LEI, and SVLK still allow conversion where legally authorized. 
4.3 Meaningful and equitable participation 
In the standard-setting process, all schemes were established by multi-stakeholder participation. The FSC has three 




































































chambers. Members can participate in FSC processes such as the development of standards, election of the Board of 
Directors, and voting on decisions that lead to the future of the organization. The FSC General Assembly is FSC’s 
highest decision-making body, and meets every three years. The IFCC, on the other hand, has two caucuses 
(business and community) to accommodate different stakeholder requirements. The IFCC develops its standards in 
an open, multi-stakeholder and consensus based process (IFCC Statute 2013). The IFCC has a General Meetings of 
membership (GMM) as the paramount authority of the Association. LEI has four chambers (business, indigenous 
group and community, NGO, and eminent person), and as regulated by LEI Statutes, at least two-thirds of its 
members or 50% of members from each chamber must be present for the LEI congress to be legitimate. The SVLK 
does not have a chamber or caucus, but involve public consultations in their certification process. However, the 
SVLK was established by involving several stakeholders from government, industry, academic and research 
organizations, and NGOs, including the LEI as a facilitator. Currently, it is managed by the government via the Sub-
Directory of the TLAS. It allows independent observers to monitor the implementation of SVLK in Indonesia. 
Meaningful and equitable participation only occurs in public consultation and coordination of relevant stakeholders 
in the assessment phase. In decision making process, the FSC prefers voting power rather than a consensus, while 
the IFCC and LEI strive for consensus in their general assembly, and the SVLK does not use this method in their 
decision-making process.  
4.4 Avoidance of unnecessary obstacles to trade 
The FSC schemes follow the ISEAL Code as the basis to avoid unnecessary obstacles to trade, while the IFCC 
follows ISO/IEC guide 59, PEFC documentation, and ISEAL Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and 
Environmental Standards in the standard-setting process. The LEI is not a member of ISEAL, but LEI standards 
comply with their criterion. The SVLK, on the other hand, is derived from the FLEGT-VPA. Accordingly, all of the 
schemes fulfilled this criterion. 
4.5 Based on objective and measurable performance standards 
All standards of the FSC, IFCC, LEI, and SVLK are performance-based including chain of custody. They are 
quantifiable with indicators, verifications, and guidance on interpretation. All standards of the FSC, IFCC, LEI, and 
SVLK are based on international principles and criteria of sustainable forest management, such as the ITTO Criteria 
& Indicator of Sustainable Management of Natural Tropical Forest and ISO 14000. In use of international operating 
systems, the FSC has a standard for local adaptation and endorses the national standard through the standard 
development group (SDG). For the national standard, the CBs must use interim standards before a national standard 
by the National Initiatives of the FSC is developed. Currently, adaptation of the local national standard is the task of 
the SDG. The PEFC also has a procedure for endorsement by a national body, while the IFCC is a PEFC official 
endorsed body. IFCC standards are performance-based with criteria for all types of forest management and chain of 
custody at the FMU level. The standards are written in quantifiable terms, with definitions of each criterion (IFCC 
ST 1001 2013). The FSC and PEFC require consistency in their national endorsed standards. However, these criteria 




































































4.6 Certification decisions without conflicts of interest 
All schemes comply with this criterion by requiring decisions free from conflict of interest. The FSC fulfills all 
requirements of Criterion 6 by developing its standards according to relevant ISO rules. Certifications are conducted 
by accredited CBs, and the certification decision requires neutrality and expert judgment. The PEFC also separates 
standard settings, certification, and accreditation process into different organizations resolves potential conflicts of 
interest arising from accumulation of power in conformity assessment. The IFCC is not involved in the certification 
of the accreditation process, which done by the third parties. The IFCC certification scheme sets up requirements for 
the structure, procedures, and personnel of the CBs to ensure impartiality and competence. Similar, the LEI has 
developed different guidelines for each participator in the scheme including CBs, expert panels, and field assessors. 
The LEI guidelines for CBs (LEI 99-01,-04.-07), requires they not have relationships that may cause conflict of 
interest. In the LEI Guideline for Field assessors, the LEI also require they have no relationships with the 
management unit being assessed. This document shows that LEI requires its certification decision to be free from 
potential conflicts of interest. The SVLK requires freedom from conflict of interest by including this in its social 
indicators. Reliable mechanisms for conflict resolution are sufficiently regulated by the government (MoEF Reg 14 
2014). 
4.7 Transparency in decision making and public reporting  
All schemes require its CBs to publish reports on certification decisions and forest management evaluation. FSC, 
IFCC, and SVLK provide corrective action request in their surveillance results while the LEI does not require this. 
The FSC requires its CBs to prepare a forest certification public summary report for each forest management 
enterprise or group entity to which certificates are issued in accordance to requirements specified in standard. An 
update of the public summary report on forest management evaluation, including results of the surveillance audit 
and the Corrective Action Requests (CAR), are publicly available on the FSC database website or those of its CBs 
(FSC-STD-20-007b). The FSC are the only scheme who use CAR and publish information about its accreditation 
decisions. The IFCC and SVLK do not provide this because accreditation is done by a third party, while the LEI 
does not provide reports on the accreditation process on its website. All schemes require its CBs to publish reports 
on their own or the scheme’s website. However, the FSC is the scheme that complies with requirements of Criterion 
7 by publishing reports on its own or CB websites. The LEI and SVLK only comply with some requirements, such 
as public reports of forest management evaluation, but not on the surveillance or the accreditation process. For 
IFCC, as a new scheme in Indonesia, there is still no certification process. This results show that there is still a lack 
of transparency in the LEI and SVLK for providing publicly available reports on their certification and legality-
verification processes. 
4.8 Reliable and independent assessment 
The FSC, IFCC and LEI declare themselves as independent, not for profit, transparent, participative/voluntary-
based, and non-governmental organizations established to support environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial, 




































































independent with compliance to the international rules, including ISO Guides in developing their standards. Only the 
FSC and LEI accredit their CBs and both of them plan field visits. The IFCC and SVLK do not run accreditation 
procedures. All schemes require field visits and surveillance on certified FMUs in the pre-assessment or assessment 
stages. All schemes involve public consultation in their assessment process. All schemes have appropriate 
procedures to include stakeholders’ comments in the certification process, but not in accreditation process for the 
IFCC, the LEI, and the SVLK. The FSC, IFCC, and LEI have their own standards about CoC, but SVLK does not 
regulate this. All schemes have a procedures and guidance on logo usage. The FSC regulates CoC certificates to 
exclude unacceptable sources, while IFCC uses the term “controversial sources.” The LEI excludes illegal timber in 
the CoC standards, while SVLK does not have a regulation about CoC. However, it requires the exclusion of timber 
from illegal sources and conversion forests not legally authorized by the government. All schemes regulate 
complaints and appeals processes, and all are accessible to any party. However, only the FSC makes this 
information publicly available and free of charge (except for accreditation), while the IFCC, LEI, and SVLK provide 
correspondence and there is no information about the fee. 
4.9 Deliver continual improvement in forest management 
Only the FSC has a procedure for compliance of non-conformities, while the IFCC, LEI, and SVLK will not award 
certificates under the condition of non-compliance. The FSC requires surveillance at least annually for certification 
and accreditation and evaluates whether the breach is a major or minor non-conformity, which leads either to a CAR 
or suspension or withdrawal of the certificate. The CB cannot issue a certificate if there is any major non-
conformity. However, there is a procedure and time limit to comply with CAR and non-conformity both in the 
accreditation and certification process (FSC-STD-20-007). The IFCC and SVLK also require surveillance at least 
annually for certification. IFCC Certificates are not issued if there are outstanding non-compliances. However, 
major and minor non-conformities must be corrected and CAR verified by the CB before granting certification and 
recertification. The period for completion of the CAR for major non-conformities identified in surveillance audits 
and their verification by the CB does not exceed three months. CAR for minor non-conformities are verified no later 
than the next audit (IFCC ST 1002 2013). The CBs of LEI, on the other hand, only issue certificate under the 
conditions of non-compliance in LEI. Certification decisions are classified into two categories, pass or fail, and in 
turn rated as Gold, Silver, Bronze, Copper, and Zinc. The certificate is awarded only to management units who 
receive Bronze, Silver, and Gold ratings (99-24.-34,-44). Surveillance visits are conducted by CBs at least twice 
within a five-year period for Gold ratings, 3 times for Silver ratings, and four times for Bronze ratings (99026,-36,-
46). Unlike other schemes, there is no V-legal certificate awarded if there are outstanding non-compliance issues in 
SVLK scheme. The PHPL certificate is issued to the auditee with intermediate or good results. When it has a poor 
result, but complies with wood-legality verification, a V-legal certificate is issued. The auditee has opportunity to 
correct their performance and re-apply for assessment. Surveillance visits are conducted once a year. There is no 





































































4.10 Accessible and cost-effective for all parties 
All schemes have fulfilled this criterion by developing standards for different types and sizes of forests. The FSC 
has small or low-intensity managed forest (SLIMF) certification for small-forest holders who need cost-effective 
certification (FSC 2014b). The CBs classify the FMUs included in the scope of the evaluation as sets of like FMUs 
for the purpose of samplings, within each forest type, size, and the applicable national standard (FSC-STD-20-007).  
The PEFC has group certification (IFCC ST 1000 2013); the LEI has specific standards for plantation, nature, 
NTFP, and CBFM (LEI 5000-3); the SVLK has specific standards for plantation, nature, large/small industry and 
group. Especially for the SVLK, the government set new mechanisms through Regulation 95 to support small 
holders and communities by group certification, paying the first cost of certification and surveillance, and providing 
Supplier Conformity Declarations (DKP). This will make the SVLK more accessible and cost-effective to those who 
require this certification. 
4.11 Voluntary group participation 
The FSC Criteria (FSC-STD-30-005), LEI (LEI 5000-3), and SVLK (MoEF Reg 13 and 14 2014) develop their own 
standards of group certification. The IFCC do not have a specific standard, but the PEFC have already regulated 
group certification. All schemes require written agreements for membership of the group as part of the application. 
The members of the group must adhere to the standards of the scheme and the rules of the group. In case of a breach 
by the group, all schemes provide mechanism/procedures for the withdrawal/suspension, punishment/penalty, and 
even exclusion of the member. 
5 Discussion and conclusion  
Assessment against the FCAG framework shows that the FSC scheme fulfills almost 100% of FCAG requirements. 
Consistent with Walter’s (2006) findings, for a large number of issues examined, the FSC documentation delivered 
evidence of conformance with the FCAG framework, and this underlines the high credibility of the FSC scheme 
(Hinrichs and Prasetyo 2007). Due to the similarities in the standards, the IFCC and LEI have almost the same 
scores as second and third. This result contradicts Maryudi (2009) who concluded that for most of the FCAG 
criteria, LEI matched FSC and on some points, such as detail of its standards, even exceeded the FSC. Criteria 
concerning compliance to the international rules benefited the FSC, while the IFCC was assisted by the endorsement 
from the PEFC. The LEI and SVLK/PHPL met the criteria on standards and standard-setting process due to their 
local adaptability, detailed indicators, as well as verification and guidelines for reporting. All schemes that supported 
stakeholder involvement met the criteria for conformity assessment, certification, and accreditation. The 
SVLK/PHPL had the lowest scores because, as a government mandatory system, it could not fulfill some criteria in 
the FCAG frameworks, such as transparency and public reporting. 
Specifically, we note that these schemes are different in six ways. First, internationality of the standard. As an 
international scheme, almost all requirements in FCAG match with FSC principles, criteria, and standards, and even 




































































result of not-applicable requirements. For example, the FCAG frameworks require compliance to ISEAL or IAF, 
and since the IFCC, LEI, and the SVLK/PHPL tend to accommodate national circumstances, they cannot fulfill this 
criterion (Maryudi 2009). Criteria for compliance to international rules benefits the international scheme, the FSC, 
and the IFCC is assisted by the endorsement of the PEFC. 
Second, compatibility with national needs. All standards are performance-based, accessible, and cost-effective in all 
scheme types by developing standards eligible for different types and sizes of forests. There are considerable 
differences between the FSC and the PEFC due to the approaches used–specifically, more international control for 
FSC versus more national autonomy for PEFC (Walter 2006). As a response to high demands for national 
adaptation, the FSC is now implementing the FSC-Indonesia national standard. The PEFC standard is considered 
more flexible, allowing a national endorsed scheme (IFCC) to accommodate national circumstances in standard-
setting and certification. As oldest forest certification scheme in Indonesia, LEI has continuously been improved to 
achieve pre-conditions towards a sustainable forest management practices. The SVLK/PHPL is a mandatory system 
based on government regulation and national rules. Therefore, as a national voluntary scheme, the IFCC and the LEI 
try to adjust its compliance standards to the SVLK/PHPL.  
Third, advocating small-scale forestry. FSC standards tend to focus more on natural forests, community forestry, 
and small holders (similar: Kruedener 2000; Auer 2012; Ota 2006) while the IFCC focuses on plantation forests 
(Overdevest 2010). This supported by Rametsteiner and Simula (2003) who found that the FSC advocates nature 
forestry based on, but not restricted to, non-introduced, indigenous species, while the PEFC allows planting of non-
indigenous species on a larger scale. However, both prohibit wood sources from natural forests, while the LEI and 
the SVLK/PHPL accommodate this. The FSC also monitors comprehensive assessment across the supply-chain 
unlike the SVLK/PHPL. The SVLK/PHPL permits raw materials from non-forest area with legal origin 
documentation (Surat Keterangan Asal Usul), an earlier rule on Indonesian timber legality. To support the small 
enterprises and community forestry, all schemes provide group certification as voluntary participation. The FSC has 
group and SLIMF certification, the IFCC has group certification, the LEI has community forestry certification, and 
the SVLK/PHPL has group, community forestry, and small industry certification. 
Fourth, clarity of timber source. The FSC regulates CoC certificates to exclude timber from unacceptable sources, 
while the IFCC uses the term “controversial sources.” LEI-CoC standards clearly disallow illegal timber 
consumption while the SVLK/PHPL excludes timber from illegal sources and conversion forests not legally 
authorized by the government. On special provision, the FSC regulates against converting high-conservation-value 
forests, while the IFCC, the LEI, and the SVLK/PHPL allow conversion under certain circumstances if legally 
authorized.  
Fifth, membership and public participation in standard development process. Each scheme has its own policy to 
include or exclude certain parties in their organizations and involve them in the process of standard development. 
The FSC has three chambers (environment, social, and economic), the LEI has four chambers (business, indigenous, 
and community, NGOs, and eminent persons), and the IFCC has two caucuses (Business and Community) to 
accommodate different stakeholder participation. The SVLK/PHPL does not have a chamber or caucus, but still 




































































stakeholder processes and provide for equitable participation for different stakeholders in their standard-setting, 
certification/accreditation, and governance processes. To ensure decisions free from conflict of interest, the FSC 
opts for voting than consensus by stakeholders, while the LEI applies a consensus mechanism in their general 
assembly decision-making. Significant differences in the decision-making procedures between the FSC and the LEI 
prevail, which might lead to inconsistent certification decisions even in cases where similar field assessment results 
are reported (Hinrichs and Prasetyo 2007). Stakeholder involvement is intended by the PEFC, but decision-makers 
at the national level (IFCC) do not ensure a balance of interest and can be dominated by representatives of one 
stakeholder group (Walter 2006). In contrast to both, voting and consensus mechanisms are not used in decision-
making processes in the SVLK/PHPL scheme.  
Sixth, disputes on non-compliance performance of FMU. For continual improvement in forest management, only the 
FSC has procedures for compliance of non-conformities, while the IFCC, the LEI, and the SVLK/PHPL will not 
award certificates under the condition of non-compliance. The FSC emphasizes the improvisation and performance 
enhancement of FMUs when the assessment standard on one indicator differs between surveillances. The 
SVLK/PHPL does not implement gradual assessment. There are differences in the timing of surveillance visits, but 
all schemes have mechanisms for surveillance that support continual improvement in forest management.  
Beyond these differences, we found competition among the schemes’ proponents across the market. On some 
occasions (for example the Anti Forest-Mafia Coalition 2014) the WWF and its collaborators criticized the SVLK, 
including its legality definitions and inappropriate certification, and accused it of being designed to certify poorly 
performing companies. Apparently, their allegation strengthens the stereotype that schemes supported by 
government and industry lack transparency and public reporting (Nussbaum and Simula 2005; Overdevest 2010; 
Meridian et al. 2014). On the contrary, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Forestry claimed that the SVLK has 
higher standards than other schemes and companies do not require FSC certification (Sindonews 2013). Meanwhile, 
the PEFC through the IFFC claimed its scheme is better because it adapts to local needs and is based on forest 
companies’ awareness of sustainable forest management practices, rather than merely meet market requirements 
(Citizen Daily 2013). 
Competition among forest certification schemes is normal and widely observed in Sweden (Gulbrandsen 2005), 
Canada, the United States, Germany (Cashore et al. 2005), Russia (Malets 2015) and Indonesia (Nurrochmat et al. 
2014). The aim of competition is not merely legitimacy and trust in the marketplace (Cashore et al. 2004; 
McDermott 2012) exists because of different norms and concepts of SFM in each scheme (Maryudi 2006). The 
proliferation of certification programs is the main driver of competition. Our respondents acknowledge that 
certification does not support their business directly. It provides brand image (22-26%), supports environmental and 
social activities (21-26%), and satisfies business relationships (14-16%). Intense and unfavorable competition 
among the schemes could generate distrust by both timber-processing industries and timber-product buyers. As the 
weakest player, small-scale forest holders may build their own standard against established schemes and market 
coalitions (Keskitalo et al. 2009). If forest certification is driven for the interest of scheme holders, FMUs will only 




































































FMUs and the government (Cadman, 2011). In addition, Kanowski et al. (2000) found that proliferation of schemes 
may cause confusion on the market and consumer apathy for certified products and this distracts preferences of 
environmentally concerned consumers from wood products.  
Our survey proves that ideal scheme for improving forest governance and enhancing business practice is not 
automatically chosen by firms. As many as 60% of respondents acknowledge that the FSC is a necessary scheme for 
Indonesia, followed by the SVLK (13%), the LEI (12%), and the PEFC (9%). However, respondents from logging 
companies and the wood-processing industry prefer to be certified under the SVLK (48-57%), followed by the FSC 
(43-48%), the PEFC (13-43%), and the LEI (9-29%). This preference is strongly influenced by mandatory nature of 
the SVLK, government subsidy, and market acceptance. In summary, good certification schemes are not gaining 
market leadership. To overcome this gap, respondents suggest mutual recognition among the schemes with common 
standards. Some analysts (for example, Atyi and Simula 2002; Fischer 2005) also recommend this. However, mutual 
recognition may double the cost of assessment, and lead to unsuccessful cooperation as it did with the FSC and the 
LEI joint certification program in late 2000s (Innes and Hickey 2005).  
It should be noted that each scheme cannot work alone to achieve a successful forest certification implementation in 
the field. The scheme holders need to work together or at least to support government programs in realizing long-
term stable forestland tenure and small-scale forestry businesses (He et al. 2015). Reciprocally, scheme standards 
should be synchronized and adaptable to local forestry practices and respect domestic laws and regulations 
(Wiersum et al. 2013). In the case of Indonesia, success in timber-legality verification could result in forest 
certification (Maryudi 2015), especially for firms that want to reach a broader market or improve brand image, 
although this may not increase the quality of forest management (Nordén et al. 2015). 
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24. LEI 88-26 Guideline for Surveillance (Year not given) 
 
SVLK Documents 
1. MoF. Regulation (Permenhut) No. P38/Menhut-II/2009 jo P68/Menhut-II/2011 jo P45/Menhut-II/2012 jo 
P42/Menhut-II/2013 jo P43/Menhut-II/2014 jo P95/Menhut-II/2012. Standards and guidelines on 
implementation of performance assessment of sustainable management of production forest and TLAS 
(SVLK). 
2. MoF. Regulation of the Director General No. P.6/VI-Set/2009, P.02/VI-BPPH/2010, P.8/VI-BPPHH/2011, 
P.8/VI-BPPHH/2012, P.5/VI-BPPHH/2014, P.14/VI-BPPHH/2014, P.1/VI-BPPHH/2015. Standards and 
guidelines on implementation of performance assessment of sustainable management of production forest and 
timber legality assurance system (SVLK). 
3. MoEF. Regulation of the Minister of Environment and Forestry, P.96/Menhut-II/2014. Revision of 










































































































































Appendix 1: The comparison results of contested schemes using FCAG framework 
 






I. Compliance with International Norms and Standards 
Criterion 1 - Compliance with international frameworks for certification, accreditation, and standard setting 
a. The accreditation body is affiliated with an international 
accreditation organization. 
1 0,5 - - 
b. Monitoring and surveillance carried out by the organizations cover 
the activities of accreditation in the field of forest management. 
1 - 1 - 
c. All CBs are accredited for activities carried out for the forest 
management certification scheme under assessment. 
1 1 1 1 
d. Accreditation requires compliance with ISO Guide 62, 65, or 66. 1 1 1 0,5 
e. Standard-setting bodies are affiliated with the ISEAL Alliance. 1 - - - 
Subtotal I 5 2,5 3 1,5 
II. Standards and the Standards-Setting Process 
Criterion 2 - Compatible with globally applicable principles that balance economic, ecological and equity 
dimensions of forest management and meet Global Forest Alliance Requirements. 
Compliance with all relevant laws. 1 1 1 1 
Respect for tenure and use rights. 1  1 1 1 
Respect for indigenous peoples’ rights.  1 1 1 1 
Respect for community relations. 1 1 1 1 
Respect for workers’ rights.  1 1 1 1 
Delivery of multiple benefits from the forest. 1 1 1 1 
Assessment and mitigation of environmental impacts.  1 1 1 1 
Maintenance of critical forest areas and related natural critical habitats. 
The schemes/systems explicitly require that forest operations maintain 
critical forest areas and other critical natural habitats affected by the 
operation. 
1 1 1 1 
Specific provisions for plantations. 1 0,5 0,5 0,5 
Implementation of management plan. 1 1 1 1 
Effective monitoring and assessment.  1 1 1 1 
Subtotal 2 11 10,5 10,5 10,5 
Criterion 3 - Meaningful and equitable participation of all major stakeholder groups in governance and standard 
setting 
a. Relevant stakeholder groups have been officially invited to 
participate. 
1 1 1 1 
b. Relevant stakeholder groups participate meaningfully. 1 1 1 1 
c. A procedure is in place to involve stakeholders in case of failure to 
achieve meaningful participation of relevant major stakeholder 
groups. 
1 1 1 0,5 
d. Written documents are available on what efforts have been taken to 
include stakeholders and how issues raised by stakeholders have 
been addressed. 
1 1 1 1 
e. The decision-making process is striving for consensus among 
relevant stakeholder groups. 
1 1 1 0 
f. Procedures are in place to achieve balanced decision making in the 
absence of consensus. 
1 1 1 0 
Subtotal 3  6 6 6 3,5 
Criterion 4 - Avoidance of unnecessary obstacles to trade 
 1 1 1 1 
Subtotal 4 1  1  1 1 
Criterion 5 - Based on objective and measurable performance standards that are adapted to local conditions 
a. The standard contains explicit performance requirements, including 
chain of custody, if relevant. 




































































b. The standard is written in quantifiable terms, with guidance on 
interpretation if flexibility is required. 
1 1 1 1 
c. International principles and criteria used as the basis for 
development of national standards include provisions for the 










d. Mechanisms and processes are in place to facilitate the 
harmonization/equivalence of national standards or national 
schemes within the international system. 
1 1 - - 
e. Processes exist for consistency between national standards. 1 1 - - 
f. National standards are endorsed by the international system. 1 1 - - 
Subtotal 5  6  6  3  3 
III. Conformity Assessment, Certification and Accreditation 
Criterion 6 - Certification decisions free of conflicts of interest from parties with vested interests 
 1 1 1 1 
Subtotal 6 1 1 1 1 
Criterion 7 - Transparency in decision making and public reporting 
7.1 Public availability of scheme requirements 
For standard-setting bodies the ISEAL Code of Good Practice for 
Setting Social and Environmental Standards specifies the following 
publication requirements: 
- Complaints resolution mechanism 
- Annual work program, including a description of the standards under 
development, scope, objectives, and rationale 
- Draft standards 
- Written synopsis of comments received during public consultation 
and how these were addressed 
- Standard-setting procedures 
1 1 1 1 
The certification scheme/system makes documents publicly available 1 1 1 1 
7.2 Public availability of certification and accreditation reports. 
a. Public reports on forest management evaluation and surveillance 
provide the rationale for the certification decision. 
1 1 1 1 
b. Public reports on forest management evaluation justify the 
certification decision by providing key findings with respect to 
compliance with the standard. 
1 1 1 1 
c. Public reports on forest management evaluation and surveillance 
include the CAR raised in regard to the performance of the 
operation being evaluated. 
1 1 0 0,5 
d. Public reports on accreditation provide the rationale for the 
accreditation decision. 
1 0 0 1 
e. Public reports on accreditation provide the CAR raised in regard to 
the performance of the evaluated CB. 
1 0 0 0 
f. Public reports are readily available. 1 0,5 1 1 
Subtotal 7 8 5,5 5 6,5 
Criterion 8 - Reliable and independent assessment of forest management performance and chain of custody 
8.1 Independence of assessments         
The Global Forest Alliance partners consider the independence of the 
assessment as the basis of any credible certification.  
1 1 1 1 
8.2 Field evaluation of forest management and CB performance.  
a. Accreditation procedures for the initial evaluation and surveillance 
of CBs require field visits to certified-FMUs. 
1 0 1 0 
b. Accreditation requirements specify evaluation and surveillance 
intensity to be applied by CBs. 
1 1 1 1 





































































8.3 Chain of custody requirements         
a. The scheme has a standard for the control of chain of custody that 
covers production and trade from the forest of origin to the final 
product. 
1 1 1 0 
b. Standards and control mechanisms exist to prevent application of 
logos on uncertified timber. 
1 1 1 1 
c. Chain-of-custody certificate holders are required to exclude timber 
from illegal sources and from conversion of forests. 
1 1 1 0,5 
d. Procedures for claims comply with ISO Standards 14020 and 
14021. 
1 1 1 1 
8.4 Stakeholder consultation in the certification and accreditation 
process. 
        
a. Accreditation bodies undertake proactive and culturally appropriate 
external consultation as part of initial assessment and surveillance 
of CBs. 
1 0 0 0 
b. CBs undertake proactive and culturally appropriate external 
consultation as part of initial assessment and surveillance of 
certificate holders. 
1 1 1 1 
c. Appropriate procedures exist to incorporate stakeholder comments 
in the decision-making process for certification and accreditation. 
1 0,5 0,5 0,5 
8.5 Complaints and appeals mechanisms         
Complaints and appeals mechanisms of accreditation, certification and 
standard-setting bodies are: a) accessible to any interested party; b) 
publicly available; and c) free of cost implications for the complainant. 
1 0,5 0,5 0,5 
Subtotal 8 12 9 10 7,5 
Criterion 9 - Delivers continual improvement in forest management 
a. The scheme sets deadlines for full compliance if certificates are 
issued under the condition of fulfillment of outstanding non-
compliance. 
0,5 - - - 
b. Surveillance visits from CBs and accreditation bodies are carried 
out at least annually. 
1 0,5 0,5 0,5 
c. Clear deadlines exist for compliance, with CAR issued as a result 
of surveillance. 
1 1 0 0 
Subtotal 9 2,5 1,5 0,5 0,5 
Criterion 10 - Accessible to and cost-effective for all parties 
a. Mechanisms exist that allow equity of access to all participants, 
regardless of the size, location, or forest type under operational 
management. 
1 1 1 1 
b. The above mechanisms provide access to forest certification at a 
cost that does not exclude small-forest owners, communities, and 
other groups that may have limited access. 
1 1 1 1 
Subtotal 10 2 2 2 2 
Criterion 11 - Voluntary participation 
a. In cases of group certification, a set of contractual arrangements 
exists between the owners or their designated intermediary and the 
entity that holds the group certificate for the requirements of 
certification. 
1 0,5 1 1 
b. A mechanism exists to ensure that each member of the group must 
meet the standard or exit the group 
1 0,5 1 1 




































































d. All participating forest owners have signed a commitment to 
adhere to the standards set by the scheme. 
1 0,5 1 1 
Subtotal 11 4 2 4 4 
Total 1 until 11 58,5  47  46  41 
Source : WWF & World Bank (2006), adapted by Maryudi (2009) 
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